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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines moral visions of the political economy of mainstream 
Christian social ethics through a liberationist and postcolonial analysis of the work of three 
leading political economic ethicists, Daniel Finn, Max Stackhouse, and Philip Wogaman. 
Constrained by their subject position within modernity/coloniality and a commitment to a 
neoclassical understanding of the political economy, mainstream Christian ethicists have 
stopped short of condemning the inextricable complicity of the capitalist political economy to 
colonialism and its racist, patriarchal, and oppressive power relations. This dissertation argues 
that the moral visions of mainstream Christian social ethicists must be decolonized and points to 
Latina/o thinking and heterodox economic thought as two starting points for such a 
decolonization of the moral imaginary. 
The project makes contributions to both Christian social ethics and Latina/o religious 
cultural studies. It contributes to Christian social ethics by examining the underlying 
commitment to neoclassical economic thought of mainstream Christian social ethics, deploying 
postcolonial hermeneutics to construct ethical frameworks that move beyond collusion with 
colonialism and complicity with empire, and offering a more careful analysis of political 
economy than is generally found within the liberationist strand of Christian social ethics. In 
applying the insights of Latina/o thinking to political economic ethics, it contributes to Latina/o 
religious cultural studies by moving beyond the stagnated discussions of identity politics, self-
determination, and minority rights. It also contributes to the field by empowering Latina/o 
iii 
 
religious cultural scholars to engage in non-capitalist economic theorizing by providing new 
analytical tools to combat the hegemonic conceptualization of capitalism as co-terminus with 
the political economy. 
Mainstream Christian moral visions of the political economy must be decolonized to 
remain Christian and moral. Christian social ethics must draw on economic analyses that 
acknowledge the exploitative record of capitalism and its inextricable complicity with the 
modern/colonial complex. It must also avoid the hegemonic suppression of subjugated 
knowledges by theorizing from multiple places at once, taking on a subaltern perspective in 
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INTRODUCTION: SITUATING MYSELF 
As a work of a religious researcher with liberationist leanings, this project takes seriously 
the ways in which social location is profoundly epistemologically relevant to the scholarship of 
any individual. Some might consider this introduction a manifestation of the project’s 
capitulation to identity politics. While identity politics usually refers to theorizing from a place of 
shared injustices, it has as its goal the greater self-determination of the group in question. This 
project is not interested in the goal of gaining Latina/os a seat at the table of modernist/colonial 
oppression. The attention given to social location in this introduction and the rest of the project 
is not based on belief of a one-for-one correspondence between one’s social location and 
scholarship. Social location is but one of the factors that influence what can be known. Social 
location is crucial to the extent that it limits one’s intellectual conversation partners, those who 
the scholar “knows with.”1 The acknowledgment of social location issues forth from the 
recognition that a scholar unaware of the effects of one’s social location and the power 
dynamics embedded in one’s intellectual history/genealogy will replicate the same power 
dynamics in their own intellectual production. This introduction highlights some of my own 
                                                          
1
 “Know with” is a phrase I encountered in Brian D. McLaren, The Last Word and the Word after 
That: A Tale of Faith, Doubt, and a New Kind of Christianity, 1st ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005), 
129f. I use the phrase somewhat differently than McLaren. What I have in mind is the social 
interdependency of knowledge discussed by feminist thinkers such as Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Sandra 
Harding, and Patricia Hill Collins. For more on the epistemic interdependence of knowers see Sandra G. 
Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women's Lives (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1991); Lynn Hankinson Nelson, Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1990). For a discussion on feminist standpoint theory, which articulates the 
importance of perspectival differences stemming from social location see Sandra G. Harding, ed., The 
Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies (New York: Routledge, 2004); 
Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, 
2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009 [1990]). 
2 
experiences as a way of acknowledging the conversation partners that I know with and making 
explicit the power dynamics embedded in my own social location.  
 
Growing up in Miami, Cuba 
My identity as a person and a scholar has been shaped by the years I spent in Miami in 
working class neighborhoods of immigrant families from various parts of Latin America 
(Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, among others) as part of a Cuban 
family. My brother, sister, and I were raised by our abuelo/as. None of our abuelo/as spoke 
English because they had no need to speak it, except for a few words and phrases which always 
surprised me when I heard them. As anyone who has been to Miami knows, Cubans have 
managed to retain Cuban life, language, and customs in diaspora, though of course constant 
exposure to gringos has made its impact. Miami Cubans like to chatter about Cuba, about what 
went wrong, about when “Fidel” would be toppled, and about the possibility of returning to the 
island one day, even though as the years (and decades) went by that possibility seemed ever 
more remote. Partly as a result of living in a large Cuban community and partly because of the 
periodic arrival of more relatives from the island—tío abuelo/as, primo/as, and the like—stories, 
memories, and dreams about Cuba deeply influenced my development, even though my 
abuelo/as had fled from la isla years before I was born. Thus, it was jarring when abuelo Luis 
insisted that I was estadounidense cubano, not cubano estadounidense.2 Later I realized that 
abuelo Luis was right: I was a child between worlds, or between islands, since “Cuba es una isla y 
Miami también.”3 While I had never stepped foot on the island of Cuba, my identity was shaped 
                                                          
2
 Growing up I considered myself to be Cuban, sans qualifier. 
 
3
 Carlos Victoria, "De Mariel a Los Balseros," Encuentro invierno, no. 15 (1999-2000). 
 
3 
through an U.S. experience grafted onto a communal remembrance that grew within me an 
exilic Cuban imaginary.4 
 
An Education in Economics 
My exilic Cuban imaginary expressed itself in various ways throughout my education. I 
became enamored with economics as espoused by Milton Friedman in Capitalism and 
Freedom.5 The close link Friedman makes between democracy and capitalism, political freedom 
and economic freedom, fanned my intellectual interests. I had heard of Marx, of course, but I 
had been taught that he was the founder of communism and thus his writings were not worth 
studying. My own social location seemed to serve as evidence for this dismissal. For a son of 
exilic Cubans who fled in search of economic opportunities and political freedom, Friedman’s 
arguments were quite powerful and persuasive.  
I continued to study economics, in particular in the context of global politics, law, and 
international cultures, at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. In our 
discussions it was taken for granted that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries had largely solved the problems of slow growth, low efficiency, 
substantial economic fluctuations, and an unfair distribution of income and were therefore to 
be taken as models of how to help emerging economies do better. It would be too simplistic to 
say that I was being trained in the Washington consensus, the basic logic of which is the 
improvement in economic efficiency (and thus social welfare) through the mechanism of free-
                                                          
4
 For Lacan, the imaginary is a mode of representation that makes the self and world intelligible. 
See Jacques Lacan and Bruce Fink, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 2006 [1970]). The imaginary will be discussed in more detail in chapter one. 
 
5
 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 [1962]). 
4 
market.6 The economic crises in Latin America and in East Asia during the mid and late 1990s 
that shook the confidence in the Washington consensus was also felt by my professors. But 
there was no abandonment of the consensus. Rather, the question at hand was: how should the 
consensus be adjusted?  
At the same time I was also exploring the cultures, politics, and history of Latin America 
and among U.S. Latina/os. Todorov helped me make the connection between the activity of 
language and the activity of conquest. The vastly outnumbered expedition of Spaniards were 
able conquer the empires of the Americas, Todorov argues, not through superior technology or 
military skills but through language. The Spanish would linguistically and symbolically exploit 
what they knew of the Aztecs’, Incas’, and Mayans’ cyclical codes and beliefs to subjugate them. 
Studying Walter Mignolo further underscored for me the relationship between language history 
and the practice of colonization. Alternate forms of knowledge and structures of power were 
created through the practice of reading and ideology of cultural hierarchies. 
                                                          
6
 John Williamson was the first to coin the phrase “Washington Consensus.” Williamson included 
10 principles that made up the consensus: 
Principle 1: Fiscal discipline  
Principle 2: Concentration of public expenditure on public goods including education, 
health, and infrastructure  
Principle3: Tax reform toward broadening the tax base with moderate marginal tax rates  
Principle 4: Interest rates to be market determined and positive  
Principle 5: Competitive exchange rates  
Principle 6: Trade liberalization  
Principle 7: Openness to foreign direct investment  
Principle 8: Privatization of state enterprises 
Principle 9: Deregulation or abolishment of regulations that impede entry or restrict 
competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental, and consumer protection 
grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions  
Principle 10: Legal security for property rights 
John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform," in Latin American Adjustment : 
How Much Has Happened?, ed. John Williamson (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 
1990), 7-33. Later, the exception to the 9
th
 principle for regulations “justified on safety, environmental, 
and consumer protection grounds, and prudential oversight of financial institutions,” leading Williamson 
to disavowal the phrase as representative of his work. John Quiggin, Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas 
Still Walk among Us (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 52-53.  
 
5 
After graduating from Penn, I worked briefly at the World Bank before taking a position 
as a consultant at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The IDB was founded in order to 
encourage economic and social development and reduce poverty and inequality in Latin 
America. During my tenure there, I noticed that many of the IDB’s past projects were similar to 
the sorts of projects that were currently under review. Despite the IDB’s diligent and long-
standing efforts, high unemployment persisted in the region and the reforms that the Bank had 
initiated did not seem to have improved the lives of the poor much at all. I began to question 
whether the diagnosis of neoclassical theory and the medicine it offered were adequate to 
respond to the needs of people in the Majority World. 
While I was living in DC, I continued to cultivate my interest in Christian theology and 
spirituality. It was clear that I had a passion for and fascination with Christian theology and with 
development work.7 In my own mind, these two interests were united by the theme of change. I 
was interested in thinking deeply about and helping to enact social and personal change. 
 
A Fuller Gospel: Christian Social Ethics of Corporate Life 
It was at Fuller Theological Seminary that I began to integrate my faith and theological 
convictions with my concern for social change. Under the tutelage of Glen Stassen, I recognized 
that there are few issues more thoroughly addressed in the Bible than political economic life. 
Jesus came not just to preach the good news but to preach the good news to the poor (Lk 4:18-
21). I became convinced that the center of Jesus’ teachings is a prophetic judgment on riches 
accumulated through the exploitation of the poor and a challenge to the dominant economic 
and political practices of the world. While evangelicals have often reduced the moral values of 
                                                          
7
 Later, I found that the academic study of theology—a critical, rigorous, and systematic 
enterprise—is quite different from the more speculative and spiritual forms of theology I had read up to 
that point. 
6 
Christianity to concerns for abortion and gay marriage, literally hundreds of verses in the Bible 
discuss God’s concern for poverty, the environment, and the mistreatment of the least in 
society. 
In the summer following my first year of seminary, I had the good fortune to take a class 
with Ada María Isasi-Díaz at Drew University. It was in that class, entitled La Justicia y El Amor Se 
Abrazan (Love and Justice Embrace), that I was first exposed to liberation theology. We read and 
discussed five theologians: Jean B. Metz, Gustavo Gutiérrez, Leonardo Boff, Juan Luis Segundo, 
and Jon Sobrino. I was immediately attracted to liberation theology’s ethos and premises. 
Theology and politics imply one another. God is on the side of the poor. In articulating a 
theology, one must be in solidarity with those who suffer and are oppressed. As a theology of 
conscientization it involves unmasking false explanations given by a privileged class to explain 
why things are the way they are. It is theology that reminded me about the connections 
between power and a telling of history, between language and conquest. Praxis precedes 
theology: theology is dependent on beings involved in the struggle for liberation. If a theology 
refuses to condemn the oppressive structures of the world, it remains a theology of the status 
quo, which always works to maintain the privilege of the privileged.  
 
Working with Workers at CLUE 
Shortly after graduating from seminary, I put my new convictions about liberation 
theology to work. As an associate pastor at an urban Latina/o church in Los Angeles, Iglesia 
Unidad de la Comunidad, I represented our congregation at the Religious Leaders Committee 
meetings for Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE), an interfaith association 
committed to responding to the crisis of the working poor. I had the opportunity to meet with 
low-wage workers, including grocery workers, janitors, and hotel workers, and accompany them 
7 
in prayer and spiritual reflection at worker meetings and in street demonstrations in front of 
their workplaces. The workers were largely women of color and immigrants, who faced 
mistreatment of various forms, including uncompensated injuries on the job, unpaid overtime, 
harsh working conditions, and for undocumented workers, employer threats to contact 
immigration authorities when they complained about working conditions. They represented 
only a fraction of the working poor of Los Angeles, an entire impoverished community 
surrounded by communities in which wealthy Christians lived in extravagant homes and 
worshiped in lavish church buildings. The incongruity made clear to me, emotionally and 
spiritually, that any theology worthy of the name must involve praxis. 
 
Theology and Economics Reexamined: Postcolonialism and Economic Heterodoxy 
I was confronted with a different sort of challenge when I entered the JDP. Through my 
experiences with CLUE, I saw Christianity as a force for justice. A major charge I encountered 
early and often in my doctoral studies was that Christianity has often been the motivation of 
injustice. More specifically, the charge was that Christianity is complicit with the impact of 
modernity/colonialism on the lives of the majority of the world. I thought carefully about this 
charge and with the help of Kwok Pui-lan, Joerg Rieger, and Mayra Rivera Rivera considered how 
one might parse out the elements of Christianity that are complicit with empire from those that 
are not: I reflected on how to develop a postcolonial Christian theology and ethics. 
In line with this charge is the critique that liberation theology, because it relies on the 
concept of human dignity and the ability of human beings to shape their own destinies, Marxist 
analysis in the critique of capitalist societies, and metanarratives about the mobilization of the 
masses towards a utopian kingdom of God, is complicit with modern/colonial complex. These 
critiques have forced me to examine my own liberationist sympathies. While liberation 
8 
theologians have responded in various ways to this critique, my own view is that liberation 
theology has evolved in the face of these criticisms.8 The Latin American theology that was born 
in the late 1960s is not the last word on liberation theology. Many second and third generation 
liberation theologians have undergone the paradigmatic shift from modernity to postmodernity, 
from coloniality to postcoloniality.9 My project has liberationist leanings, but it should not be 
understood through the lens of late 1960s Latin American liberation theology. It is a project in 
Christian social ethics that responds to and uses the tools of postmodern and postcolonial 
theorizing to extend liberation theology’s basic insights. 
My own social location, including the exilic Cuban imaginary, had prevented me from 
engaging in any serious way with Marx. I was resistant on the grounds that it was Marx’s ideas 
that gave rise to the oppressive regime that threatened by family and forced us from our edenic 
island. My interest in social change helped me overcome my reticence and I enrolled in Alan 
Gilbert’s class on Marx and Social Change. It was in that class that I was given space and time to 
read and digest large portions of Capital, Vol 1. This was my first real exposure to something 
other than neoclassical economic thinking. Subsequently I learned that Marxism and Neo-
Marxism are just one of many heterodox schools of economic thought, all of which critique 
neoclassical thought and reject its rationalist, individualist, and reductionists approach to 
economic life. 
                                                          
8
 For a study on the various ways these liberation theologians have responded see Joerg Rieger, 




 Here I have in mind figures like Marcella Althaus-Reid who embraces the liberationist concern 
for the poor, but critiques liberation theologians for imitating the homogenizing tendency of much of 
modernist thinking. For example, she argues that liberationists construct the subject of the poor as a 
male, heterosexual peasant but have remained silent on patriarchal and sexual liberation that their 
theology implies. Althaus-Reid is one of many liberationists who challenge and extend liberation 
theology’s basic insights by adopting postmodern and postcolonial tools. See Marcella Althaus-Reid, 
Teología Indecente (Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2005). 
9 
I began to wonder how heterodox economic thought would change the construction of 
Christian moral visions of political economic life. I had read mainstream Christian ethicists on 
the issue of the political economy, but now I read with a different focus: with an interest in the 
underlying social and economic assumptions in their ethical reflections. In what ways are 
Christian moral visions challenged by what I had learned about language and conquest, about 
social location and a particular historical narrative? In what ways does mainstream Christian 
social ethics uphold the neoclassical understanding of economics and what are the relevant 
insights that heterodox, postmodern, and postcolonial theory can bring to bear on the 
construction of a moral vision of the political economy? It was these sorts of questions that led 
me to this project.  
10 
CHAPTER 1: CHRISTIAN POLITICAL ECONOMIC ETHICS FROM A LATINA/O AND 
POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Defining the Topic: The Problem, Research Questions, and Thesis 
The U.S. and world economy grew steadily in the Post-War era.10 Some have taken this 
effectiveness in bringing about productivity growth as a vindication of the prevalent capitalist 
political economic system. Yet, increases in GDP have been accompanied by a downward 
pressure on social mobility, persistent poverty, and increasing inequality. Growth-centric 
capitalism has moved people from middle class to the working class and has transferred wealth 
from the working class to the wealthy. While poverty rates have stagnated since the late 1970s, 
the 13.2 percent poverty rate in 2008 was the highest rate since 1997. From 1979 to 2009, 
productivity in the U.S. increased 80 percent, but real wages—that is, nominal wages adjusted 
for inflation—rose less than 10 percent.11 The result is that increasingly skilled and educated 
workers are producing wealth more effectively for their firms than ever before and being paid 
comparatively less. This effect of downward social mobility, poverty, and inequality is magnified 
when one examines the data broken down into categories defined by difference: gender, 
                                                          
10
 From 1946-73, U.S. GDP rose on average 3.8% per year. That growth rate has since slowed to 
only 2.7% per year. From 1965-99, the average rate of growth was steady across income levels: 4.1 
percent in low-income countries, 4.2 for middle-income countries, and 3.2 percent in high-income 
countries. Tatyana P. Soubbotina, Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable Development, 
2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004). 
 
11
 Susan Fleck, John Glaser, and Shawn Sprague, "The Compensation-Productivity Gap: A Visual 
Essay," Monthly Labor Review 134, no. 1 (2011): 57-69. 
 
11 
race/ethnicity, age, and national origin.12 Many women continue to make cents on the dollar to 
men in comparable positions. One-third of African American adult males will at some point in 
their lifetimes be incarcerated. White families are twice as likely to own a home as Latina/o 
families. The members of dominant group(s) maintain their privilege by extracting wealth from 
marginalized individuals and communities. The idea that when the elite prosper the rest will 
follow has yet to be evidenced.  
The response of mainstream Christian social ethics to the problems of increasing 
inequalities of wealth, income, and opportunity and persistent poverty begins with an insistence 
that the capitalist political economy has substantially improved the condition of all people, both 
in the U.S. and around the world.13 The task of Christian social ethics from the mainstream 
perspective is, therefore, to uncover what is redeemable about capitalist political economics 
while denouncing that which is irredeemable. Christian moral visions are constructed 
accordingly: they envision a reformed capitalism tempered of its grossest excesses.  
The problem with mainstream Christian moral visions of the political economy is that 
they fail to deal with the host of ways in which the structures of capitalism are complicit with 
the modern/colonial complex. While mainstream Christian social ethicists lament the situation 
of the poor and stubborn inequalities, their efforts to bring religious and moral commitments to 
bear on political economic practices stop short of condemning the ways in which the capitalist 
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 Or really any category of difference. Beverly Tatum identifies seven commonly cited categories 
of difference: race/ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status (or class), religion, sexual orientation, age, and 
physical and mental ability. The privileged or dominant group within each of these categories tends to 
subsume or ignore the characteristics of difference. See Beverly D. Tatum, "The Complexity of Identity: 




 For example, “All the jokes about economists aside, increasingly over the past decades 
applications of mainstream market economics on both the macro and micro levels have substantially 
improved economic conditions within the United States and around the world, and for persons from all 
levels of society.” John E. Stapleford, Bulls, Bears & Golden Calves: Applying Christian Ethics in Economics 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 33. 
12 
political economy has strategically and dangerously reconfigured colonialism and its racist, 
patriarchal, and oppressive power relations.14 The destructive and death-dealing effects of these 
social structures on members of subordinate groups show such a pro-status quo response to be 
utterly inadequate. 
Two questions naturally emerge from the above discussion. First, why does mainstream 
Christian political economic ethics fail to address capitalism’s neocolonial configuration? 
Second, is it possible to construct decolonized Christian moral visions of political economy, 
visions that attend to the plight of racial/ethnic minorities, women, and the most vulnerable 
members of society and that function in anti-hegemonic and anti-colonial ways? These are the 
central, driving questions of this project. 
In this dissertation, the answers to these questions are shaped by liberationist and 
postcolonial theory and methodologies. With the liberationists, it takes on the perspective of 
the socially, politically, and economically oppressed in analyzing Christian moral visions of the 
political economy articulated by mainstream social ethicists.15 To paraphrase James Cone, to the 
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 Fanon was one of the first to articulate the logic of capital in the context of what he called the 
problem of colonialism. See Frantz Fanon and Richard Philcox, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Richard 
Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004 [1965]). 
 
15
 Some liberationist theorists have argued that continuing to focus on work of the mainstream 
thinkers directs attention on the center and distracts from the project of articulating theologies and ethics 
from marginalized perspectives. The author agrees, as far as this goes. But there is something wrong-
headed about this critique: it assumes that liberationist theorizing exists in isolation from the broader 
tradition, as if it arrived on the scene fully formed. Concepts much celebrated among liberationists, such 
as human dignity or even liberation, have a long history in the western tradition. It seems at best 
disingenuous to proceed as if the first usage of these terms occurred in the second half of the 20th 
century. 
Both liberationist and mainstream perspectives are branches of the same trunk of the Christian 
theological tree. Moreover, given that liberationist views continue to be sidetracked and seen as only 
about and for the communities from which they are written, it is both appropriate and relevant to critique 
mainstream perspectives. While liberation theologians have excelled at scrutinizing in exquisite detail 
how oppression operates within sinful social structures, their analysis of the political economy usually 
ends there. The liberationist ethicist’s summative dismissal of society as it now stands falls short of critical 
engagement with the mainstream theorists which may be vital to achieving social change. 
 
13 
extent that these Christian moral visions fail to address the communities of the oppressed, they 
cease to be Christian or moral.16 Thus, methodologically the analysis proceeds by pressing the 
liberationist question: does mainstream Christian ethics envision a political economy 
substantively different than the status quo? It is axiomatic that if a moral vision supports the 
status quo or some gently modified version of it, it has failed to advocate for the oppressed and 
marginalized of society. With postcolonial theorists, this project engages in a reading strategy 
and method of critical analysis focused on the dynamics of power, resistance, and identity.17 The 
question of epistemic privilege which lies at the heart of the liberationist critique receives 
further and fuller articulation in the discourses of postcoloniality. The postcolonial theoretical 
backing is most clearly expressed in suggesting a way forward for Christian political economic 
ethics, since any moral vision that remains complicit with modern/colonial structures could 
never constitute a decolonized moral vision. 
Enrique Dussel’s approach to ethics, which combines postcolonial thought and 
liberation theology, has been particularly influential to the project. In Dussel's view, the current 
political economy is a result of a succession of systems of exploitation and expropriation of 
value that originates with the creation of modernity and coloniality, when Europe organized the 
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initial world system and placed itself at the center over and against the periphery.18 Approaches 
to political economic ethics that focus solely on poverty, as defined by measures of income, 
occlude the imperial nature of the capitalist system of production and accumulation of wealth.19 
In short, in order to speak about the problems of wealth and poverty one must also speak of 
global capitalism, colonialism, and the historical patterns of wealth accumulation which enriches 
the minority while impoverishing the majority.20  
The central argument of the project is twofold. First, mainstream Christian ethicists have 
constructed their moral visions of the political economy according to modern/colonial logics. 
Second, decolonizing mainstream Christian moral visions requires theorizing from the 
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 Dussel’s development as a philosopher and ethicist largely coincide. During the late 1960s and 
1970s, recognizing the pedagogical inappropriateness of the methods he had learned in Europe and 
intrigued by the revolutionary and populist movement in Argentina and Latin America, he undertook the 
task of developing a philosophical methodology that was responsive to Latin American symbols and 
hermeneutics. See Enrique D. Dussel, Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, [1. ed., 2 vols. 
(Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Argentina Editores, 1973); Enrique D. Dussel, Filosofía Ética 
Latinoamericana, vol. 3, Colección Filosofía y Liberación Latinoamericana (México: Editorial Edicol, 1977); 
Enrique D. Dussel, Filosofía Ética Latinoamericana, vol. 4, Colección Filosofía y Liberación Latinoamericana 
(Bogotá: USTA, 1979); Enrique D. Dussel, Filosofía Ética Latinoamericana, vol. 5, Colección Filosofía y 
Liberación Latinoamericana (Bogotá: USTA, 1980). In the second stage of his philosophical/ethical 
development, Dussel immersed himself in reading Marx and in doing so discovered a Marx that is relevant 
both to the project of liberation and to the critical reception of Marx in the twentieth century. See 
Enrique D. Dussel, La Producción Teórica de Marx. Un Comentario a Los Grundrisse, 1a ed., Biblioteca del 
Pensamiento Socialista. Serie Estudios Críticos (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1985); Enrique D. Dussel, 
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perspective of Latina/o thinking and disrupting Christian social ethics’ operative understanding 
of economics. The first part of the argument explains the problem while the second offers a dual 
solution. 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Concerns 
The Social Embeddedness of Ethical Systems and the Moral Imagination 
A crucial theoretical basis for the project is the social embeddedness of ethical systems 
and the moral imagination. Various societies have evolved embedded ethical systems—rules, 
principles, narratives, basic convictions—intended to guide moral behavior. It is worth noting 
that ethics is derived from the same Greek root as the English word ethos,21 which refers to 
what is habitual, a way of life, or what Bourdieu refers to as “habitus.”22 Ethos belongs to a 
people, a culture, a group; it is the characteristic or prevalent existential tone, the immediate 
world of human works under the horizon of meaningful action.23 From this embedded ethic and 
ethos arises philosophical ethics, which tries to methodically and explicitly analyze what is 
already being lived out at the level of the ethos and to elucidate the embedded ethical 
systems—the beliefs and patterns of acceptable behavior—of a given human community.24 
Greece gave birth to philosophical ethics, but despite claims that their reflections are universally 
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valid, it was necessarily a Greek philosophical ethics; it could not have been otherwise. The 
Greeks, critical of their own world, could not apply their critique beyond the horizons of the 
Hellenistic world. That is, the horizon of their ethical imagination was already historically, 
culturally, and socially bound and determined.25 
Ethics analyzes and interprets the embedded moral imagination of a historically 
bounded and determined people, community, or society, even when an ethicist does not 
acknowledge her or his subject position within the habitus. Despite insistences of some, 
Aristotle’s discussion of eudaimonia (“happiness” or “flourishing”) and arête (“virtue”) in his two 
ethical treatises, disseminated under the titles Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics, do 
not deal with an ethic valid for all human beings at all times, but only for the Greeks of his 
time.26 Although he lacked the critical self-consciousness to recognize it, Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason reflects the ethos of the Prussian people at the end of the 18th century and 
beginning of the 19th century.27 Despite Kant’s Enlightenment presumption of universality, his 
ethics are socially situated and only comprehensible on those terms. This does not mean that 
the reflections of Aristotle or Kant are to be abandoned wholesale, only that their ethics must 
be examined in the context of their ethos, of their habitus. 
The focus of this dissertation is on Christian social ethics, not with Greek or 
Enlightenment philosophers directly. They are meant only to illustrate that even the figures that 
loom largest in the moral imagination are bounded by their own time and space. If that is true 
for Aristotle or Kant, then it is certainly true for the contemporary figures examined in this 
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dissertation. Since ethics is correlated to habitus, it is clear that social ethics evokes questions of 
epistemology, ontology, and existentialism; questions about what and how human beings know, 
what reality is, and the identity and place of human being in that reality. Like all forms of ethics, 
then, Christian social ethics imaginatively constructs moral visions conditioned and limited by 
the ethos and habitus of the theorists. 
 
Core Theoretical Concepts 
Decolonizing 
The focal point of the dissertation lies at the intersection of three core theoretical 
concepts: decolonization, moral visions, and the political economy. Each of these offers a way to 
understand the project. The first way of understanding the project is as a performance in 
decolonizing mainstream Christian social ethics. 28 Decolonizing is necessary because any 
attempt to construct an unmodified form of Christian ethics, a universality valid ethics, is 
already an ethnocentric and colonizing act in at least in two ways. First, tensions and 
connections with empire and colonization have been part of Christianity from its earliest 
beginnings and have been part of the context of Christianity, in a variety of ways, since then. 
Nonetheless, Christian thinkers have rarely reflected on these tensions.29 In the modern period, 
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Christian (or sometimes “civilizing”) mission as part of the rationale for empire building, has 
until recently seldom been critiqued. To take one example, within the massive amount of 
research dedicated to the 19th century theologian Schleiermacher there are hardly any 
investigations into the colonial context of his work.30 Although empire/colonialism has been the 
context for Christianity, and Christianity has often been co-opted by empire and colonizing 
power, these connections have been considered only infrequently. Christian social ethics that 
ignores the involvement of colonizing and imperial forces becomes an ethic synonymous with 
the projects of colonization and empire. 
Second, the ethnocentricsm is expressed through a colonial mindset which warps and 
distorts the personal identities and intellectual endeavors. Edward Said and Walter Mignolo 
have identified this phenomenon whereby efforts to describe the other, of the (Near or Middle) 
East or (American) West, transmute into a reflection and serves the purposes of the one 
describing.31 Through the transmutation of Said’s Orientalism and Mignolo’s Occidentalism, the 
other is created to expand the power and boost the self image of the colonizer. One important 
implication of the Orientalism/ Occidentalism interpretation is that there is no such thing as 
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unqualified Christian ethics. There can be only African-American Christian Ethics or Latina/os 
Christian Ethics or Euro-American Christian Ethics. Writing under the rubric of (unmodified) 
Christian Ethics marks either a refusal to recognize the ethos and habitus already present in 
one’s work or a ethnocentric, hegemonic, and social-cultural colonial move that claims 
superiority over other forms of Christian ethics (even if it is unconsciously made). Constructing a 
Christian social ethic that is more than a colonizing act requires a critical examination of the 
ethnocentricism and colonial mindset and searching for those insights that can move the 
conversation beyond the horizon of empire.  
The little work that has been done in the field usually falls under the rubric of 
postcolonialism, which gives the mistaken impression that the colonial period, has come to an 
end. Positing a strong pre/post binary assumes amorphous and porous elements can be 
somehow separated. While some formal colonial relationships have ended, others have 
remained. Guam and Puerto Rico, both acquired under the Treaty of Paris after the Spanish-
American War, for example, continue to function as U.S. colonies, despite the end of official 
colonialism. The French Départements d'Outre Mer (DOM) of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, and Réunion, although official integrated regions, are considered by many to be the 
contemporary colonies of France. One might consider this quibbling—after all, the U.S. refers to 
these as organized territories, not colonies; the French consider these “departments.” Yet the 
power differencials characteristic of colonizer/colony still exist: Puerto Ricans are subject to U.S. 
laws even though they are excluded from participation in electing officials who create them. 
Guam finds itself under similar circumstances. And although the residents of DOM colonies 
officially enjoy the same status of European French, they are often relegated to the status of 
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second-class citizens. Thus, the term postcolonial thus fails both in terms of historical accuracy 
and in signifying the end of power differentials that have not come about.32 
Since post-colonialism signals the end of colonialism in only a limited way, the term 
deployed in this project is decolonizing, which recognizes that there is no easy escape from 
modern/colonial powerful differentials, structures, and mindset. And yet these must be faced 
head on. Instead of the perhaps unrealizable, utopic dream of a postcolonial world, this 
dissertation proposes a realistic utopia, one that acknowledges the modern/colonial context of 
our world.33 Like the mestiza Guadalupana, who embodies both continuity and discontinuity 
and symbolizes both oppression and liberation, decolonizing attempts to get at the best of the 
euroamerican/modern tradition, rather than rejecting it wholesale. 
Moral Visions 
Social ethics, as noted above, must always be both descriptive and prescriptive. It 
attempts empirical description of the social context as well providing practical proposals for 
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social change. The role of social ethics is to use the critical tools of social science, philosophy, 
and the natural sciences in the direction of pragmatic reinterpretation necessary for the 
prescribing norms for regulation of social life. This pragmatic reinterpretation forms a moral 
vision of Christian social ethics. The range of practical proposals constitutes a spectrum of the 
Christian moral imagination; it is the spectrum of the possible. Chapter two takes on the task of 
mapping the spectrum of the Christian moral imagination on the political economy. What 
follows is a theoretical grounding and methodological justification for exploring moral visions 
and moral imagination. 
Moral visions, as the pragmatic reinterpretation of critical social analysis, are the 
culmination or apex of ethical formulations. They are also the starting point of ethical 
reflections. Moral visions shape social ethics and ethical methodologies which in turn influence 
moral visions. In this sense, moral visions work in analogous ways to physical vision; human 
beings do not pay attention to everything they see. Magic tricks work because when the human 
eye detects motion, the brain tracks the movement and actively suppresses the visual stimulus 
around it.34 In a similar way, ethicists who expound moral visions attend to what is in motion, 
the segment of society they consider most important, and actively suppress the concerns of 
other segments. The ethicist’s moral vision always already delimits the range of what is seen 
before they begin theorizing.  
The construction and deconstruction of moral visions is one of the main activity of social 
ethics, and indeed all practical and critical social theory. Theorizing alternative worlds or 
articulating moral visions requires, among other things, activating the imagination. Imagination 
is the power to enact a mental image of what society might be, whether one envisions a world 
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in which most abide by the rules or principles of an ethical system (a focus on behavior), or 
embody the virtues/character of the same (a focus on a communal and individual ethos), or in 
which institutional and social evils have been transformed into just ones (a focus on structural 
realities). That is, ethical reflection, regardless of the mode of operation—deontological, 
teleological, responsible, virtue, narrative, character, etc.—even if it describes merely a task or 
mechanism or quest for self-knowledge,35 depends on the faculty of the imagination and the 
articulation of moral visions. Following Satre, imagination refers to the mechanism by which 
mental images of the world manifest themselves as objects to the consciousness, rather than 
merely a bridge between sense and cognitive faculties.36 Thus, Christian moral visions reveal as 
much knowledge about the subjective mental states of the ethicists as they do ontological 
knowledge. Stated differently, moral visions provide a basic framework that externalizes the 
internal conception of reality of ethical theorists.  
 
Political Economy 
Social theorists, including ethicists, have often deployed the terms political economy, 
global political economy, globalization, etc., but have seldom used these terms as more than 
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fashionable buzzwords. The reader is to understand that these terms refer to something like 
“the current state of things” but otherwise is left to guess what these terms might mean. This 
imprecision or lack of analytical rigor concerning “political economy” and/or related terms is 
perhaps unsurprising since it reflects the imprecise use of the term in popular discourse. Recent 
social theory has not done much better in formulating a more precise concept of political 
economy despite insistences by some to the contrary. All of which begs the question: what is 
the political economy? 
On a basic level, political economy refers to the relationship between politics and 
economics, between public and private spheres, between nation-states and markets. But in a 
sense this definition is too limited: political economy refers to a synthesis of any form of political 
authority and economic activity, both from above (regional, international, the global) and below 
(the local, state, and provinces). Moreover, defining political economy as the relationship 
between politics and economics assumes the ability to separate politics from economics. 
Pioneers of International Political Economy (IPE), such as Susan Strange, have stressed that the 
political economy involves the inseparability or mutual influence of the economic (resource 
mobilization and wealth-creation) and the political (authority, power, and control). For Strange, 
IPE is concerned with the “social, political, and economic arrangement affecting the global 
systems of production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein.”37 In 
short, political economy is concerned with the nature and exercise of power, be it economic or 
political or both, within the material social context in which human beings live. 
Having defined political economy as the exercise of power within a material context, 
implies that the particular sort and practice of power known as western democratic-capitalism is 
by no means inevitable. A market-oriented political-economic system as the single possible 
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solution to human want is a product of the modern/colonial imagination. The mechanism 
undergirding the system of democratic-capitalism, the unchecked pursuit of self-interest so 
vigorously defended as an omnipresent and timeless part of human nature, is an historically 
contingent socio-cultural product.38 
Those with more economistic leanings might object, arguing that the capitalism cannot 
be considered a cultural product since, as Karl Marx noted, culture is a superstructure with only 
a derivative relationship to economics. According to Marx, the capitalist economy sets the tone 
for culture, which changed in order to accommodate it. The concern here is not simply to turn 
the explanation around, as Max Weber did, to argue that culture is the formative influence on 
the development of a capitalist market economy. The debates in western social science, split 
along the lines of economistic and culturalist ways of thinking about the origins of the modern 
market economy, are less relevant than the acknowledgement that regardless of which came 
first, the economy or culture, the capitalist economy represents a decidedly modernist/ 
colonizing way of organizing the material world.  
It is important to note that a modernist/colonizing way of looking at the world is not 
equivalent to a Euro-American or European way of looking at the world. The adoption and 
legitimization of market oriented capitalist system among Europeans took centuries. Mercantile 
feudalism categorized the European political economy for over 1,000 years during the Middle 
Ages. Certainly there were markets: traveling fairs and places where agricultural producers sold 
their goods. The idea of a market as more than a place of exchange, however, as the driving 
force for sustaining an entire society, was unthinkable. There was good reason why medieval 
Europe could not conceive of a market system. It had not abstracted the elements of production 
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necessary to conceive of a market system: land, labor, and capital. In the feudal way of life, 
lands formed the core of social life. They were the basis of status and prestige, of military, 
juridical, and administrative organization. A medieval nobleman would no more sell part of his 
land than the governor of Connecticut would sell adjacent counties to the governor of Rhodes 
Island.39 Serfs were not free agents contracting out their services for pay. Serfs, like apprentices 
and journeymen, labored but their labor never entered into a market to be bought and sold. 
There was no more of a labor market than is provided by hospital interns.40 While capital existed 
in the sense of private wealth, there was no impetus to put it to use as leverage for more 
efficient production methods. The slowest and most labor intensive process was preferred to 
the fastest and most efficient.41 
The dread of change and innovation gave way very slowly over the course of centuries. 
Several movements gave rise to the change: the rise of nation-states, conquest and colonialism 
(of the Holy Land, within Europe, of the Americas, and then Africa and Asia), changing religious 
ideas (acquisitiveness construed as a virtue by Protestant Reformers), changes in infrastructure 
and increasing international trade (spurred on by events like the drive to build Gothic 
Cathedrals), the rise of humanism, the rediscovery of ancient learning via Arabs, and scientific 
curiosity (and creation of sub-industrial inventions).42 It was not until the late 18th century that 
the economic ideology of liberalism emerged. Liberalism advocates for broader political 
participation, free economic markets, maximum amount of individual liberty possible, and that 
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individuals should pursue their own economic self-interest unapologetically because in doing so 
they will raise the standards of living for everyone. This ideological position was important in the 
break with medieval European notions and the creation of modern ones. 
Increasing global integration based on commercialization and commodification—of 
land, labor, and capital—is not inevitable, even for Europeans. The political economic principle 
that each person acting in their own self-interest will yield the greatest social well-being is not a 
discovery of an eternal timeless truth, but an imaginative invention of a people within a 
particular historical and socio-cultural framework. It is an invention that attempts to legitimize 
the current social configuration as the best of all possible worlds.  
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Nature and Scope of the Project 
The second half of the twentieth century marked a shift in concerns for normative ethics 
towards meta-ethics.43 Questions such as “what is the good?” or “what are one’s duties to 
others” tended to fade into the background of ethical discussions, supplanted by meta-ethical 
questions such as “what does the good mean?”; “how are goodness and rightness related?”; 
“what purpose does moral language serve?”; and “how is it possible to know what is ethical at 
all?” Meta-ethical questions such as these are not new—Socrates asked them more than two 
thousand years ago—but they occupied a greater part of the attention of professional ethicists 
in the twentieth century than in any time in the past.44 
 This research project is a work of meta-ethics. The distinction is an important one. 
Normative ethics has as its subject matter the human conduct. Meta-ethics, in contrast, has the 
discipline of normative ethics as its subject matter: it is the systematic study of normative ethics. 
While normative ethics is once removed from moral practice, meta-ethics is twice removed.45 As 
a twice-removed inquiry, it stands apart from normative ethics proper, asking questions about 
ethical theories and the problems of meaning, method, and knowledge. The project undertakes 
an analytical and meta-ethical examination of Christian moral visions of the political economy.46 
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 This paragraph borrows heavily from Oliver A. Johnson, Ethics: Selections from Classical and 
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 Oliver A. Johnson is just one who makes this classic distinction between normative and meta-
ethics. See Ibid., 9-11.  
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 The project only examines the moral visions articulated by professional Christian social 
ethicists. Christian advocacy groups, grass-roots resistance movements, and the like are not in view. These 
no doubt would provide rich sources for analysis, but they do not represent fully articulated moral vision 
of the political economy. 
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It is not an attempt to elaborate a Christian moral vision of the political economy; instead it is an 
attempt to provide methodological guidance for decolonizing Christian moral visions of the 
political economy.  
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
The discussion of the dissertation proceeds along the lines suggested by the thesis. 
Chapter one sets the parameters of the study and laying some of the theoretical groundwork for 
what follows. The second half of the chapter examines decolonizing, moral visions, and political 
economy—three concepts central to the discussion. The chapter concludes with some thoughts 
about the nature and scope of the project and an outline of the dissertation. Chapter two maps 
the discourse of mainstream Christian social ethics of the political economy. It focuses on the 
work of three leading ethicists writing in this area—Daniel Finn, Max Stackhouse, and Philip 
Wogaman—who represent the mainstream perspective.47 Chapters three and four constitute 
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 These authors are influential representatives of the mainstream perspective of Christian 
political economic ethics. Over the last few decades, there have been a number of publications in this 
area, though in the mind of the author there are reasons to exclude them from the analysis at hand. One 
such work is the often cited Herman E. Daly, John B. Cobb, and Clifford W. Cobb, For the Common Good: 
Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future, 2nd ed. (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1994 [1989]). Cobb and Daly’s work is more of a critique of mainstream economic concepts 
than it is a thoroughgoing Christian ethical analysis of the political economy. Two related works, which 
aim to introduce economic concepts to the “theologically minded” non-specialist are Samuel Gregg, 
Economic Thinking for the Theologically Minded (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001); and 
Walter L. Owensby, Economics for Prophets: A Primer on Concepts, Realities, and Values in Our Economic 
System (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1988). 
Another work is Hans Küng’s sweeping A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics (Hans 
Küng, A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)). While 
Küng’s work surveys a wide range of ethical issues in politics and economics—driven by the conviction 
that the world’s religions are capable of supplying the basis for his “global ethic”—it is not a theological 
examination of the political economy. Küng’s is a pluralist moral vision: he draws almost not at all on the 
Christian tradition in his reflections on politics and economics. 
An excellent critique of the liberal tradition’s attempts to reconcile theological ethics and 
economics can be found in P. Travis Kroeker, Christian Ethics and Political Economy in North America: A 
Critical Analysis, Mcgill-Queen's Studies in the History of Religion (Montreal ; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1995). Kroeker examines the work of Rauschenbush, R. Niebuhr, and the pastoral letters 
by the Canadian and U.S. conferences of Roman Catholic Bishops and ultimately concludes that they fail 
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to rise above their faulty theological assumptions. While it is a compelling critique and useful in thinking 
about attempts to articulate a political economic ethics of previous generations, Kroeker only provides a 
sketch of his own proposal based on a return to Augustinian realism, as opposed to the sustained 
treatment of the views in the works of the authors chosen. Moreover, Kroeker’s call to return to the 
theological foundations of an earlier area is voiced earlier and more powerfully by Stackhouse.  
Other works focus on Biblical perspectives of wealth such as Bruce C. Birch and Larry L. 
Rasmussen, The Predicament of the Prosperous, 1st ed., Biblical Perspectives on Current Issues 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1978); Craig Blomberg, Neither Poverty nor Riches: A Biblical Theology 
of Material Possessions (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999); and John R. Schneider, Godly Materialism: 
Rethinking Money & Possessions (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994). 
Still others attempt to give a theological account of the economy or to use the metaphor of 
economics to reformulate theology, such as D. Stephen Long, "The Theology of Economics," in Calculated 
Futures: Theology, Ethics, and Economics, ed. D. Stephen Long, Nancy Ruth Fox, and Tripp York (Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2007), 105-16; and M. Douglas Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God 
and Political Economy (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989). 
Some works are not serious scholarly contributions, but are meant for individual Christians and 
churches interested in responding practically to political economic realities, such as Rebecca M. Blank, Do 
Justice: Linking Christian Faith and Modern Economic Life (Cleveland, OH: United Church Press, 1992); 
David P. Gushee, Toward a Just and Caring Society: Christian Responses to Poverty in America (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Boooks, 1999); Susan R. Holman, God Knows There's Need: Christian Responses to 
Poverty (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Rebecca Todd Peters and Elizabeth L. Hinson-
Hasty, To Do Justice: A Guide for Progressive Christians, 1st ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2008); Ronald J. Sider, Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger: Moving from Affluence to Generosity, 20th 
anniversary revision. ed. (Dallas: Word Pub., 1997 [1977]); and Ronald J. Sider, Just Generosity: A New 
Vision for Overcoming Poverty in America, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2007 [1999]). 
Other works examine Christian spirituality as a way of opening up alternative kinds of political 
economic spaces, such as William T. Cavanaugh, Being Consumed: Economics and Christian Desire (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2008); Rodney Clapp, "Why the Devil Takes Visa: A Christian 
Response to the Triumph of Consumerism," Christianity Today 40, no. 1 (Oct 7, 1996); and Daniel G. 
Groody, Globalization, Spirituality, and Justice: Navigating a Path to Peace (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
2007). 
Then there are a series of earth-centric books on ethics including Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary 
Radford Ruether, Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, Religions of the 
World and Ecology (Cambridge, MA: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Harvard University 
Center for the Study of World Religions, 2000); David G. Hallman, Ecotheology: Voices from South and 
North (Geneva, Switzerland; Maryknoll, NY: WCC Publications; Orbis Books, 1994); Willis Jenkins, 
Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008); Sallie McFague, Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001); Michael S. Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, New 
Studies in Christian Ethics (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Larry L. 
Rasmussen, Earth Community Earth Ethics, Ecology and Justice (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996); and 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology: With a New Introduction, 
10th anniversary ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993 [1983]). These texts are invaluable in uncovering the 
theological relationship between God, nature, and humanity; calling for a rearticulation of Christian 
theology in light of the ecological challenge; recognizing the link between oppressive systems and 
ecological threats under the rubric of eco-justice; and emphasizing the covenantal commitment and 
sacramental obligation of Christians to engage in ecological justice. While most of these texts condemn 
market-focused political economic system for their ecological unsustainability, none have a construction 
of a Christian political economic ethics in view. 
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the solution portion of the discussion, taking each of the two-fold suggestions cited above in 
turn. Chapter three deconstructs the epistemic limitations of Christian social ethics that 
universalizes the subject position of its author and explores the ethical and epistemic potential 
of Latina/o thinking. Chapter four exposes the neoclassical economic framework which 
undergirds Christian moral visions and offers an analysis using the tools of heterodox 
economics. Chapter five revisits the argument of the dissertation, states its contributions to 
Christian social ethics and Latina/o religious-cultural studies, and suggests prospective lines of 
research and theorizing to further the project of decolonizing moral visions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Since talk about globalization has become commonplace, a number of works have been 
published that critically examine globalization, such as Pamela Brubaker, Globalization at What Price?: 
Economic Change and Daily Life, Rev. and updated. ed. (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2007 [2001]); Cynthia D. 
Moe-Lobeda, Healing a Broken World: Globalization and God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2002); 
and Rebecca Todd Peters, In Search of the Good Life: The Ethics of Globalization (New York: Continuum, 
2004). These works address the issue of globalization which is a broader concern than the just political 
economy. 
Other works along these lines that might have been but were not included because they were 
the singular work of the author in this area or because they contain ideas and arguments that are already 
represented by the authors chosen: David M. Beckmann, Where Faith and Economics Meet: A Christian 
Critique (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Pub. House, 1981); Robert Benne, The Ethic of Democratic 
Capitalism: A Moral Reassessment (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981); Warren R. Copeland, Economic 
Justice: The Social Ethics of U.S. Economic Policy (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1988); Robert Lee, Faith 
and the Prospects of Economic Collapse (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981); Albert Terrill Rasmussen, 
Christian Responsibility in Economic Life (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965); Robert L. Stivers, The 
Sustainable Society: Ethics and Economic Growth (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1976); and Richard K. 
Taylor and Joint Educational Development, Economics and the Gospel: A Primer on Shalom as Economic 
Justice (Philadelphia: Published for Joint Educational Development [by] United Church Press, 1973). 
Lastly, there are two books, published by the current co-chairs of Economic Ethics group of the 
SCE, James P. Bailey, Rethinking Poverty: Income, Assets, and the Catholic Social Justice Tradition (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010); Kathryn D'Arcy Blanchard, The Protestant Ethic or the 
Spirit of Capitalism: Christians, Freedom, and Free Markets (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books). The themes 
covered in these two books are thoroughly represented in works addressed in chapter two. Bailey’s book 
applies Catholic social thought to the issues of economic poverty, and his solution, to empower the poor 
by building assets, adds little to the discussion among mainstream Christian ethicists. Blanchard, along 
with Finn, is part of the “markets rightly-conceived” camp. That is, they both argue that markets can 
become “moral” (Finn) or “other-interested” (Blanchard) if conceptualized correctly. Moreover, Finn, 
Stackhouse, and Wogaman have a much larger corpus related to the issues of ethics and political 
economy, each having written on the topic for decades.  
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CHAPTER 2: MAINSTREAM CHRISTIAN ETHICS OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
For as long as the universe contains conscious beings whose willed actions cause 
themselves and each other many kinds and degrees of suffering and joy, moral 
questions will remain inescapably important.  
—Christopher Clausen48 
 
Envisioning a Moral Political Economy 
Religious and non-religious thinkers alike are interested in envisioning a moral political 
economy. Many of these theorists have concluded that capitalism—the prevalent form of 
political economy currently operative in the world—is violent, discriminatory, dominating, and 
exploitative. Most wars have underlying economic causes, usually about access to resources. For 
example, it is now widely accepted that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was motivated primarily by a 
quest for oil.49 The widespread U.S. consumer demand for any and all types of drugs has led 
directly to the increase in violence, drug dealing, and arms trade in Latin American and other 
developing countries.50 Income and wealth flow to a select few at the expense of the vast 
majority. Social categories of race/ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation are used to maintain 
privilege and oppress individuals not because of anything they have done or not done, but on 
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 Christopher Clausen, The Moral Imagination: Essays on Literature and Ethics, 1st ed. (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 1986), 5. 
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 Even the fiscal conservative Alan Greenspan acknowledges as much in his book Alan 
Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (New York: Penguin Press, 2007). 
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 A topic under discussion at a recent meeting between Honduras’s Minister of Public Security 
Oscar Alvarez and his U.S. counterparts in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). The ATF 
operation called Operation Fast and Furious was meant to track the guns and then take into custody those 
involved in drug cartels. The operation went badly and allowed as many as two thousand guns to flow 
illegally into Mexico, Honduras, and other Latin American countries. As reported on Univison’s Al Punto, 
broadcast on July 24, 2011.  
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the basis of difference. Lack of access to clean water in many places has led to the spread of 
preventable diseases, chronic illnesses, and sometimes death.51 Climate change attributable to 
industrial activities of humans is leading to desertification, decimation of food sources, and 
starvation. While it may be somewhat difficult to accept, there is little doubt that the present 
capitalist political economy deals death every day.  
One would expect that the moral vision articulated by Christian social ethicists, who 
have the prophetic Biblical tradition to draw from, would take the lead in critiquing a system 
that encourages human beings to trample on each other, the Earth, and all life in the name of 
economic gain.52 On the contrary, Christian social ethical discourse, while ostensibly concerned 
about injustice, inequity, and the poor, defends the basic framework of the world-capitalist 
system. This chapter argues that mainstream Christian ethics of the political economy endorses 
the status quo and affirms the virtues of the prevalent free-market system. The argument is not 
that those who write in the field of Christian ethics are maliciously intent on designing ways for 
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 There are relatively inexpensive and quickly implementable water purification systems, such as 
the H20 Tech 2 system installed in the community of Aceituno, Guatemala through partnership of Central 
Presbyterian Church and the author’s local church, Presbyterian Church of the Covenant. For incredibly 
low cost (the entire system cost $10,000, has a life span of 10 years, and purifies more than 120 gal of 
water per day) the system reclaims contaminated water (the only available water in the community) into 
safe, potable water. 
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 Biblical scholarship reveals a Jesus who said and did a great deal relevant to the political 
economy. One can make a good case that promoting a moral economy was a pivotal project for Jesus. See 
Blomberg, Neither Poverty nor Riches. The prophetic social role of Jesus’ ministry has been identified as a 
key aspect of Jesus’ brief public ministry. Marcus Borg identifies five key roles of Jesus’ ministry. He was a 
person a mystic, healer, wisdom teacher, social prophet, and founder of a movement. See “Jesus Before 
and After Easter: Jewish Mystic and Christian Messiah,” in Marcus J. Borg and N. T. Wright, The Meaning 
of Jesus: Two Visions, 1st ed. ([San Francisco]: HarperSanFrancisco, 1999), 53-76. A social prophet, Jesus 
followed in a line of earlier prophets who protested a system of domination, the economic and political 
arrangement that oppressed and exploited, and announced that it was God’s will for a very different 
system. Jesus promoted an alternative moral vision of an inclusive and egalitarian society, a vision that 
challenged the social boundaries of his day. That is, Jesus challenged the systems of domination of his 
day. One could make the argument that Jesus was killed for his economic and political policy suggestions, 
which challenged the wealthy and powerful of his day. This line of reasoning is pursued in the small 
pamphlet Tom Head, Envisioning a Moral Economy, ed. Chel Avery, Pendle Hill Pamphlet 405 
(Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill, February 2010). 
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privileged groups to maintain their power. Nor is it that they fail to condemn some violations of 
human dignity and ecological integrity. What is being argued is that mainstream Christian 
ethicists understand these injustices as occasional exceptions to a system that generally yield 
good economic and political outcomes.  
This chapter examines mainstream Christian social ethics’ moral visions of the political 
economy. In order to examine these moral visions in some detail, the discussion is limited to the 
work of three prominent Christian social ethicists—Daniel Finn, Max Stackhouse, and Philip 
Wogaman. All three have written extensively on the issues of political economic ethics and have 
served as Presidents of the Society of Christian ethics (2009, 1986-87, 1976-77, respectively). 
Finn has Catholic roots while the other two draw on the Protestant theological heritage: 
Stackhouse is ordained in the United Church of Christ while Wogaman is an ordained United 
Methodist minister. Together they represent mainstream Christian social ethics of the political 
economy. Their work reveals the various configurations of the political economy Christian 
ethicists imagine are possible and what they believe to be “unimaginable,” or outside the 
boundaries of the possible. 
Each section begins with a brief biographical sketch of the thinker under discussion, with 
a focus on his intellectual history, before proceeding to an analysis of his work. The biographical 
data offers a way of locating each thinker within his social location. It is not an attempt to 
reinscribe the trope of the narrative identity of the great white man, who self-sufficiently speaks 
to all times and places. On the contrary, it serves as an acknowledgement that identities and 
social locations are relevant features of epistemic assessments and are important in the 
construction of moral visions. Acknowledging the social embeddedness of knowledge is a crucial 
step in decolonizing moral visions. 
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Finn’s Trade and Free Markets, Correctly Understood 
Daniel Finn began his academic career in Mathematics, earning a B.S. in 1968 from St. 
John Fisher College, a liberal arts Catholic college located near Rochester, NY.53 After college, 
Finn did not move far: he stayed in and around Rochester for the next five years. Influenced by 
his Catholic upbringing and training, he worked first for Project REACH, an organization 
dedicated to youth advocacy in Perkinsville located just south of Rochester, and then as a High 
School teacher of Calculus and Algebra. Finn moved to Chicago in 1973 where he earned an 
M.A. in Economics (1975) and a Ph.D. in Religious Social Ethics (1977), both at the University of 
Chicago. The University of Chicago’s economics department of the 1970s was well-known for its 
uncompromising faith in neoclassical macroeconomics and its advocacy of economic liberalism 
and free markets.54 Thus, Finn was trained in the sort of economy theory advocated by Milton 
Friedman, George Stigler, and Arnold Harberger, all of whom taught in the economics 
department at Chicago during that time. As a newly minted Ph.D., Finn received a joint 
appointment in Theology and Economics at College of Saint Benedict/St. John’s University in 
Minnesota, an appointment he has held to this day.55 
Finn’s research interests on the intersection of ethics and economics dates back to his 
dissertation which explores the normative basis of economic decision making in policy.56 Since 
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then his publications, from his first, “Norm and Method in Normative Economics,” to his most 
recent, “The Unjust Contract: A Moral Evaluation,” have all had an almost single-minded focus 
on the Christian social ethics and political-economic life.57 Moreover, Finn has experience in 
structuring conversations across disciplinary boundaries, annually attending professional 
meetings in both economics and Christian ethics for decades, and serving as the president of 
Association for Social Economics (1986) and well as the SCE (2009), as noted above. As one of 
the most widely published and well-known Christian political economic ethicists, Finn is a 
particularly appropriate theorist to examine in the current project. 
In Toward a Christian Economic Ethics, Finn’s first monograph, co-authored with Prentiss 
L. Pemberton, Finn notes the consistent theological demand of God throughout history to care 
for the “economically downtrodden.” The economically downtrodden includes what they 
euphemistically call economically “unsuccessful” individuals, those living at or below 125 
percent of the poverty level, meeting some minimum standard of living, yet facing “significant 
deprivation” and economic hardship.58 The problem with the U.S. economy is that it produces a 
large and increasing ratio of such economically unsuccessful individuals. For example, in 1982 in 
the U.S. the economically unsuccessful numbered 46.5 million or one in six individuals. In the 
face of this worrisome trend, Pemberton and Finn questioned whether a harsher form of 
capitalism, that has little to do with economic justice, was developing.59 For Pemberton and 
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Finn, the problems of poverty and unemployment have a structural rather than just an 
individual basis. Christian economic ethics demands an obligation towards all who are 
economically unsuccessful, which means creating “counter-structures that effectively challenge 
unjust social structures.”60 
These counter-structures must be built on a Christian moral vision of the political 
economy, which must include six crucial elements: 
1. The just entitlement of the poor61 
2. Constraints on the right of ownership (as far as it concerns obligations to towards 
the poor) 
3. A reorientation of personal lives 
4. A transformation of social structures 
5. A commitment to individual and social transformation through “countervailing 
power” 
6. A reliance on democratic processes.62  
 
The first two general principles affirm a prophetic devotion to the poor, the infirm, and the 
outcast as well as the counter-cultural idea that not everything in God’s creation ought to be 
owned. The last four principles stress individual, communal, and structural transformation. 
Taken together, the six principles represent a good starting point for conversation in Christian 
communities concerned with economic injustice. It is in the application of these general 
elements to particular problems that it becomes clear how Pemberton and Finn’s work supports 
the basic structure of the capitalist political economy. They concretized these principles into five 
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 The just entitlement of the poor means that the poor “have a valid claim on those goods 
possessed by the rich over and above the necessities of life,” Ibid., 169. 
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 Ibid., 167-77. On this last element of their moral vision, democratic decision making, they are 
careful to point out that it is a fallacious idea that preferences of the majority will solve all ethical 
questions or even that it will make decisions that promote justice. Having pointed out this possible failing, 
they express confidence that the “prophetic stance” of the church has the power to act as a structural 
safeguard against the “excesses of democracy.” This caveat itself challenges their assurances that a robust 
democratic process is the means to implement a moral vision of the political economy.  
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“operative norms”: 1) strengthen social welfare programs for the poor; 2) regulate energy costs 
so they are lower for poor and subsidize renewable energy costs to support a reduction in the 
use of nonrenewable energy; 3) resist market failures by enforcing true competition since 
competition is “the guarantor against injustice in capitalism”63; 4) limit the influence of large 
economic interests (corporations) on government; 5) transform the inner operations of the 
firm.64 All of the operative norms they suggest are, in some fashion, already in place. From 
prophetic and counter-cultural principles they have derived a position that is neither. They 
affirm some important reforms to capitalism and capitalist institutions, but their work falls 
safely within the structures of U.S. capitalism. 
Moreover, by being narrowly focused on poverty, defined as being “locked out of career 
employment and locked into menial, dead-end jobs or into sheer joblessness,” Pemberton and 
Finn ignore the broader matrix of oppression operative within the political economy.65 They 
suffer from a limited range of moral vision. Within the framework they have adopted, Christian 
political economic ethics deals with social justice issues as it relates to poverty and employment. 
For them, the intersection of politics, economics, and ethics is concerned only with income, 
wealth, and employment. They do not see beyond these narrow parameters towards the ways 
in which capitalism is implicated in various forms of oppression.66 Ironically, Pemberton and Finn 
warn their readers that too narrow a focus on any one form of injustice “tends to splinter the 
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spirit of the corporation. 
 
65
 Ibid., 7.  
 
66
 Iris Marion Young, a leading feminist and political philosopher, in her brilliant essay parses out 
the “five faces” of oppression: economic exploitation, socio-economic marginalization, lack of power or 
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overall effort.” They note that in focusing on racial/ethnic injustice, black and Hispanic groups 
might miss the way that their actions oppress women, or middle-class whites focusing on the 
poor might fail to see their own racism/ethnic prejudice and sexism. Yet, they themselves fall 
into the trap that they warn their readers about. Simply put, their assault on the current political 
economic structures does not go far enough. Rather than challenging oppressive structures 
Pemberton and Finn propose an ethic that is a far cry from the prophetic and counter-cultural 
norms in biblical, patristic, and medieval sources they excavate.  
Toward a Christian Economic Ethic concentrates on the U.S. political economy. Just 
Trading, published nine years later, focuses on the morality of international trade.67 The basic 
framework for Finn’s thinking survives the intervening years. Economic ethics is still primarily 
about economic welfare as defined by income, buying power, and wealth. As in Toward, Finn 
engages in a review of the relevant biblical and theological themes, now in relationship to 
international trade, but the review in Just Trading seems much more cursory and less focused 
(less than 15 pages of the 269 page book). Surprisingly, Finn concludes that the biblical and 
theological data provides limited guidance for an ethic of international trade. The tone is 
dismissive, as if the relevant biblical and theological themes are anything but relevant.  
 Finn argues that even if one is clear on the theological norms that should guide 
adjudication between trade policies, a great deal of moral flexibility exists in the choice of any 
particular policy. The realities of international trade are such that they create a psychic and 
geographical distance between environmental and social costs of production and economic 
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benefit enjoyed by consumers.68 Even a “modest” lifestyle by the standards of developed 
Western nations—driving a car, using a dishwasher, taking a plane to travel either for business 
or vacation—threatens the integrity of creation and does little to address the grinding poverty 
of so many inhabitants of the globe.69 After reviewing the arguments for and against trade, Finn 
highlights the extension of the “welfare-enhancing” exchange of the domestic market to the 
globe.70 His position is that international trade can be just if it is correctly understood. 
International trade must be bound by carefully constructed laws and regulations to prevent the 
most serious abuses and injustices.71 
Finn’s pro-trade position and his Christian convictions seem to be at odds. Yet, the 
contradictions and inconsistencies between what Finn describes as the relevant biblical and 
theological insights and the arguments against increasing trade remain unexamined. The love of 
neighbor, the preferential option for the poor, the commitment to the integrity of creation 
(environmental stewardship), a concern for foreigners as well as fellow citizens, are all 
inconsistent with the downward pressure on wages, protections for workers, and environmental 
safeguards that critics argue are characteristic of international trade. He partially resolves this 
incongruity by noting that moral convictions should not be allowed to trump “scientific 
understanding of causal relationships.”72 Citing “the world capitalist system,” Finn claims, is not 
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in itself an explanation for why rising inequalities, environmental problems, etc, happen.73 Finn, 
however, ignores the data that support the causal relationship with the current system of 
international trade and ill effects on people and the environment. 
In 1993, the notorious Catholic defender of markets Michael Novak published The 
Catholic Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, in which he argues for the moral necessity of market 
economy as the proper economic system for creative beings made in God’s image.74 Since then, 
others have closely paralleled Novak’s arguments. Markets, under certain conditions, are moral 
because they allow individuals to act freely and with dignity and respect.75 This sort of argument 
is just one degree away from stating that capitalism is the divinely sanctioned form of political 
economy. It rejects the view that capitalism necessarily leads to the exploitation of labor and 
discounts the idea that it concentrates resources in the hands of the wealthy and privileged. On 
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the contrary, it celebrates capitalism as a system that allows human beings to express their 
innate creativity, thereby “improving and adding to God’s bounty on Earth.”76 Forgetting the 
adage “there is no divinely sanctioned human economic system,” Novak and his ilk must 
minimize or discount the evidence that refuses to fit their thesis. The loud cheers for capitalism 
drown out the caution (even hostility) towards capitalism expressed in by Paul VI in Populorum 
Progressio.77 At the very least Novak’s analysis is incomplete, as far as Catholic social teaching is 
concerned. Worse, the injustices that capitalism leaves in its wake are minimized or ignored. 
A more moderate position insists on the value of markets while still maintaining a 
critical spirit towards the injustices of laissez-faire capitalism. Finn’s Moral Ecology of Markets 
expresses this more moderate position, though it has much in common with Novak’s arguments. 
In Moral Ecology of Markets Finn argues that markets, understood as a mechanism for 
distributing resources, are value neutral.78 Only when markets are assessed within their context, 
to their “moral ecology,” can moral evaluations of the market be made. He insists that markets, 
correctly understood as voluntary interactions of individuals and businesses functioning under 
the pursuit of self-interest, can be considered moral under the right conditions, within an 
appropriate legal framework and a system that guarantees to provide essential goods and 
services. 
The first part of Moral Ecology focuses on the market as a moral issue, reviewing the 
unsuccessful attempts of Friedman, Buchanan, and Hayek to defend markets without reference 
to moral argument, the defense and critique of markets and self-interest, and the four 
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fundamental problems of economic life. Finn’s primary claim is that there is an ethically sound 
“economic defense of self-interest” in markets, but that “this argument is often misunderstood, 
especially by those who most frequently make it.”79 In Finn’s view, everyone agrees—even 
proponents of liberty and free markets like Nozick and Friedman—that government should 
enforce some limits on people’s actions. In Finn’s language, the market should have fences, or 
laws that restrict what is allowed within the market.80 Finn’s central discussion revolves around 
the nature and number of these fences. The book concludes with a warning that the economic 
defense of self-interest cannot be extended to governmental process because lobbying efforts 
change the rules of the game. 
Finn’s vision of the political economy is a world in which advocates and critics of 
markets, those from the right and the left, can sit down and have dialogue about the strengths 
and weakness of markets in their own context.81 In this dialogue, both sides would take the 
other’s point of view seriously, critically examine their own assumptions, and engage in a 
genuine conversation about how to address the “four problems of economic life” which are 
allocation, distribution, scale, and quality of relations.82 According to Finn, the goal of each of 
these factors is, respectively, increasing efficiency, reducing inequality, sustainability, and 
community.83 In his discussion about allocation, Finn reinscribes the neoclassical definition of 
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economics as “the study of the allocation of scarce” resources and stresses the effectiveness of 
self-interested activity.84 
In adopting this schema, Finn reveals that his understanding of economics and his moral 
vision of the political economy falls within the narrow spectrum of orthodox economics. Finn’s 
search for a common framework to discuss the merits and faults of markets is an attempt to 
discredit the arguments of libertarians and critics on the left. According to Finn, libertarians do 
not really believe in unrestricted market mechanisms and critics on the left who assume that 
markets and the pursuit of self-interest are axiomatically amoral are wrong. He is saying, in 
essence, “if everyone would simply be reasonable, and have a real discussion, they would see 
that markets are an essential part of solving the problems of economic life.” In arguing that 
markets and the pursuit of self-interest, under certain conditions, is ethically defensible, Finn 
has provided fodder for proponents of the status quo. 
On his starting assumption, Finn is correct: formally speaking, the market refers to the 
economic activity in which buyers and sellers, through the forces of supply and demand, agree 
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on a price.85 Finn argues that markets cannot be understood apart from their context, but he 
does not take his own argument far enough. Markets imply market economies, and in an age of 
increasing economic integration, the context of markets is free market economics, the reduction 
or elimination of international trade barriers under conditions that favor the wealthy, Western 
nations at the expense of nations in the global South.86 Where Finn’s argument fails is in 
pretending that context is waiting to be discovered; the current global political economy is the 
context and from the perspective of the poor, markets are anything but moral. Finn insists that 
markets and the exertion of self-interest can “receive a conditional moral approval” if markets 
have defined legal boundaries and certain essentials are provided.87 Yet in making this claim he 
has ignored actual historical insistences in which his proposed solution has been applied and yet 
falls short of any meaningful definition of morality. 
Yet, Finn attends to this distinction of perspectives in considering the question “are 
markets just?” He points out that those who advocate for markets presume the context of the 
prosperous nations of the West and those who are critical of markets present the context of the 
majority of the world, where most live in poverty.88 Having noted how much context matters in 
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developing conditions under which market outcomes can be considered just, Finn proceeds to 
elaborate two examples, one involving buying cans of green beans and secondly a throw rug. 
Both of these examples describe a decidedly bourgeois activity: having purchasing power and 
choices among various goods. From these two illustrations, Finn draws the conclusion that it is a 
serious mistake to think it is always morally wrong to act out of one’s self-interest and that 
moral evaluations of narrowly self-interested actions in the market “depend on the context and 
the result that eventuate.”89  
It is troubling that Finn feels the need to defend markets as a moral, albeit within, as he 
puts it, a “properly structured context.”90 He does so, one suspects, because he is concerned 
about getting the thinking about markets right. While Finn stops to get his thinking right, the 
majority of the world’s people continue to live in misery and squalor. While Finn is right to insist 
that markets must be understood in their context before they can be evaluated as just (or 
unjust), his work does very little by way of disrupting or challenging the status quo. As we have 
seen, Finn’s political economic ethics is limited to thinking about the economy as neoclassical 
economists do. Since economic life can be conceptualized concisely as allocation,91 and markets 
do very well in efficiently allocating, then market capitalism must be considered the best 
configuration for solving the problems of economic life. Finn sets the boundaries of what is 
morally conceivable and economically desirable within the basic configuration of the 
contemporary world and advances this as a Christian moral vision of the political economy.92 
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Stackhouse’s Metaphysical-Moral System 
Stackhouse studied philosophy of religion at DePauw University in Greencastle, IN (B.A. 
1957). In the 1950s he spent a summer working on a railroad while reading Marx and Sartre in 
the evenings. He found their radical and existentialist ideas so appealing that the next fall he 
began to write a column for the campus paper, “The Ax by Max.”93 Stackhouse spent a year at a 
Dutch institute on a scholarship arranged by one of his professors, where his conversations with 
other students who had experienced Marxist regimes in action began to curb his enthusiasm for 
radical political economics.  
Stackhouse returned to the U.S. to begin his seminary education at Harvard Divinity 
School. At Harvard, he studied under James Luther Adams, a ethicist of democratic socialist 
leanings well known for translating and interpreting the work of German theologians Paul Tillich 
and Ernst Troeltsch. Fifteen years after receiving his M.A. and B.D. (1961), he edited a series of 
Adams’s articles collected in an anthology billed as the “first comprehensive collection of his 
ideas and work.”94 During his time as a seminarian, Stackhouse first encountered Reinhold 
Niebuhr who was at Harvard as a visiting professor. Stackhouse describes himself as being 
“puzzled” at hearing Niebuhr lecture for the first time.95 He became fascinated with Niebuhr and 
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mechanisms that ensure those with power and privilege maintain their positions. This is discussed in more 
detail in chapter three. 
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chose to write his dissertation on the intersection of eschatology and ethics in the work of 
Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr (Harvard University, 1965).96 
Over the years, Stackhouse moved has moved far to the right of the Marxist and 
existentialist socialism he advocated for as an undergraduate.97 During the 1970s while teaching 
at Andover Newton Theological School, he critiqued the military-industrial complex, calling 
instead for a counter complex of just peace.98 Then during the 1980s he drifted further to the 
right of the democratic socialist influence of his teacher, Adams. He critiqued any form of 
Christian theology formulated from a particular cultural or social context (one presumes that 
includes Black, Feminist, and Latina/o theologies) for lacking a trans-cultural logic and failing to 
critically assess local cultural realities.99 He also expressed serious concern with “radical” 
Christians who identify with the oppressed and who see liberation as the primary locus of God’s 
activity.100  
In 1991, Stackhouse co-authored an essay with Dennis P. McCann an essay trumpeting 
his decisive move rightward. “A Postcommunist Manifesto” announced that with the death of 
Soviet communism, the prophetic witness of “the Protestant Social Gospel, early Christian 
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realism, much neo-orthodoxy, many forms of Catholic modernism, the modern ecumenical drive 
for racial and social inclusiveness, and contemporary liberation theories” were proven wrong 
about socialism.101 Stackhouse (along with McCann) criticizes religious leaders for clinging to the 
belief that capitalism is “greedy, individualistic, *and+ exploitative” and that socialism is 
“generous, community affirming, *and+ equitable.”102 The authors proclaimed a new era for 
social ethics in which socialism and socialist ideas have no ground on which to stand: “everyone 
who holds to a ‘preferential option for the poor’ must now embrace capitalism.”103 Theologians 
and ethicists who advocate for socialist institutions and programs (even if they never argue for a 
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full-blown socialism) are misguided. Christian pastors and teachers on the left of the 
conventional spectrum—including those of socialist, liberationist, and ecologist variety—are 
confused about the nature and character of economic life.104 Socialism and socialist programs 
are “regressive, superficial, *and+ demonically destructive of morality.”105 Any theologian with 
socialist leanings or sympathies with the socialist leanings of the great figures of the Protestant 
theological heritage, including W. Rauschenbush, Karl Barth, R. Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., must abandon those ideas or become irrelevant in the public square.106 
Stackhouse affirms the liberationist’s “passion” for social justice, but dismisses the rest of 
liberation theology’s insights as “narrow dogmatism.”107 Liberation theology views social 
questions through the lens of power analysis which distorts an “accurate understanding” of the 
causes of oppression by drawing on Marxist analysis.108 Ecological theologians (along with, 
presumably, eco-feminists, eco-womanists and the like) are also mistaken, since their theory 
tends to be anti-technological and it is clear that God may use technology to heal, build 
community, and preserve creation.109 Those who cannot rethink the issues must be left behind 
as relics of an earlier era. 
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Elsewhere, Stackhouse puts things differently. According to Stackhouse, contemporary 
voices in Christian ethics imagine three possibilities at the intersection of the global political 
economy and issues of faith: the statist, liberationist, and neo-sectarian. The statist debate 
replicates the arguments between democratic capitalists and social democrats about the right 
mix and blend of government involvement.110 Conservative and business-oriented forces of the 
developed West argue for less government interference with the market, but more protection 
from international competition. Progressive and liberal forces meanwhile advocate for more 
government involvement in welfare benefits, racial and sexual equality in access to economic 
opportunity, guarantees of job security, and a living wage. The debates have become “political 
ritual and quite tired.”111 Stackhouse reduces the liberationist position to a concern for human 
rights, ecology, and the poor with a commitment to Marxists analysis. He describes the neo-
sectarian view as being suspicious of “any attempt to form a social ethic on any other basis than 
biblical, narrative-driven or dogmatic convictions.”112 Neo-sectarians agree with the postmodern 
claim that public possibilities of meaning have disappeared with the triumph of the market 
economy. 
Stackhouse claims that he agrees with liberation theology’s diagnosis of wrong—social 
sins resulting from complex societies—and its idea that “the only God worth worshiping is 
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biased in favor of the oppressed.”113 Yet he wants to offer an alternative prescription to the 
pretense that salvation can be found in a form of revolutionary/radical social change.114 Instead 
of radical social change, Stackhouse proposes drawing on the “dynamism” of contemporary 
democratic capitalism.115 In his view, Christianity (especially Protestantism) has done much to 
sustain and support this dynamism. In the twentieth century, it helped to subdue Fascism, 
imperialistic colonialism, national socialism, and communism.116 The ghastly events at Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, during the Holocaust, and in the Gulag were all resisted by constitutional 
democracy, human rights, and economic corporations independent of state control, all forces 
defended (even generated by) Protestantism.117 Because of its Protestant roots, this sort of 
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democratic capitalism has an “inner validity,” a “moral coherence” and “spiritual fiber.”118 Citing 
Matthews, he affirms that all political systems are to be evaluated by their abilities to sustain all 
persons in a community and that the community of faith is not to become identical to coercive 
structures of government.119 In economic matters, Stackhouse agrees with Matthew that 
Christians above others should have a deep sympathy with the poor and unfortunate, but it is a 
mistake to think of Jesus as being against wealth. Christian approaches should be more anti-
greed than anti-capitalist.120 
Stackhouse doubts the ability of any of these other options to adequately access the 
deeper Christian ethical heritage or respond to the present political economic needs. Instead of 
these options, Stackhouse proposes the development of a “public theology.”121 Public theology 
presumes that theology, while related to personal faith, particular communities, and concrete 
social conditions, can never be “psychologically defined, contextually determined.”122 According 
to Stackhouse: 
‘Public theology’ points toward a wider and deeper strand of theological reflection 
rooted in the interaction of biblical insight, philosophical analysis, historical discernment 
and social formation. It sees the moral interpretation of the common life as a 
fundamental task of theology and seeks to link that interpretation with the cultivation of 
a normative vision to form, guide and reform society.123 
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Over and against neosectarians, public theology insists that we can elaborate a discourse that is 
intelligible to both those within religious traditions and those outside of it. It is an effort to offer 
guidance for society, its sectors, institutions, and organizations. It makes use of public sources, 
insights, and terminology. Thus, public theology is a theology informed by public discourse 
about social, political, and economic problems.124 
Public theology insists on the relevancy of theology and ethics to a pluralistic society. 
This claim poses no problem for Stackhouse who contends that modern society is constructed 
by values grounded in a religious metaphysical-moral foundation. For Stackhouse, developments 
in the early church gave rise to the idea of universal moral law and the creation of a universal 
community independent of tribe or nation. The ethos of the church gave rise to creeds which 
became the basis for human solidarity, identity, and universal human rights.125 He doubts that 
God and Mammon have ever been kept separate.126 He suggests that “modern” political-
economic life “must be understood, at least in part, by reference to its religious heritage.”127 
Since theological values have such direct bearing on worldly affairs expressed in political forces 
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and economic interests, it becomes obvious that a public theology can once again provide 
ethical guidance for the structure of society and public life.  
For Stackhouse, what is decisive for economics is the kind of religion that forms the 
ethos of the civilization.128 In this sense, Stackhouse’s project heavily depends on and agrees 
with Weber, who argued that the “inner-worldly asceticism of Puritanism first produced a 
capitalist ethic.”129 In structuring society, the decisive pattern is not culture, human will, rational 
choice, class interests, or ruling ideology. These are all secondary to religious and spiritual 
dimensions, defined as “the basic structure of meaning and the principles of right and wrong, 
good and evil, truth and falsehood.”130 Stackhouse finds Weber especially useful in combating 
the utilitarian secularists he believes pose such a threat to political and economic life. According 
to Stackhouse, Weber “has demonstrated that modern social realities simply cannot be 
understood without detailed knowledge of the metaphysical-moral visions that, along with 
other factors, brought into existence the modern method, on which our political and economic 
systems depend.”131 What Weber cannot do is articulate that metaphysical-moral system. 
In 1997 Stackhouse wrote that though in the past he believed that corporations acting in 
a capitalistic context produced inequities of distribution, after fifteen years of spending every 
leave and sabbatical in socialist countries with different modes of production, he concluded that 
he “was substantially in error.”132 The problems of misdistribution and consumerism are worse 
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in socialistic economic systems than they are in the West where corporate structures of 
production dominate.133 While he grants that there is no definitive “Christian” political economic 
system, he argues that the political economic systems of developed countries are theological 
and ethically defensible. For Stackhouse, a mixed political economy, centered on the 
corporation but moderated through government regulations and taxes, is the most “likely social 
form of economic life in the foreseeable future.”134 Moreover, because corporate capitalism 
“support*s+ the possibilities of pluralistic democratic governance under laws and protect[s] basic 
human rights, minorities, and dissent,” it is also “the best expression of basic theological 
principles in modern social life.”135 Those who scorn capitalism and condemn the corporation as 
“the embodiment of profit-oriented greed, a soul-less artifact that pollutes the environment, 
uproots people from their farms, closes plants, dislocates workers, [and] promotes growing 
discrepancies between the rich and poor” have failed to diagnose the problems of modern 
political economies.136  
Stackhouse argues that of the seven possible social centers for economic organization—
families, worker guilds, religious organizations, the market (an indirect possibility), the state, 
and the corporation, only the last two are serious contenders. In socialist experiments in Eastern 
Europe and elsewhere around the world, “problems of maldistribution and rampant 
consumerism are at least as dramatic, if not more striking, than they are in the West.”137 
Government-centered economic production has succeeded, and then only partly, where state-
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centered economic planning functioned very much like independent corporations.138 In other 
words, the corporation is currently the chief social form of economic life and is likely to remain 
so for the foreseeable future. Stackhouse concludes that business corporation-centered 
production and distribution is the only viable model of the political economy.139  
In Stackhouse’s moral vision of the political economy, the basic structures and 
institutions through which humans organize social life remain unchallenged. He agrees that 
there are serious problems with the political economy and that the emphasis of Christian social 
ethics should be to demand more equitable distribution of wealth, defend human rights, ensure 
full employment, and defend the poor. His solution to these problems is the revitalization of 
current political economic structures through public theology. Since there are no serious 
alternatives to the corporation as the center for production and distribution, the task of 
Christian ethicists and theologians is to transform the corporation spiritually and morally. Thus, 
Stackhouse affirms the status quo as it pertains both to the broader political economic 
structures and to the central role of corporations in production and distribution. 
 
Wogaman Democratization as Social Ethic 
Wogaman grew up in Southern California. He stayed in his home state for college, 
earning a B.A. at the University of the Pacific in Sacramento (1954). Immediately after college, 
with a sense of calling to the pastorate, Wogaman moved to Boston where three years later he 
earned an M.Div and after three more years of work a Ph.D. in Social Ethics (Boston University, 
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1957, 1960). Rather than return to his home Methodist conference and take a church as he had 
intended, Wogaman was “lured into teaching.”140 Initially, he taught at his alma mater, the 
University of the Pacific (1961-66) before taking a post at Wesley Theology Seminary in 
Washington, D.C. as a professor of Christian social ethics where he taught for 26 years (1966-
92). His only pastoral experience during that time was for a two year appointment during his last 
year of seminary and first year of doctoral work in “the (then) shoe mill town of Marlborough, 
Massachusetts.”141 After his retirement from that post in 1992, Wogaman began an 
“unexpected journey”142 as Senior Minister at Foundry United Methodist Church, also in D.C., at 
the age of sixty. In that post he served as spiritual advisor to Bill Clinton, who regularly attended 
the church during his terms as U.S. president.143 
In his writing, Wogaman has generally been attentive to the issues and problems of his 
day. His dissertation, published in 1960, dealt with some of the theoretical and practical 
challenges of racial integration in the Methodist Church.144 Wogaman’s early writing also 
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addresses religious freedom and the problem of human overpopulation.145 His ethics is guided 
by the conviction that there is a logical connection between religion and ethics, that Christian 
theology has something to add to moral discourse, and that to be relevant, Christian ethics must 
speak to the structures of the human existence in the present world.146 Wogaman, like Finn and 
Stackhouse, has written extensively on the intersection of economic and politics with ethics. In 
the 1960s, he addressed the issues of guaranteed income.147 Sensitive to the plight of the poor 
in “civilized” countries and excited by the national debate about new social proposals to simply 
give to the poor a minimum income, Wogaman took up the question: “is it moral for people to 
be given income which they have not earned and may not deserve?”148 The idea commanded 
the attention of neoliberal economists Milton Friedman as well as liberal thinkers Robert 
Theobald and Leon Keyersling. Wogaman articulates the arguments for and against and 
concludes that the basic material conditions for human life is a social right of every person.149 
God’s purpose for economic life is to “create and maintain the material conditions which best 
serve man’s true humanity.”150 Objections to guaranteed income on the grounds of injustice 
without work, “its damaging effect on human creativity and social fulfillment, its overlooking the 
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incompetence and immorality of the poor, and its neglect of the need to overcome man’s 
selfishness and inertia” are rejected on the basis of denying a person’s right to physical and 
social existence.151  
Affirming this somewhat radical position of guaranteeing a minimum income floor for 
all, Wogaman is quick to warn his readers that this does not in any way equal “socialism” or any 
form of “collectivism.”152 Socialism, which Wogaman glosses as government ownership of the 
means of production, is not necessary for guaranteed annual income to work. All the means of 
production could be in private hands and still the concept would not be affected. He continues 
to push the limits of the idea of economic equality as the Christian norm, citing some exceptions 
where inequalities are necessary in order to maintain God’s covenant community. All the while 
emphatic that “guaranteed income does not mean ‘socialism.’”153 Ensuring equality of income, 
Wogaman insists, will engender a genuine sense of community and will strengthen democracy, a 
chief mechanism in bringing about God’s intention for creation.  
In his later writings Wogaman continues to be optimistic about the ability of democracy 
to defend against injustices. In The Great Economic Debate he expands his concerns from the 
narrow exploration of the ethical issues associated with a guaranteed minimum income for the 
poor to a concern with the political economy as a whole.154 The “great economic debate” of the 
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title refers to the ideological debates particularly fervent during the Cold War era about the 
organization of economic life. Wogaman compares five competing ideologies: Marxism, laissez-
faire capitalism, social market capitalism, democratic socialism, and economic conservationism. 
These he compares on the basis of “moral considerations” and pragmatic “real world” 
considerations. Ultimately, Wogaman concludes that the two ideologies on the extremes, 
Marxist communism and laissez-faire capitalism “seem to have fatal flaws which would prevent 
a Christian from espousing either without serious reservations.”155 The other three choices he 
holds out as possible positions of Christians to hold since each of these forms “can be deeply 
committed to human rights and political democracy,” “can envisage the use of economic 
production for the welfare of human beings in the good society,” and “can encompass 
safeguards against sinfulness.”156  
 Wogaman writes about liberation, and even speak approvingly of Gutiérrez, Cone, 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Segundo, but then has amnesia about this when it comes to 
creating criteria for adjudicating between political economic systems. He affirms the major 
themes of “Third World theologians” and challenges whoever believes that Christian ethics is 
mostly a “sanction of an unjust status quo” need only read their works.157 He believes that 
liberation theory “has much to teach us,” but he has one caveat. 158 While the theme of 
liberation is “laden with possibilities for an economic ethic” it does not constitute the entirety of 
Christian thinking on economic matters. A too narrow focus on liberation from oppression in 
history distracts from the overall task of Christian ethics: the “careful analysis of ultimate 
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norms” in terms of relationships to God and the material world. One needs to return to the 
basic “metaphysical and ontological commitments” to determine “whether ‘liberation’ or any 
other kind of action really matters.”159 Wogaman presents a glowing assessment of liberation 
theory and history only to immediately dismiss its insights. 
 Wogaman lists what these ultimate Christian norms relevant for economic life are on a 
number of occasions. According to Wogaman, Christian ethics applied to economic life: 
1. Understands creation as the sphere of provision for material well-being and human 
fulfillment. 
2. Upholds the basic unity of the human family undergirded by mutual love in 
community. 
3. Values each individual and is committed to individual freedom, creative 
development, and expression. 
4. Affirms the basic equality of human beings. 
5. Takes the universality of human sinfulness seriously.160 
 
A careful analysis of how these norms relate to the economy, according to Wogaman, would 
yield a moral vision of the political economy. Yet, these values would not raise eyebrows within 
current pluralistic societies.  
In Economics and Ethics, Wogaman offers an articulation of economics based on his 
interpretation of Christian moral values based on the theoretical grounding that the 
“connections between economic reality and social purpose . . . cannot be understood apart from 
an ethical frame of reference.”161 He expands his list of norms necessary for constructing a 
Christian ethical framework to six: 
1. “The material world is good because God created it to reflect good purposes” 
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2. Grace precedes works. Justice should be patterned in accordance with the priority 
of grace, in such a way to enhance human well-being, self-acceptance, and 
communal feeling without reference to what people deserve. 
3. Both physical well-being and good social relationships are necessary for the moral 
structuring of economic life. 
4. Human beings are invited to respond to God’s grace and to the creative activity of 
vocation. 
5. The perspective of stewardship allows for the enjoyment and use of property for 
loving and not selfish purposes. Treating right to property as absolute is not 
permitted. 
6. The recognition that self-centeredness—i.e., original sin—is a painful and persistent 
part of human nature. Thus blaming poverty on the character deficiencies of the 
poor is out of bounds.162  
 
Though they are stated here in theological language, many of these values are already widely 
accepted outside of Christian communities. For example, both the goodness of the physical 
world and the human tendency towards selfishness are very widely held views.163 Thus, it 
remains unclear how these two sets of values challenge the boundaries of established political 
economic order.  
For Wogaman, the relationship between economic reality and ethics is reducible to a 
choice between social priorities, based on (in)visible values that are always present.164 Choosing 
among priorities always involves a trade-off: saying yes to something necessitates saying no to 
others on all levels of decision making, from personal and family to national and international.165 
The question arises: who is to make the choices regarding social priorities? In Wogaman’s view, 
there are three possible answers to the question of who should decide: the free market, elites 
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(private, public, or party), or a responsible civil service.166 He rejects free markets as the 
exclusive means for deciding between choices because they inefficient in addressing social and 
communal concerns, such as highways and national defense. The second method, priority 
setting by some type of elites, he seemingly rejects as inefficient aristocratic paternalism, both 
on the right (extraordinarily wealthy private citizens) and left (Marxist party elites). Wogaman 
favors the third method, that of a civil service responsive to a basic ordering of social priorities 
determined through democratic means. In other words, it is democratization that matters most 
in adjudicating between political economic choices: “either a democratic capitalism or a 
democratic socialism or some mixture of the two” is acceptable as the basis for a moral political 
economy.167 
Wogaman’s Christian moral vision of the political economy has the same basic structure 
of the political economy of the liberal democratic nation-states of the world. The practical 
outworking of his moral vision are clear from his application of the norms discussed above the 
social priorities of adequate production, equity and security, employment and educational 
opportunity, conservation, and a new world order.168 In Wogaman’s system the poor and 
families in need of welfare and those who do not have adequate resources must depend on 
largess of the majority in order to participate fully in the social enterprise. His ethic provides no 
mechanism for caring for the least of these except the hope (remote as it is) that those who 
govern, chosen either through election or appointment, hold the right sorts of values in order to 
translate their concerns into actual social policy. His insistence that participatory, democratic 
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economic arrangements are most in keeping with Christian values, given the widening gap 
between rich and poor, widespread unemployment, enormous global military expenditures, and 
the threat of exhaustion of basic resources and environmental pollution (all of which Wogaman 
acknowledges as economic realities!169) constitutes a short-circuiting of the moral imagination 
and an endorsement of the status quo.  
Wogaman’s interpretation of the spectrum of the Christian moral imagination in terms 
of politics reveals the same short-circuiting of the moral imagination. Wogaman divides the 
major viewpoints—or “generating centers” as he calls them—of Christian ethics of the political 
economy into five camps: 1) Pacifist and Anarchists; 2) Liberationist; 3) Neoconservative; 4) 
Evangelical (right and left); 5) Mainstream liberal. He emphasizes that these viewpoints 
represent intellectual tendencies and thoughtfully recognizes that each is in the state of 
“dynamic development.”170 Wogaman is striving not for an airtight classification—none is 
possible—but proposes instead to explore issues. Thus, he acknowledges, there is overlap 
between categories and many of the figures discussed in one section might be discussed in 
another. Critically examining each viewpoint in turn provides evidence of how Wogaman has 
already set the conditions and boundaries of what is “imaginable” in term of the political 
economy.  
 The Christian Pacifist and Anarchist perspectives question the legitimacy of the state by 
asserting that violence and coercion, the typical tools of state action, contradict fundamental 
principles of Christian ethics. From this perspective, the heart of the gospel is nonresistance to 
evildoers (Tolstoy) or renunciation of the way of violence (Yoder). Power exercised in the 
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political order is then necessarily and by definition illegitimate; Christians cannot morally 
approve or reconcile the fundamental contradiction between Christian conviction and state 
action.171 For the pacifists-anarchist, Christians best serve the state through their personal and 
social participation in a gospel-formed reality to which the state must respond.  
According to Wogaman, they accept subjugation but not obedience to the state.172 To the extent 
that the state employs coercion and/or violence, it is something less than a Christian 
understanding of the state and can only be conditionally accepted.173  
Wogaman is cautious about any kind of pacifist-anarchist orientation. Though he 
presents it as a question, it is clear enough that he believes this orientation “may not best 
represent Christian teaching.”174 His major concern is that this perspective theologically 
weakens the legitimacy of the political order that he imagines as the proper Christian view of 
the political economy. Ultimately, Wogaman concludes, this perspective is “an inadequate one.” 
Wogaman’s caution is a form of falsifying—as delusional or unrealistic—the pacifist/anarchist 
perspective since it does not affirm the current political order.  
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At the outset, shaped by a moral imagination determined by his social and cultural 
matrix, Wogaman is unable or unwilling to imagine an alternative form of political ordering. The 
legitimacy of the state in its current configuration is a fundamental, non-negotiable part of his 
moral language. While these pacifists-anarchists do an admirable job of reminding us that 
violence is evil and “counterproductive,” and that Christians ought never to be cavalier about 
acting “coercively or violently,” Wogaman insists that their perspective is by and large 
dismissible on the grounds it fails to affirm the political order. Convinced that social 
responsibilities are best exercised in and through the current political regime, Wogaman short-
circuits the imagination, falsifying a creative alternative even when it is an alternative 
articulated in and through the symbols and categories of his basic (Christian) convictions. 
 According to Wogaman, the liberationist perspectives share many concerns about the 
legitimacy of the existing power structures of the leading pacifists thinkers. Liberation theologies 
are consciously revolutionary in respect to what it sees as oppressive structures and are critical 
of reformism.175 Reformism implies that some social-political-economic system is fundamentally 
sound and needs only improvements at some points.176 Liberationists are skeptical about 
reformism as it is seen as shoring up the current power structures and deflecting attention from 
the root causes of oppression. The call to revolution implies that the entire system is 
fundamentally, irrevocably flawed. It calls for an overthrow of existing order by the powerless 
who empower themselves. The Magnificat of Mary provides the liberationist’s slogan: “He has 
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brought down the powerful from their thrones, and lifted up the lowly; he has filled the hungry 
with good things, and sent the rich away empty.”177 
 Wogaman elaborates three “troubling points” about liberation theology in all its forms: 
1) an inadequate account of redemption given the social or institutional location of sin; 2) the 
absolutizing of the limited diagnostic tools of Marxism; 3) a seeming unwillingness to listen to its 
adversaries—or to learn from the “oppressor.” On the first point, Wogaman’s concern is the 
degree to which the liberationist account of sin rides on the outcome of concrete political 
objectives. The institutionalization of sin bothers Wogaman insofar as it suggests that 
redemption can be found in institutional change. Wogaman insists that “personal self-
centeredness of individual human beings limits both the permanence and the quality of any 
institutional change.”178 Is Wogaman suggesting there can be no just institutions as long as 
human sin—conceptualized as personal self-centeredness—persists? If so, this is not only a case 
against the revolutionary call of liberationists, but of the reformist impulse Wogaman is pointing 
towards. 
On the second point, Wogaman acknowledges that Marxist analytical tools have far 
greater value than most Western Europeans and North Americans are willing to admit. His 
concern is whether liberation theology is “open enough to presentations of empirical truth” 
unfiltered through ideological lenses, such as Marxism.179 Wogaman’s appeal to “empirical 
truth” is a way of dismissing the type of analysis of capitalism by Marxists diagnostic tools.180 
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Moreover, his appeal reveals a more troubling tendency underlying his analysis: a simple 
distinction between “truth” and ideology, between fact and values. Wogaman’s analysis, like the 
debate between moral objectivists and moral subjectivists is misguided: in as much as matters 
of fact and matters of value are not easily distinguished.181 They are best thought of as 
statements along the same continuum, with statements (whether fact or value) that are widely 
accepted by a given community of language users on one side (statements for which warrants 
are usually not demanded), and statements which are in contention on the other. For example, 
that babies should be not be chopped up for use in bullion is a value statement, but one which 
there is widespread agreement in U.S. society. Wogaman is troubled by liberation theology’s 
filtering the world through an ideological lens, one that accepts the Marxists tools as a valid 
basis for analyzing and critiquing capitalism. It is not “empirical truth” that Wogaman offers, but 
a different moral imagination, one that does not accept the validity of Marxists tools, but 
implicitly embraces capitalism. Hence, Wogaman short-circuits the imagination in refusing to 
make use of the insights of liberationist theologians.  
Wogaman’s third concern correctly emphasizes a loss of humanity on both sides that 
follows any hard and fast division of oppressor/oppressed, rich/poor, us/them. Overcoming 
oppression is as important for the oppressor as the oppressed. Agreed, although this insight is 
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not original to him: postcolonial theorists have for decades argued along these lines.182 While 
people located in places of privilege have something valuable to share, one wonder if this is just 
another way to dismiss the creative insights of those employing a different moral imagination, in 
particular those on the margins of society. It may be a form of falsification on the grounds that 
people of privilege are busy elaborating their own very valuable contributions. It is easy to see 
how the insistence that even the oppressor may have something to share can devolve into a 
reification of the oppressor’s moral imagination. 
 Conservative movements usually represent a concern to preserve institutions and 
values in the face of what is perceived as imminent danger. Conservative political regimes such 
as those of Ronald Reagan in the U.S. and Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain formed in the face 
of Soviet power and communist expansionism. With the end of the Cold War, the threats and 
dangers have shifted. Nevertheless, the mood of neoconservatives, a new generation of 
theological conservatives, remains “anti,” with communism “replaced by feminism, abortion, 
homosexuality, pornography, and the perceived liberalism of Protestant denominations and 
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councils of churches.”183 Neoconservatives should not at the outset be characterized as one-
dimensional. The latest generation of neoconservative thinkers of this orientation tends to be 
former liberals and even former radicals.184 They continue to espouse aspects of their more 
former political views and are therefore more complex than the characterization “anti” 
suggests. 
 Amid this complexity, Wogaman identifies several themes. Neoconservatives 1) affirm 
democracy, 2) emphasize a limited state, 3) exhibit a deep commitment to capitalism, 4) support 
a strong U.S. military and political presence around the world, and 5) maintain that individual 
Christians (mostly) and churches (to a lesser extent) should be engaged in political life. 
The neoconservative perspective serves as perhaps the best evidence of the limits of the 
their moral imagination: they engage in a form of falsification through an accusation that 
alternatives are delusional. Unlike pacificists and liberationists who exhibit skepticism 
concerning democracy, neoconservatives strongly affirm the superiority of democracy among 
possible political systems. For the neoconservative, democracy is indelibly linked to capitalism. A 
market economy may be “a necessary condition for democracy.”185 And capitalism promotes 
liberal-democratic political systems. In the minds of many neoconservatives, such as Paul 
Johnson, democracy and capitalism are the twin parents of freedom, and the “notions of 
political and economic freedom both spring from the workings of the Christian conscience as a 
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historical force.”186 For neoconservatives, democratic capitalism is not only a superior way to 
provide adequate material well-being for the people of the world, but is, in a substantive way, 
the form of political-economic organization ordained by God.  
When the collapse of the Soviet Empire around 1990 revealed profound flaws in the 
economic and political Soviet-style communism the neoconservatives went much further in 
condemning communism. For them, communism was not just deeply flawed; it was the enemy, 
the “prime example of social, political, economic evil of our time.”187 The absoluteness in the 
neoconservative opposition to world communism reveals an “almost Manichean tendency” 
that, as Wogaman correctly points out, is “as much a form of idolatry as the absolutizing of any 
person or movement we wish to affirm.”188 The danger is not only the spiritual danger of self-
righteousness, but a short-circuiting of the imagination, a closing off of creative possibilities.  
 Wogaman argues that evangelicals offer a great deal of fire, but very little light. The 
brevity of his treatment suggests he finds very little insight among evangelicals in terms of the 
intersection of Christian thought in politics and economics. He divides evangelicals into the right 
and left. Evangelicals of the right, while a diverse lot, share a number of views: the identification 
of Christian values with U.S. tradition, advocacy for the restoration of prayer and Bible reading 
in public schools, alarm over liberals and secular humanists, and a host of issues to which they 
are opposed including abortion, homosexuality, pornography, drugs, and gambling. While these 
positions are pursued with passion, it remains unclear how any of these positions are derived 
from a theological analysis, raising doubts that it constitutes a serious Christian conception of 
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the political economy. The evangelical right relies on intellectual capital of earlier conservative 
theologians and secular thinkers whose support for limited capital they incorporate into their 
thinking.189 Wogaman believes that the “lack of well-thought-through positions or of openness 
to dialogues with alternative views means that this movement is not—at least not yet—a strong 
generating center of Christian political thought.”190 
 Evangelicals on the left are more of “an intellectual force than their counterpart of the 
right.”191 They emphasize along with the pacifist and liberationist perspectives God’s special 
concern for the most vulnerable members of the human community. Both evangelicals of the 
right and left cite the Bible as the source of their political views. But while evangelicals of the 
right draw mostly from the prescriptive laws of the Hebrew Bible, the left characteristically 
draws on Jesus and the Prophets. Evangelicals of the left adhere to a generally conservative 
theological orientation while pressing for a liberal political agenda. Their political liberalism is 
expressed in their vigorous attention to “economic issues, civil rights, prison reform, and 
international peace” but have remained decidedly conservative in regards to their views on 
abortion and homosexuality. 
 The label “mainstream liberalism” for the fifth generation center of Christian political 
thought is somewhat misleading. Though mainstream suggests majority opinion and/or 
relationship to mainstream Protestantism, the high visibility and political success of the 
evangelical right, along with the inclusion of Roman Catholic thinkers within this perspective 
indicates otherwise. By mainstream liberal, Wogaman is referring to Christian thinkers who are 
committed to established churches and participate in crafting denominational and conciliar 
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documents. They share one fundamental theological conviction—a Niebuhrian conception of 
original sin.192 Reinhold Niebuhr’s conception of “original” sin as perennial and universal, 
ultimately based on human insecurity, was accompanied by the idea that human beings are 
capable of justice and benevolence. Two consequences for political economic ethics result from 
the view that evil and good are inherent in human beings. First, that all political solutions are 
limited and provisional. Second, since all have sinned, no one individual or group has grounds 
for self-righteousness; politics cannot be reduced to the forces of righteousness against the 
forces of evil.193 
Other characteristics mainstream liberals share: an ecumenical spirit, a reformist 
attitude towards change, a positive attitude toward government, and acceptance of the 
legitimacy of democratic states including police action. Writing in contexts where they do not 
consider revolution a viable option, mainstream liberals advocate for broad outlines of a “mixed 
economy.” They are involved in political struggles for: 1) adequate public welfare; 2) full 
employment and job training programs; 3) a more progressive tax structure; 4) adequate health 
care delivery; 5) environmental protection and energy conservation; 6) additional protections of 
public safety, such as safety features on automobiles and great regulation of nuclear reactors; 7) 
civil rights struggles; 8) support for disarmament, increased role for the UN, more generous 
foreign aid programs, and greater regulation of transnational corporations.194 
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Wogaman portrays the mainstream liberal perspective as a mediating position, 
rhetorically strengthening the position he favors.195 The mainstream liberal orientation lies at 
the center of “ether end of the ideological spectrum.”196 “The orientation is . . . treated as 
revolutionary by ideological conservatives. And radical structuralists, such as socialists, often 
characterize reformism as an implicit support for existing systems of injustice because the 
reform only serves to make the system more palatable.”197 The language of “ideological 
extremism” is another technique for dismissing more leftist or radical views. Wogaman 
acknowledges the critique that his perspective supports unjust structures, but offers no 
response except to state that “mainstream liberals remain unpersuaded by the arguments at 
either end of the ideological spectrum.”  
Wogaman believes a mainstream liberal position is the most “reasonable” one offered 
by Christian thinkers, avoiding excessive trust in any one particular political configuration, 
standing above the fray of the raging debates. Moderation and reformism are the bywords of 
the mainstream position. They will not challenge the violence and coercion inherent in state 
action (like the pacifists), nor will they stand in opposition to oppressive structures and 
institutions (like the liberationists). These are, no doubt, manifestations of humanity’s universal 
sin expressing itself. But the same human beings are capable of wondrous acts of righteousness. 
Wogaman has it right: the fundamental theological conviction of mainstream liberals is in the 
coexistence of the universality of sin with the possibility of righteousness in every person.  
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 The preceding analysis of Wogaman’s account of the full spectrum of the Christian 
moral imagination concerning politics reveals Wogaman’s affirmation of the status quo. To 
reiterate succinctly, for Wogaman, the pacifists-anarchist view categorically excludes violence 
within the range of acceptable Christian action and denigrates “‘effectiveness’ as a primary goal 
for Christians.”198 The only logical conclusion of their perspective is to somehow exist apart from 
the sate—an impossibility—or to dissolve the state. The liberationist perspective combines an 
emphasis on conscientization, insistence on praxis, and open advocacy for revolution with 
skepticism about existing political institutions and ambivalence about democracy. By identifying 
sin with current social structures, they fail to address the problem of evil and injustice after the 
revolution takes place. Neoconservatives insist on the superiority of the democracy, the 
indispensability of capitalism, the need for a limited state, the importance of social mediators, 
and the legitimacy of U.S. military and economic power abroad. They were better suited to 
opposing totalitarianism than elaborating a positive vision. Evangelicals, alternatively relying on 
the intellectual capital of an earlier era (the evangelical right) or combining a political liberalism 
with a social conservatism (the evangelical left), lack a concrete, comprehensive moral vision of 
the political economy. Despite their enthusiasm for serving justice, evangelicals on the left lack 
an understanding of the consequences of a power vacuum upon the dismantling of social 
institutions. Finally, mainstream liberals, convinced of both the universality of sin and human 
benevolence, strive to affirm what is redeemable in the current political economic climate and 
reform what is not. It advocates for Christians to achieve a balance that both stands outside of 
the mainstream society as a prophetic community and works within it to help recover a civil 
identity that grounds society. Ultimately, Wogaman envision that Christians will, “in concert 
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with people of goodwill of all faiths and nations” will forge “a new era of global community with 
peace and justice.”199  
 Wogaman builds the case that the only viable moral vision of the political economy is a 
type of reformism that emphasizes democratization within the contours of current structures. 
Wogaman’s “prophetic” Christian moral vision is basically the status quo, with some modest 
policy adjustments to curb the most grotesque forms of injustice. Attempts to creatively imagine 
alternatives that question the legitimacy of current structures (such as the inherent violence of 
state action or that existing social systems create injustice) are falsified as either fantasy or self-
deception (i.e., unrealistic and delusional). For Wogaman these alternatives are necessarily 




The task of Christian ethics is to evaluate political economic life in light of the 
requirements of the Christian faith. Some Christians uncritically endorse the political economic 
world, while others have nothing but condemnation for it. In the view of mainstream Christian 
social ethicists, the appropriate posture is somewhere in between.200 There are injustices in the 
world that are in need of prophetic critique, but a blanket condemnation of modern political 
economic systems is unwarranted.201 
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Mainstream Christian ethicists’ moral vision of the political economy is a market-based 
society circumscribed by appropriate laws and regulations, in Finn’s language, “markets with 
fences.” These Christian ethicists are concerned with what is morally defensible in the context of 
that account of political-economic life. Instead of challenging the system of capitalism, 
mainstream social ethics grapples with how market outcomes, corporate behavior, and 
government actions can be conceived of as more just.202 The entire discourse centers on 
eliminating moral abuse of both governments and markets through providing a Christian moral 
underpinning to society. The basic claim that capitalist economies improve the economic well 
being of nearly everyone is accepted as fact.203 
The three ethicists under study here are concerned not only with relating theology to 
political economy, but in constructing a Christian moral vision of the political economy. Yet it 
remains an open question whether they have done so. All three acknowledge that Christian 
teaching emphasizes the importance of the material necessities of life.204 Without adequate care 
for the conditions of the materially needy, human beings cannot be what God intended human 
beings to be spiritually. Along with Rauschenbusch, they affirm that good spirituality requires 
confronting material inequality and injustice. With Karl Barth (though Stackhouse would dislike 
being associated with him), they affirm “creation as the external basis of the covenant” and of 
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“the covenant as the internal basis of creation.”205 They hold that the material realm (creation) 
represents the preconditions for the fulfillment of the spiritual ends of human life.206 These 
thinkers insist on the relevancy of Christian theology and ethics on the practices of other 
religions (Stackhouse especially) and for the wider world. They are also clear that God has a 
special concern for the poor (Finn particularly) and values the importance of liberation from 
oppression (Wogaman here is especially sympathetic). Neither are they oblivious to the horrors 
and gross tragedies that have coincided with the rise of democratic capitalism since the 
sixteenth century. 
Yet, they have constructed a selective theology that is resonant with capitalist political 
economics rather than one that is critical of it. In their view, the brutality of laissez-faire 
capitalism has given way to social welfare capitalism, which institutionalizes a greater concern 
for the poor.207 Not everyone has benefited, true, and there have been injustices, yes. But the 
possibility still exists that economic productivity can yield a just system in which all can benefit, 
if only markets and international trade are conceived of correctly, if only theology once again 
takes on a publically accessible character, if only democratic processes are allowed to function 
properly. These Christian social ethicists do not attribute these injustices to the capitalist 
political economic climate at all. They consider these events aberrations, excesses, or outliers to 
a system that has, on the whole, brought about freedom, wealth, and well-being. They therefore 
see no fundamental incompatibility with these values and norms and global democratic 
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capitalism. From their perspective, a system which is better or more compatible with Christian 
social ethics has yet to be conceived. 
It is wishful thinking that somehow one can disrupt systems of oppression by 
perpetuating more of the same. But such wishful thinking is what Christian ethicists are engaged 
in most of the time. The result is a Christian moral vision that does not matter, one that fails in 
terms of addressing the urgent needs of the majority of the world’s peoples. It views pluralist 
liberal capitalist democracy as the best way to organize political economic life and the entire 
moral imagination is subordinated to this overarching modernist conclusion. Despite its 
purported concern for the least of these, mainstream Christian ethics poses no threat to the 
current capitalist political economic system. In fact, it affirms reformed capitalism as the system 
which is most in line with a Christian moral vision. As a result, mainstream Christian ethics fails 
to deal in any substantive way with the social realities of inequality, discrimination, and 
oppression generated by the capitalist system. Perpetrators of capitalist injustice might get 
disgusted by being gummed and slobbered on by this toothless Christian social ethics that 
supposedly protects society from oppression and inequalities.208 But they are under no real 
danger. 
The next chapter takes up the challenge of how we can expand the Christian moral 
imagination. It points to Latina/o thinking as an ethical space from which to theorize Christian 
political economic ethics, disrupt the feedback loop, and reestablish the connections of the 
short-circuited moral imagination. 
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The previous chapter argued that mainstream Christian ethicists affirm the status quo 
with some modifications, despite the insistence that their work constitutes a prophetic and 
counter-cultural call for social change. Given the growing disparity between the promises of 
capitalism—namely material prosperity and political freedom for all—and what it can deliver, 
devotion to capitalist models of political-economic development constitutes a failure of the 
moral imagination.209 
There are two ways to account for this failure of the moral imagination. The first 
concerns the epistemic limitations of theorizing from a universalizing point of view that covers 
up or conceals the geopolitical location and structures of power of the speaking subject.210 In 
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other words, the problem is with the particular point of view that presents itself as being 
without a point of view, the “point zero” of western philosophies. 211 The second lies with an 
underlying neoclassical understanding of economics combined with a rhetorical strategy that 
frames Marxist socialism and unfettered neoliberal economics as the entire spectrum of choices 
for the political economy. Given this structural framework, some form of moderated mixed 
economy (a democratic socialism or democratic capitalism) becomes the inevitable and 
“obvious” moral choice for the political economy. The second issue is addressed in chapter four 
through a heterodox analysis of mainstream Christian ethics’ weak economic framework. 
This chapter focuses on the former challenge. It moves beyond the failure of the moral 
imagination by exploring the ways in which the social location of mainstream Christian ethicists 
limits their moral imagination and by proposing an alternative social-cultural framework.212 It is 
not enough, however, to replace one social-cultural framework with another; one must instead 
construct a dynamic framework that allows for multiple subject positions and the intersection of 
cultures. What is needed is a paradigm that resists the “god’s eye view that hides its local and 
particular perspective under a universal perspective,” dualistic (either-or) conceptual paradigms, 
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monoculturalism, and ethnocentrism.213 What is needed is an epistemic framework that 
consciously and critically relates the local and particular to the global, closes the dualistic gap, 
embraces pluralism, and achieves a holistic perspective in cognition. Latino/a thinking offers 
such a framework.214  
Latina/o thinking is a pointer to Latina/o religious and cultural discourses, a way of 
referring to its insights and analyses. Latina/o thinking affirms the idea of postcolonialism, but 
from a standpoint of embodied existence on the border, of life between colonial forces and 
postcolonial imaginary. It does not precede from the orderly assumption that one can claim a 
higher moral ground by achieving a postcolonial state of being. Instead it aims for a decolonizing 
of reflections, praxis, and narratives of the other as the basis for constructing moral visions. It 
refers to the epistemological and ethical potential of thinking on the borderlands. Authors refer 
to this thinking and meaning-making on the borderlands in various ways: “new mestiza 
consciousness” (Anzaldúa), “double consciousness” (Du Bois), “creolization” (Glissant), “religious 
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poetics” (León), “border thinking” (Mignolo), “double translation” (Subcomandante Marcos).215 
These terms refer to a simultaneity of multiple (at least two) perspectives; they critically reflect 
on the hegemonic paradigm that assumes a neutral, universalistic, and objective point of view. 
They affirm that people always speak from a particular social location, acknowledging that no 
one can escape the sexist, racial, gender, and geographical hierarchies of the modern/colonial 
world system. 
Latino/a thinking is intrinsically concerned with intermixing combinations of cultures, 
languages, and thought. It incorporates rather than excludes multiple perspectives. It invites 
discontinuity and change. It refers to subjugated forms of knowledge produced by Latina/o and 
Latin American critics and religious scholars who—because of their status as a hybrid, mestiza/o, 
mulata/o, people standing between two (or more) worlds, in a “third space,”216 have gravitated 
in their scholarly work to theorize cultural and religious mixing. Some of these intellectuals, like 
Gustavo Gutiérrez, Enrique Dussel, and Walter Mignolo, live between former colonized and 
colonizing countries. Others did not move, but the world moved around them, such as American 
Indians in Latin America. Still others belong to a category somewhere between these two: 
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Chicano/as are part of migration but the world has also moved around them. Virgilio Elizondo, 
Gloria Anzaldúa, and Chela Sandoval are a few examples.217 
Other groups have engaged in this dual strategy of critical theorizing and epistemic 
decolonization: the sub-altern studies group from the Indian sub-continent and African thinkers 
focusing on inculturation, to name but two cadres. The parallel manifestation of such a strategy 
in the Americas is what is referred to here as Latina/o thinking. The argument here is not that 
Latina/o thinking is unique or that is it categorically “better” than thinking of people from mono-
cultural backgrounds (whatever that might mean). Instead, the argument is that Latino/a 
thinking offers a socio-ethical space from which to construct a moral vision of the political 
economy that counters capitalism’s complex web of oppression.  
Like a symphony, this chapter proceeds in five movements, with the addition of a 
conclusion.218 The opening movement explains how the moral imagination is socially contingent, 
analyses how the dynamic of privilege works to render invisible the concerns of those on the 
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Latina/o thinking. A more systematic and sustained discussion of their epistemological insights lies outside 
the scope of this study.  
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margins of society, and illustrates how social location and privilege work together through 
mainstream Christian ethicists’ allegiance to Niebuhr’s realism to limit the moral imagination. 
The second movement sets up the parameters of Latina/o thinking. It insists, despite claims to 
the contrary, that there is such a thing as Latina/o thought; it parses out the categories of 
Latina/o religious-cultural discourse; it warns of essentialist dangers in the quest to describe 
Latina/o thinking; and it makes the case that Latina/o thinking addresses the postmodern 
critique of the vanishing center. The third movement addresses Latina/o thinking’s potential for 
restructuring moral visions of the political economy by moving beyond identity politics, 
connecting identity and epistemic modalities through a noninnocent reading of history, a 
rearticulation of the self according to a border imaginary, and examining Latina/o thinking’s 
postexilic moments. The discussion moves apace in the next two movements which further 
explore Latina/o thinking by examining two key concepts: praxis and lived experience. In short, 
Latina/o thinking proposes a decolonizing praxis which calls for a transformation of the 
methodology and social/intellectual basis of Christian social ethics. Connected to Latina/o 
thinking’s praxis of decolonization is the concept of lived experience, which challenges rigid 
academic categories and has the potential to broaden the moral imagination.219 The final 
movement critically analyzes two concepts that have family resemblances to Latina/o thinking 
articulated among scholars associated with world system analysis: the notions of Border 
Thinking and Transmodernity.220 Both contribute and strengthen Latina/o thinking’s project of 
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decolonizing moral vision of the political economy. The chapter concludes with a summative 
rearticulation of the implications of Latina/o thinking for decolonizing and rearticulating 
Christian moral visions of the political economy.  
 
First Movement: Social Location and the Moral Imagination 
Linking Social Location and Moral Imagination 
Social location and moral imagination, or moral vision, are linked in three important 
ways. The first pertains to the recognition that the spectrum of the moral imagination is 
historically and socially contingent. Inherited symbolic systems, lived experiences, and historical 
narratives constitute the horizon of possibilities concerning what is feasible and ethically 
desirable.221 For example, medieval scholastics writing about economics in the fourteenth 
century did not consider increases in wealth to increase quality of life, let alone be an end to 
itself. For the scholastics, wealth was beneficial only if it was used in a way that was consistent 
with the demands of justice and charity. A social system built on avarice, or at least 
acquisitiveness, was unimaginable. Yet within a couple of centuries of the scholastic debates on 
wealth that began humbly in manuals for confessors, commercial attitudes pushed moral 
questions aside.222 Instead of disputing the morality of profit, profit-seeking behavior was taken 
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for granted. Thinkers began to work out the implications of people taking actions that were in 
their own interests. Economic thought was increasingly abstracted from situations of economic 
compulsion and the ethical dilemmas that gave rise to it.223 A social world in which individuals 
did not pursue their own interests, in which they would not use any means to maximize that 
interest, became unimaginable. 
Second, ethical reflection is as much a function of imagination and social sentiments—
both socio-historical accidents—as it is of rational comparison.224 Stated differently, 
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contemporary ethical debates pit not just different rational arguments against one another, but 
different moral and social imaginaries.225 Making ethical decisions in complex world—puzzling 
through possible responses using various motifs (or ways) of forming ethical norms—and 
adjudicating between responses requires drawing on one’s social location and the activation of 
the imagination. A simplistic appeal to ends, principles, or virtues cannot alone solve complex 
ethical problems. Regardless of the approach to making moral decision-making that is favored 
(either teleological, deontological, or character/virtue ethics), the active use of the social 
imaginary is required. 
Much of contemporary Christian ethical discourse that addresses imagination takes its 
understanding from Kant’s focus on its productive aspect and the Romantic Movement’s 
association of imagination with creativity, genius, and freedom.226 Imagination is conceived as 
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the human capacity or power to transform experiences into new mental constructs. Bernard 
Hoose writes in his introduction to Christian Ethics that “we stand in relation to reality not 
merely physically . . . but also through our imagination.”227 Creativity is an essential element in 
elaborating theological ethics. As Darby Kathleen Ray put is, “if there is one thing we cannot do 
without on this journey into Christian responsibilities, it is the imagination, robust and 
patient.”228 Some authors, like Cardinal J. H. Newman—concerned with the relationship 
between science and theology in the late nineteenth century—pit reason against imagination.229 
The author takes a different approach than this familiar trajectory. Moral imagination in this 
project refers to a complex social capacity which does not set imagination in opposition to 
reason, but is an inseparable part of it. Since moral judgments always involve prior imaginings, 
imagination and reason must be understood as co-constitutive elements; imagination cannot in 
any simple way be separated from reason, practical or otherwise.230 
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Third, theories of morality are irreducibly imaginative and depend largely on socially 
constructed images, schemas, metaphors, and narratives.231 Fundamental concepts of morality 
depend on deep (usually unconscious), socially mediated metaphorical understandings. 
Objectivist and rationalist approaches to moral judgments ignore how human beings actually 
make sense of the world.232 This understanding of imagination makes it clear that the spectrum 
of what is considered ethically possible is articulated out of received conceptual categories. 
Previous articulations of the moral imagination delimit boundaries for how moral action in the 
political economy is conceived/perceived. The moral imagination sets the boundaries within 
which ethicists conceive or imagine. Mainstream Christian ethicists, believing that they are 
elaborating a radical social vision, are simply producing and reproducing particular human 
conceptions of how the world works based on human social institutions, structures, and 
philosophical assumptions. This process represents a feedback loop of the Christian moral 
imagination. The feedback loop not only determines the moral imagination of ethics; it also 
creates the structure of the social reality itself. 
To make this point more concretely, consider as an illustration the following definition 
of ethics. Ethics is the analysis of how agents make judgments about good and evil, right and 
wrong. Defining ethics this way posits that there is a good or evil, right or wrong “out there,” a 
reality ready to be discovered. The binary of good and evil invokes a cosmic dualism, one 
replicated and repeated in the development of ethical models. The mind of the ethicists is 
therefore prepped, biased by their own conceptualization of the type of work they are engaged 
in, to misrepresent the complexity, ambiguity, and pluralism of contemporary society. Consider 
another illustration: the relationship between ethics and philosophy. Ethicists look to philosophy 
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(among other disciplines) for insights in elaborating their own reflections. Yet philosophical 
views depend on the cultural and historical climate in which they arise. Ethicists who rely on 
philosophy are thus stuck in a feed-back loop, endlessly rehearsing the same tired ideas about 
how to reason through complex moral issues like the political economy.233 Their imagination is 
disengaged; the world of the possible is transmuted into the world of the likely, and finally into 
the world of what is expected and anticipated. There is nothing new under the sun and ideas 
which do not correspond to “reality” as constructed in the incestuous western intellectual 
tradition are relegated to operations of fanciful, or worse, deluded minds.234 
 
Privilege, Oppression, and the Moral Imagination 
The social construction of reality, which is then internalized and becomes part of an 
individual’s consciousness, begins to explain how privilege allows Christian ethics to define 
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reality as fitting the experience of privileged theorists.235 One of the most visible consequences 
of this privilege is an uneven distribution of income, wealth, and jobs along with everything 
associated with it, from good housing to access to education and health care. As such, its 
concerns are about the right mix of government and markets, or the inherent morality of 
markets, or theorizing stewardship, or analyzing the common good. These projects are replete 
with insights into how to make Christian ethical reflections in a complex “secular” society 
relevant, and how to conceive the relationships between politics, economics, and theology. 
They simply fail to deal with the elephant in the room: a society in which for many people it is 
difficult to live decent and productive lives. Rather than challenging the yawning divide in levels 
of income, wealth, dignity, and quality of life, these ethical systems affirm the basic structures of 
society and ignore the social structures that attach privilege to being white, male (mostly), 
heterosexual, and nondisabled.236 
One of the most insidious characteristics of privilege is that is usually invisible to those 
who have it. Privilege is an unearned benefit granted to members of a particular group that is 
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denied to other because they belong to a different group.237 Privileges that some groups enjoy 
at the expense of others create the corroding effect of oppression on millions of people every 
day. And yet it is easy to be unaware of being granted these privileges. As members of a 
privilege social class, mainstream professional Christian ethicists have a vested interest in 
defending the status quo and ignoring the way in which the current political economic 
configuration deals death. It is much easier to focus on issues of that have the least to do with 
the matrix of privilege and oppression.238 The ease of unawareness to privilege is an aspect of 
privilege itself. Social problems of oppressed people are routinely ignored, even as close 
attention is paid to privilege and privileged culture. 
While mainstream Christian ethicists may acknowledge the important of views from 
oppressed people groups, in their theorizing they stay safely within the established canon 
(which of course represents the perspective of privilege). The interests of those who are female 
or of color or in some other way on the outside of privilege are not represented by mainstream 
Christian ethics. Since these interests are routinely overlooked, they become invisible. This 
becomes a major way in which patterns of privilege and oppression repeat themselves again 
and again. 
Latina/o thinking troubles this state of mainstream Christian social ethics. As much as 
people might wish that the U.S. had moved in the 21st century into a post-racist/ethnic 
prejudiced society, the reality of most U.S. Latina/os says otherwise. Segregation in housing and 
education are stubborn and pervasive. The average wealth of white families is almost 15 times 
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that of Latina/os and Black families.239 The average annual household income for whites is 44.6 
percent greater than Latina/os and 70.3 percent greater than African Americans. Income 
advantages among whites exist on all levels of educational achievement.240 Middle class 
Latina/os and blacks who believe what whites told them, that if they went to school and worked 
hard, race/ethnicity would not be an issue, are discovering that nothing can protect them from 
structures of white racism.241 Latina/os thinking destabilizes the binary epistemes that form the 
foundations of ethical analysis of the political economy. It also invites those of privilege groups 
to take ownership over their own involvement in systems of privilege in order to discover what 
can be done to heal the dysfunctionality in the system.  
Oppression, hostility, and violence on the basis of difference are part and parcel of a 
peculiar political economic system which has become the basis for every other social institution: 
capitalism. The rise of capitalism is linked historically with the invention of whiteness and racism 
on the basis of skin pigmentation, that is, for less time than Europeans have been aware of 
other “races.”242 For most of recorded history, differences that are now considered so crucial 
were considered socially irrelevant. However, when Europeans began to conquer and exploit for 
their own economic gain, the idea of race was developed to justify their behavior on the 
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grounds of racial superiority.243 Skin color, which had no importance in social life, became 
something significant in order to justify and enforce privilege within the capitalist system. 
 The dynamics of capitalism produce an enormous amount of wealth but high and 
increasing levels of inequality, within societies and globally. Capitalism manifests as a race to the 
bottom: creating jobs for the least skilled, least powerful, and most vulnerable. It is a system 
that creates and perpetuates oppressive conditions. For those living at the bottom the cost in 
terms of living conditions is enormous. Even among those who are employed, the capitalist class 
system offers little security and takes an emotional toll.244 It’s surprising, given these 
characteristics of capitalism, that mainstream Christian ethicists parrot arguments about 
capitalism being the only viable way to organize the political economy. It’s a bizarre outcome 
that results partly from their privileged social location and having benefited from capitalism. 
 
Niebuhrian Realism as Limitation 
Mainstream Christian ethicists’ social location and privilege work together, through their 
reliance on Niebuhrian realism, to limit their moral imagination.245 They argue for the superiority 
of Christian realism by affirming the paradox of the basic goodness of God’s creation, including 
human nature, with the ubiquitous presence of sin. Niebuhr’s Christian realism, they argue, is 
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 More will be said about capitalism’s deleterious effects in chapter four. 
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profoundly relevant for politics and democracy.246 They approvingly cite Niebuhr’s conviction 
that “the human capacity for good makes democracy possible, and the human capacity for evil 
makes democracy necessary.”247 Adherence to realism also supports for their opposition to 
liberation utopianism. For Stackhouse, liberationists are “on the fringes of serious political and 
economic thought” which for him is a definitive argument against it.248  
Stackhouse and Wogaman’s dismissal of liberationist’s moral visions as “naïve” and 
“unrealistic” is an odd sort of critique. To the extent that the goal is to imagine another social 
reality, it is poor practice to insist on “realism” at the outset. The initial task of the imaginative 
construction of a moral political economy is not policy recommendations, which are a second 
order activity, but to broaden the conception of what is possible. John Milbank provides a 
profound critique. He insists that Niebuhrian realism itself is an impoverished concept: 
The Christian grasp of reality right from the start is utterly at variance with 
anything the world supposes to be ‘realistic’. This is why it is so absurd 
deliberately to import the world’s realism into the sphere of Christian ethics as 
if, when it came to the practical crunch, we could set our entire religious vision 
to one side. In Christian terms it is the world that will never understand the 
world aright.249 
 
Most mainstream Christian ethicists accept Niebuhr’s Christian realism. The result is a sort 
politics of the possible, short-circuiting any notion of what is ultimately good and liberating. A 
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reliance on realism sets limits on their moral imagination and serves to legitimate reformed 
democratic capitalism.250 
 
Second Movement: Parameters of Latina/o Thinking 
¿Existe un Pensamiento Latino/a? 
Latina/o thinking can serve as an alternative social-cultural framework from which to 
elaborate Christian political economic ethics. But a possible difficulty exists in undertaking this 
type of argument. Some, like the Peruvian Augusto Salazar Bondy continue to ask ¿Existe una 
filosfía de nuestra América? (does a (Latin) American philosophy exist?), that is, a type of 
philosophy that is not contemplated by the classic accounts of what is called philosophy.251 In 
Filosofia de la liberacion latinoamericana, Leopoldo Zeo identifies Juan Bautista Alberdi as one 
of the pioneers of Latin American philosophy.252 Alberdi’s work “Ideas para un Curso de Filosofía 
Contemporánea” takes the existence of a distinctly Latin American thought for granted.253  
                                                          
250
 Long refers to this as “epistemological humility” Long, Divine Economy, 40. 
 
251
 Augusto Salazar Bondy, ¿Existe una Filosfía de Nuestra América?, decimosexta edición ed. 
(México, D.F.: Siglo XXI editores, S.A., [1968] 2004). This is not, it turns out, a new question. In 1925 José 
Carlos Mariátegui raised the question of whether there is a distinctly Latin American thought or 
philosophy and the question in various forms have been posed by Hispanic/Latino/a thinkers since. For a 
broader discussion see Susana Nuccetelli, "Is 'Latin American Thought' Philosophy?," Metaphilosophy 34, 
no. 4 (2003). Available on-line at http://web.stcloudstate.edu/sinuccetelli/Latin_thought.htm#_edn1, 
accessed July 31, 2010.  
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The problem, as José Carlos Mariátegui points out, is that many Latin American thinkers 
have been educated in Euro-American schools.254 Thus, raising the question: is Hispanic 
American thought merely a rhapsody of elements composed of motifs and fragments of Euro-
American thought? It is certainly possible to argue that Latina/o thinking is culturally dependent 
on North Atlantic societies. One could undertake a comparative approach to see if such a claim 
is supported by surveying prominent Hispanic thinkers. The results of such study would most 
likely prove only that Hispanic thought fails to be distinct from the Western tradition, since it 
has not produced the major figures and “isms” that indicate an original tradition.255 But this view 
is based on an incorrect assumption: that distinctly Latina/o thought must deny or reject its 
Euro-American elements to become Latina/o. Yet Euro-American thought forms are a 
constitutive aspect of what Latina/o thinking means. At its best, Latina/o thinking embraces the 
best of modernity, unlike Third World and/or Indigenous fundamentalism that shun these 
elements in their totalizing rejection of Euro-American thought.256  
Latina/o thinking does exists, but in a form that intersects with, runs parallel to, and 
sometime contradicts Euro-American thought.257 The content of Latina/o thinking largely 
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depends on one’s questions and interests. In history, which asks about the significance of the 
past to understand the present and construct the future, it is about the sense of history and the 
philosophy of history. In social sciences, it involves a new interpretation of social structures and 
institutions, such as dependency theory. And in cultural-religious discourse, in particular 
liberation theology and philosophy, it is about the establishment of the Reign of God, a rein of 
justice and liberation, in which human beings are no longer exploited.258 
 
Praxis and Lived Experience 
 The massive body of socio-cultural-religious texts produced by Latina/o scholars since 
the 1960s can be grouped into categories: liberation theology, philosophy, and pedagogy and 
narratives of resistance and liberation.259 That is, these texts focus on either the idea that 
thoughtful action or active thought is transformative or liberatory (often called praxis) or the 
importance of the personal narrative and other expressions of lived experience. These texts are 
the discursive component of transformative social movements, including the continued 
organization of indigenous groups (Rigoberta Menchú, Chiapas), the movement towards a more 
inclusive and multicultural society (César Chávez), the emergence of Christian base ecclesial 
communities (Gutiérrez, Boff), and development of alternative notions of pedagogy geared 
towards collective consciousness-raising (Freire). These Latina/o discursive manifestations of 
religion and social change, in addition to offering fresh examples to the tired, often used cases 
of King and Ghandi, serve as a new way to explore the complex and not always transparent 
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relationships between discursive, social, and cultural-religious change. They suggest the two loci 
of Latina/o thinking explored later in this chapter: praxis and lived experience.  
 
A Non-Essentialized Approach: A Lesson from Latina/o Identity Debates 
A deployment of Latina/o thinking as a method for formulating a cultural-religious 
framework is fraught with essentialist dangers that find parallels in the scholarly quest to 
describe Latina/o identity. Some scholars have attempted to portray Latina/o identity 
(understandably so) by describing the essential traits of Latinidad, the central characteristics or 
constitutive elements of life embodied in a Latina/o context. Invocations of Latinidad rarely 
question its exclusionary premises, especially in regards to gender and sexuality.260 The results 
of these studies have been a portrait of “homo hispanicus,” and other flat, one-dimensional 
characterizations of an enormously diverse set of peoples.261 Another, more sophisticated 
technique has been to define latinoness as the mixing between two cultures, its mestizo/a 
characteristic.262 Still others argue that this fails to go far enough and treat latinidad in 
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relationship to hybridity, pointing to complex negotiation of meanings rather than essential 
characteristics as a way to conceptualize Latina/os identify.263  
 It is this last perspective that best describes Latina/o identity. Thus, debates on Latina/o 
identity emphasizes that Latina/o thinking must eschew essentialized descriptions in favor of 
non-essentialized approaches.264 The Hispanic is creatively localized in-between worlds and 
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within worlds constituting the intercultural “border,” not as essences or reductive elements, but 
as being involved in the dialectical creation and integration of new components in the process of 
historical development.265 The dignity of this historical development should be affirmed as a way 
to destabilize the Anglo strategy of jealously projecting “su alegada superioridad cultural, 
política, religosa” (his or her alleged cultural, political, and religious superiority).266 
 
The Postmodern Case for Latina/o Thinking 
Postmodernism, as Lyotard defines it, is “incredulity towards metanarratives.”There is 
no single story, no metanarrative that holds the center together or allows a place from which to 
stand.267 Since, according to postmodernist thought, nothing that is known can be checked 
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against reality as such, what is the basis of commending a particular story, or way of making 
meaning, over another? Postmodern theorists have responded in various ways. Willad Van 
Orman Quine provides one basis for adjudication: 
Truth is whatever we can get our colleagues (our community) to agree 
to. If we can get them to use our language then—like the “strong poets” Moses, 
Jesus, Plato, Freud—our story is as true as any story will ever get. 
 Of course, if our story doesn’t “work,” if we fail to have a language that 
allows us safely to “cross a street when a bus is coming,” few of us will be 
around long in a modern city. Some language will pass out of existence because 
the language framers did not survive long enough to have children to whom 
they taught the language. But since many human languages—from Hindi to 
Mandarin to Swahili—keep us alive in the cities, they have all the truth value 
needed to keep us from being hit by a bus.268 
 
In short, the only kind of truth is the kind of truth related to practical affairs. It is on this basis 
that one can adjudicate between social-cultural perspectives: their usefulness in keeping people 
alive. There is no “truth of correspondence,” but there is efficaciousness of language insofar as it 
acknowledges death dealt out by current political economic systems and ethical reflections 
around it. 
Another way to adjudicate between competing socio-linguistic-cultural perspectives is 
to deploy Alasdair MacIntrye’s scheme for evaluating large-scale traditions. According to 
MacIntyre, a tradition can be rationally accepted if it is internally consistent and has the 
resources to address the intellectual crises it faces.269 As an example, consider the crises faced 
by the Christian tradition. Christianity survived the crucifixion of Jesus, the delay of the second 
coming beyond the lifetime of the apostles, the introduction of Aristotelian thought by Arabian 
conquests, and (much later in the 19th century) the rise of the historical-critical method. As 
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Christianity faces each of these crises, it reevaluates its account of the historical situation, 
reconstructing itself in light of these challenges. The Christian tradition thus can be rationally 
accepted, on the basis of its ability to face intellectual crises and internal consistency. Latina/o 
thinking demonstrates the same type of internally consistency and survival of intellectual crises. 
In an intellectual age (in the sense of intellectual history) that is becoming more and 
more postmodern, awash in a pluralism of perspectives, there is no sense of how to get from 
here to there. The horizon has been washed away. The fixed center has vanished. Cultural 
anarchy seems inevitable. What is needed is an intellectual-cultural framework that has 
resources for dealing with the washing away of the horizon and the vanishing of the center. A 
framework that accounts for various perspectives not in an either/or fashion, but a both/and. 
Latina/o thinking offers just such a framework.  
 
Third Movement: Thinking Beyond Identity Politics 
The third movement explores the ambiguous relationship between identity and 
knowledge production by drawing from postcolonial and Latina/o religious and cultural 
discourses. Latina/o histories and identities are indelibly linked to epistemic modalities which 
begin to address epistemic injustices. By connecting identity with the notions of noninnocent 
reading of history, exploring the European “I,” New Mestiza consciousness, la facultad, 
hybridity, and mestizaje-mulatez, Latina/o thinking offers new epistemic modalities, rather than 
just an articulation of an identity or a transmission of knowledge from a particular perspective. 
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Noninnocent Reading of History 
Latina/o thinking draws on the concept of a noninnocent history as a way of moving 
beyond questions of identity to Hispanic ways of perceiving and knowing.270 Justo González 
contends that understanding U.S. Latina/o experience necessitates a “noninnocent” reading of 
history.271 Innocent history is constructed from a singular perspective that justifies its political 
goals religiously.272 U.S. history, as taught in schools and even universities, is guilty of such 
innocence.273 González insists that as long as this country constructs its past as an innocent, “it 
does not have to deal with the injustices that lie at the heart of its power and its social order.”274 
In an innocent telling of history, Hispanics are either constructed as the “beneficiaries” of 
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missionary activity or they disappear altogether. A noninnocent history unveils the hidden 
tradition of oppression and violence and the rationalizing of that behavior.275 Latina/o thinking, 
as expressed in González’s noninnocent telling of history, articulates far more than an identity. It 
recognizes that societal norms that establish and authorize knowledge often ascribe more 
credibility to the powerful than the powerless. It makes clear that the present order is result of 
theft, and not merely “hard labor, daring enterprise, and rugged individualism.”276 
 
The European “I” and Latina/o Thinking 
 Claims about another way of thinking, an alternative reflective process are often met 
with skepticism. The astonishment—sometimes cloaked as righteous anger—that their ways of 
thinking are not the only ways is paralleled in the agonizing discovery, when they made their 
way across the Atlantic, that they are not the only people.277 But the Euro-Americans’ agony 
merits diagnosis. It must be uncovered how Euro-Americans came to totalize their experiences 
in order to uncover if Latina/o ways of thinking are different from theirs.  
Predecessors to today’s Euro-Americans did not center themselves in the same way. For 
example, Francis of Assisi recognized God within the other. But, as Dussel explains, the subject 
of the self, the European “I” is the beginning of a process. The first experience of the “I” is that 
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of “I conquer.”278 The foundation of its potency is in the “I conquer” of Cortez or Pizarro. “The 
European “I” begins with “I have sovereignty over all the lands” of the Hispanic king.”279 The 
second stage begins with Descartes “I think.” Descartes doubts everything, even his own senses 
and body. The result is the reduction of the self to a disembodied soul. The foundation of 
everything else is this “I think.” With this foundation in place, the other is subliminated, 
diminished, belittled, if not outright denied. The Indian, the African, and the Asian are reduced 
not as something exterior but ideas internal to the system of the “I.” Finally, the “I” becomes an 
“I will to power” in Nietzsche. He envisions a psychologically healthier being beyond the 
common human conditions who creates, as an artist does, all from within. Things exists when I 
believe them to exist. The “I” is the complete man (übermenschlich).280  
The “I” that emerges is unconditional and indeterminate. Nothing comes before it, no 
previous condition. Since it comes first, all determination is within the “I.” This “I” is an 
autonomous chooser who transcends cultural norms. Isolated from the interpersonal 
relationships, social responsibilities, and larger social forces, the European self lacks emotional 
bonds and commitment to social conventions that undermine ethical duty. Beyond this “I” there 
is nothing, the nothing about which nothing can be said.281  
Latina/o thinking offers a different way of articulating the self and points towards the 
possibility of another logic. It is a configuration of the border imaginary, in contrast to an 
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Atlantic imaginary, which has become the imaginary of the modern/colonial world.282 Latina/o 
thinking names a dynamic, multi-valent cultural milieu and the conditions of misery, poverty, 
discrimination, and deprivation that is the norm for so many living on the borderlands. It 
represents epistemic modalities that cannot be disassociated from the conditions and sites of its 
production. It calls into question the omissions and interpretations of the victors of history. 
Thus, Latina/o thinking holds potential for restructuring moral visions of the political economy 
by supplementing the victor’s partial perspective with those of the vanquished and calling into 
question the suffering which is the basic condition of those on the “underside of modernity.”283  
 
Latina/o Thinking’s Postexilic Moments  
Latina/o thinking also expresses the relationship between identity, history, and 
epistemic modalities through the concept of the postexilic.284 For a myriad of reasons and in 
various ways, Latina/os have been exiled from their homelands, often as a result of U.S. foreign 
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policy.285 Some of Latina/os are literal exiles. For political, economic, or ideological reasons—
more likely some combination of these—Latina/os fled their countries. They later understood 
that the U.S. supported the right-wing dictatorships Latina/os were fleeing and that the U.S. 
economic policies created the poverty at home. Whatever the reason, their lands of birth are 
now lost to them; they live in this adopted land. And though they no longer have any other land, 
they nevertheless remain exiles. Other Latino/as are not exiles in the sense that they left their 
lands of birth to come here. They were born here, and in many cases so were their parents and 
grandparents. Although they may be citizens by birth, they are not treated as full citizens; they 
remain “exiles living in a land that remains foreign.”286  
Latina/o religious scholars have theorized exile as a method of exploring the 
connections between U.S. Latina/o experiences, identity, and epistemic modalities and ancient 
Judean communities. For instance, Miguel De La Torre contends that juxtaposing the portrayal 
of the Israelites’ Babylon captivity found in Psalm 137 sheds light on the social location of Cuban 
exiles.287 The forced removal that happens during the galut—the Hebrew word translated exile, 
banishment, or diaspora—becomes more than a reinvention of identity. It becomes a “religious 
condition” and raises questions of theodicy in the mind of the displaced: How can God allow 
such a fate to come to pass on God’s people?288 The Judeans living in the foreign land of Babylon 
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drew on their faith to cope with their existential situation by finding new meaning in the 
humiliation and shame of their displacement, not just by reinventing their community’s identity. 
Exilic Cubans have also abstracted important events of the past to engage in meaning making in 
the present, a type of meaning-making that functions as a critique of prevailing ideologies.289 De 
La Torre makes explicit how the pain of exile and the struggle to cope generates a new 
religiosity. For Cubans and Judeans residing in a foreign land, (re)negotiating a (post)exilic 
identity determines their sociopolitical reality and justifies their worldview. Their alienation 
from their homeland forces a religious quest that reconfigures identity and a new 
consciousness.290 
Latina/o thinking connects postexilic moments with knowledge and aesthetics that are 
not established by transcendent subjects, but historical ones in diverse cultural centers. Within 
Latina/o thought, Chicana feminist Gloria Anzaldúa’s New Mestiza consciousness—a 
transformed state of feminist, political, and social awareness—represents a powerful alternative 
aesthetic and political hermeneutic.291 Anzaldúa’s work is characterized by a struggle to develop 
a language that offers new conceptual repertoire for understanding human existence. For 
Anzaldúa, the alternative form of knowing that comes about through la facultad (faculty). 
Anzaldúa defines la facultad as “the capacity to see in surface phenomena the meaning of 
deeper realities, to see the deep structure below the surface.”292 La facultad is “latent in all of 
us” but is more developed in postexilic subjects (or for Anzaldúa, those on the border) who are 
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constantly “against the wall” and experience “all sorts of oppression.”293 This sense is more apt 
to develop in “those who do not feel psychologically or physically safe in the world . . . the 
females, the homosexuals of all races, the darkskinned, the outcast, the persecuted, the 
marginalized, the foreign.”294 La facultad arises as a necessity, as a survival technique to assess 
threats and manage fear. Anzaldúa contends that Latina/os are “forced to develop this faculty 
so that we’ll know when the next person is going to slap us or lock us away.”295 It is a type of 
non-verbal perception, an acute awareness that communicates in “images and symbols which 
are the faces of feelings.”296 Anzaldúa’s configuration of Latina/o thinking insists that perception 
and understanding derived from pain, suffering, and loss, from an unwarranted and sudden 
offense and the fear of it happening again is a legitimate source of knowledge.  
The intersection of the postcolonial notion of hybridity to mestizje and mulatez, 
constitutes another postexilic moment in Latina/o thinking, one that speaks about the diversity 
of the human experience.297 For Hommi Bhabha, an Indian literary critique and key figure in 
postcolonial discourse, hybridity emerges as a product of colonialism. Hybridity is a state of in-
betweenness, a “third-space” of communication, negotiation, and translation resulting from the 
colonial cultures inability to replicate itself in a homogenized manner.298 Bhabha’s notion of 
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hybridity is nothing new for Latina/o scholars who anticipated his theoretical moves.299 
Nevertheless, Bhabha is a good starting point for understanding the diversity and multiplicity of 
postcolonial/postexilic/border subjectivity and its relationship to epistemic modalities. Bhabha 
highlights the ambiguous nature of the colonial process and the always unstable notion of 
culture. However, Bhabha’s notion of hybridity has its limitations. As Alred J. López argues, 
Bhabha’s writings represents a rejection of the progressive narratives of liberation in favor of 
the language of postmodernism.300 In trying to offer a theory that is applicable to colonialism in 
general, Bhabha has abstracted away historical particularities. The result is that Bhabha’s notion 
of hybridity fails to remain rooted in the daily struggles of peoples’ lives. Turing to the Latina/o 
mestizo/a and mulato/a context allows a concretization of Bhabha’s ideas in a way that both 
affirms and expands Bhabha’s notion of hybridity.301  
As a part of Latina/o thinking within the identity/knowledge complex, mestizaje-mulatez 
offers a way to reconceptualize difference and identity.302 Latino/a thinking transforms 
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mestizaje-mulatez from merely a way of representing and referencing Hispanics into an ethical 
choice and a hermeneutical tool for reinterpreting difference.303 Latina/o thinking’s embracing 
of mestizaje-mulatez as an ethical choice constitutes a denunciation of the racism/ethnic 
prejudice and the poverty it generates among Hispanics.304 Difference is reconceptualized as 
heterogeneity, not as absolute otherness or mutual exclusion. The mestiza/o and mulato/a 
embodies multiple traditions and cultures simultaneously, challenging the dominant 
conceptions of difference. The dominant and the deviant, the self and the other, are contained 
in the same body, not as discrete parts, as if one could cut off the European or Amerindian or 
African part of themselves, but as aspects of the same being, creatively intermingling. From the 
mestizo/a and mulato/a perspective of Latina/o thinking, it is clear that different cultures have 
value and that the attempt to eliminate cultural differences constitutes a great evil, something 
that should be resisted.  
Latina/o thinking’s postexilic moments given rise to la facultad, hybridity, mestizo/a-
mulato/a, revealing a strategy of resistance to the insistence of homogenized epistemic 
modalities and rigid, inflexible social orders. Latina/o thinking represents a condition of 
possibility—a creative opportunity—to construct moral visions which challenge the established 
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frameworks of thinking and knowing.305 For Christian ethicists aiming to articulate an anti-
capitalist moral vision of the political economy that moves beyond identity politics, Latina/o 
thinking can open up new hitherto unimagined conceptual possibilities.  
 
Fourth Movement: Decolonizing Praxis and Lived Experience 
Brief Genealogy of Praxis 
This section addresses Latina/o thinking’s praxis of decolonization as a way of 
decolonizing moral visions of Christian ethics. But before undertaking this task, it is appropriate 
to (briefly) trace the genealogy of the notion of praxis in some key figures in the western 
philosophical tradition, beginning with Aristotle, then flash-forwarding to the Hegel and Marx.306  
Aristotle understood the free person as having three ways of relating to life, or 
alternatively, three human activities through which understanding arises: theoria, praxis, and 
poiesis.307 The three ways represent speculative (theoria), practical (praxis), and productive 
(poiesis) modes of interaction of the reflective subject with the objective world: they are 
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therefore three different ways of knowing. The difference lies mainly in their telos or their 
intended purpose. Theoretical knowledge is an end in itself, while practical knowledge engages 
in the ordering of human actions, and productive knowledges leads to the creation of 
artifacts.308  
Aristotle used the term praxis in a number of different ways, but with a basic 
commonality. For Aristotle, praxis means a reflective action through which knowing arises 
through social engagement. In praxis, knowing arises not from inward speculation, but form the 
experience of social situation and intentional engagement with it.309 Given the purposes of 
Christian ethics discussed above, it is reasonable to argue for the praxis way of knowing as an 
epistemological basis for ethics.310 The praxis way of knowing must dialectically unite theory and 
practice in a rearticulation of the Christian community’s narrative and vision.311  
Rather than seeing these concepts in opposition, as is held by common interpretation, 
Aristotle understood poiesis and praxis as cooperating together to make possible the life of 
theoria.312 Yet, Aristotle is partly to blame for the dichotomizing of theory and praxis that later 
developed. While he understood the three forms of knowing to be interrelated, theoria led to 
the highest form of wisdom, sophia, and functioned as its own end. After Aristotle’s death, 
                                                          
308
 Nikolaus Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983 [1967]), 127.  
 
309
 See Aristotle et al., The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford (Oxfordshire); New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), book 1, chapter 5.  
 
310
 Like other discourses, the discourse of Christian ethics analysis and critiques theories and 
methods for engaging in ethics. Unlike other discourses, it claims that its purposes go far beyond that to 
the development of moral character, to persuasion of moral agents, and shaping of society.  
 
311
 For a similar claim about Christian education see Groome, Christian Religious Education: 
Sharing Our Story and Vision, 156. 
 
312




poiesis as a way of knowing fell out of favor.313 Largely as a result of the influence of the Neo-
platonists, the primacy that Aristotle gave to theoretical knowledge was further emphasized and 
praxis as a way of apprehending the world was greatly downgraded. Over time, speculative, 
theoretical knowledge became the primary way of knowing without qualification. While 
Aristotle held that both theoria and praxis were two aspects of the free human life, praxis was 
now spurned. The result was a mindset that becomes typical of Western philosophy: to know 
the world one should begin with speculative type of knowing and then apply, if any application 
existed, to practice.314  
Slowly, human knowledge as a reflection on experience was reestablished. G. W. F. 
Hegel (1770-1831) began to use the term praxis in these terms. He deepened the rational 
moment of praxis far beyond Aristotle’s notion. Hegel’s understanding of praxis is tied into the 
organizing theme of his philosophy, what he called the Geist. The Geist is the all-encompassing 
“Spirit” that is the sum total of all creation possibility. For Hegel, all praxis is the praxis of the 
Geist.315 History in Hegelian terms is an ongoing and dialectically evolving praxis, shaping the 
future towards the development of human freedom through praxis. Knowing is not realizing 
through speculative theorizing about the world, but by reflection on and participation in the 
praxis of the Geist. 
One can draw two lessons from Hegel’s understanding of praxis as a way of knowing. 
First, he rejects the underlying assumptions of theory to practice model. Hegel challenges the 
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primacy of theoria, proposing instead the primacy of praxis. Second, he rejects the dichotomy 
between theory and praxis: they bond together in a fundamental unity. For Hegel, praxis 
becomes the actualizing of Geist, and theoria becomes human reflection on the Geist’s 
actualization.316 This unity of praxis and theory appears in Latina/o thinking’s approach to praxis 
in the attempt to decolonize moral visions. However, Hegel’s conception of praxis contains a 
fundamental flaw. For Hegel, human knowing is merely consciousness of the Geist’s praxis. 
Thus, there is no self-initiated reflective and active engagement. That is, Hegel’s praxis is overly 
contemplative, receptive, and passive. One can only speculate that Hegel was caught up in the 
Greek theoretical mode of knowing.317 While Hegel brought a praxis way of knowing back to the 
attention of western philosophy, his conception is not adequate for the purposes of Christian 
social ethics.  
Marx understood that Hegel’s grand system contained this fundamental problem: 
though it promised a type of salvation through the actualization of the Geist, the world 
remained unchanged. Marx came to see Hegel’s idea of the Geist as no more than an ideology—
a false consciousness—that legitimizes the world as it appears to be as the world ought to be.318 
Still fascinated by Hegel’s system, Marx replaced humankind in the place of Geist, so that the 
evolutionary process became a human activated one. For Marx, then, knowledge is not a 
reflection of the consciousness of Geist, but a reflection of “historical materialism,” the modes 
of production and the material means of existence. 
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According to Marx, the alienation that occurs is the result of the objectification of the 
inner life of the laborer. The reappropriation of one’s labor leads to a “material synthesis” in 
which true self-consciousness is achieved. However, in a capitalist system, where the products 
of labor are controlled by the owners of the means of production, this process is stymied. Thus, 
a revolutionary praxis, Marx claimed, is necessary to change social and economic structures so 
workers can share in the products of their labor. For Marx, human praxis becomes the agency in 
history of freedom and emancipation. Labor, which mediates between subject and objects is 
both a means of engaging in the world and a means of knowing it. One knows about the world 
as she engages in critical reflection that transforms the world.319 
Two insights are distillable from Marx’s praxis way of knowing. First, Marx affirms 
human knowing demands human creativity and initiative as active participants in human praxis. 
In this he has already moves beyond Hegel. A second insight is that authentic knowing should 
transform reality towards human freedom and emancipation. But Marx’s notion of praxis is also 
deficient for the purposes here. Marx reduces human beings to products of their own labor. An 
exclusively materialist way of knowing can never be adequate for Christian ethics. The human 
emancipation Marx hoped for is entirely the product of human efforts. This is a type of 
Pelagianism that denies the transcendental realities incongruent with the Christian tradition. 
Moreover, in positing labor as the mediating moments between subject and object, Marx 
reduces the reflective moment in praxis to the level of “instrumental action.”320 Marx limits the 
breadth and scope of the reflective moment in praxis. 
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Praxis of Decolonization 
Latina/o thinking offers a broadened understanding of the active and reflective 
moments of praxis that transcends the limitations of Marx’s position. A view of praxis as 
decolonization, as part of Latina/o thinking, can serve as a basis for rearticulating Christian 
moral visions of the political economy. 
In Latina/o thinking, the term praxis can be traced genealogically to two sources. The 
first is the Latin American Episcopal Councils (CELAM), from Medellín (1968) to Puebla (1979), 
which pushed the findings of Vatican II to more progressive ends.321 The second is through 
reflections developed in response to the conditions of oppression and exclusion experienced by 
the majority of those in Latin America. Although both sources are theological, their deployment 
of praxis reveals enormous sociological, political, and economic implications.  
Gustavo Gutiérrez’s A Theology of Liberation, largely a product of the reflections of 
CELAM meetings, symbolized a significant shift in understanding praxis. Gutiérrez redefined 
theology as “a critical reflection on Christian praxis in light of the Word” enables the 
radicalization of the same praxis of liberation.322 For Gutiérrez, praxis is conscious human action 
that affects economic and political structures aimed at liberative transformation of human 
history.323 Theory and praxis are not separate; there is an inseparable and intimate relationship 
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between the two.324 Juan Luis Segundo expands the concept of praxis by arguing that any 
theological ethics worthy of attention stems from a commitment to change and improve the 
world.325 Praxis leads to a new interpretation of sociological realities which in turn leads to a 
fresh reading of the Bible and an impetuous to change the world and then go back and 
reinterpret the Bible again, and so on.326 This is Segundo’s “hermeneutic circle,” a circular 
interpretation of the world, word, and work towards transformation (praxis). 
Latina/o thinking’s praxis of decolonization enables an approach to ethics that moves 
beyond the subject-object distortion that continues to characterize the modern/colonial 
project.327 It moves ethics from the rarefied atmosphere of academia to the world of the 
formally colonized people. It’s starting point is not the “European I” but solidarity with the poor 
that “experience death before their time,” as the bishop from Chiapas put it. The praxis of 
decolonization challenges the historical practice of Christian ethics by reconceptualizing its 
social parameters and calling for a transformation of its social and intellectual basis. Social 
ethicists must begin to develop a critical consciousness about society’s neocolonial existence 
and to correct these perceptions by engaging in relationships with those who do not benefit 
from the current system. Latina/o thinking’s praxis of decolonization sets out to actively reflect 
on and critique existing forms of domination and exploitation that have become normative. 
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Lived Experience and Epistemic Privilege 
 “You’ll understand when you’re older” is an aphorism young people are no doubt tired 
of hearing. The statement might represent an argument from authority, a logical fallacy that 
argued that the statement is true or correct because of its source. Or it might be used as a form 
of deflection, a patronizing way for adults to evade difficult or uncomfortable questions. But it 
can also mean a legitimate appeal to experience as a way of gaining knowledge. A three year old 
does not understand love, but experience offers the opportunity to learn of love in its various 
expressions. “You’ll understand when you’re older” because experience is the great teacher and 
there are some lessons only experience can teach. 
Yet, the underlying assumption is of a common experience. You will understand later 
because all human beings go through similar experiences. Here the European self creeps back 
into the analysis: all human beings are in some basic way the same. Latina/o thinking starts at a 
different place. Attempting to grapple with the inadequacies of Euro-American systems of 
thought, its widespread inapplicability—and even utter irrelevance—to Latina/o communities, 
experience takes precedence as a teacher. On this basis Latina/o thinking appeals to lived 
experience as a counter-hegemonic source of epistemological, theological, and ethical 
reflection. 
Lived experience is sometimes coded in Latina/o scholarship as lo cotidiano.328 Lo 
cotidiano is a key element in the meaning making and the struggle for liberation. It corrects the 
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fixation of liberation theologies on social structural elements by pointing to daily lived 
experience. Lo cotidiano refers everyday struggles/experiences of Latina/os. Experiences “deal 
with the substance and the form of lo cotidiano” but do not constitute all of it.329 Lo cotidiano 
refers both to the material reality and the interpretation of it.330 It is the cultural, historical, and 
locative milieu around experience and through which experience has meaning. Lo cotidiano is 
tied to the work of Latina/o justice pointing to both to “the struggle (la lucha) against the 
present social order and to the liberating alterative” of the la comunidad (community).331 
Despite the underlying wisdom revealed through the common aphorism with which this 
section began, the prevailing assumption among many academics (trapped by the European “I”) 
that the everyday does not matter or at the least it cannot be accessed. In a now famous 
lecture, Heidegger criticizes philosophical attempts to access life and life experience.332 He 
argues that attempts to grasp life experience ultimately distort the thing they hope to 
discover.333 Certainly the philosophical question of how to grasp life experience in a 
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comprehensible way constitutes a rich and treacherous area of philosophical exploration.334 
However, the appeal to lived experience in this chapter is pragmatic. Lived experience focuses 
attention on the violent and oppressive realities of the marginalized people around the world 
and sets one on the path to liberation.335 
As a social space, lived experience refers to the impact of class, gender, poverty and 
work on relationships within families, friends, and neighbors, and religious authorities.336 As 
folk-wisdom, it is the engine that generates pragmatic, prudent, and levelheadedness in dealing 
effectively with situations.337 In Isasi-Díaz’s conception, lo cotidiano has at least three functions: 
a 1) descriptive, 2) hermeneutical, and 3) epistemological one. Its descriptive function feeds 
“new narratives” that have the capacity to “break the hegemony established mainly by men” 
that has produced oppressive structures.338 As a hermeneutical device, which “deals with 
context” and the “use of power,” it describes how day-to-day oppression operate and “unmasks 
those who benefit from them.”339 Epistemologically, lo cotidiano points to the fragmentary, 
provisional, and conjectural aspects of knowledge.340 Lived experience, as part of Latina/o 
thinking, appeals to the daily realities of marginalized Latina/os. Identifying with the reality of 
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marginalized groups can begin to transform mainstream Christian ethics into a counter-
hegemonic process.  
 
Fifth Movement: Latina/o Thinking in the World System 
Latina/o thinking begins at the moment reflection on conquest/discovery of the 
Americas. While Latina/o thinking of the sixteenth century has gone unnoticed by modern 
philosophy, it has contemporary relevance because it was that generation that experienced the 
creation of the first world system.341 The central ethical question of that era was the following: 
what right has the European to occupy, dominate and manage the recently discovered cultures, 
conquered by the military, and in the process of being colonized?342 The discussion of this 
question within the School of Salamanca on the “rights of people” began with the well-known 
debate of Valladolid between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan de Sepúlveda. This debate was 
erased in the eighteenth century, when the declaration of the “rights of men and of the citizen” 
came into existence. The eighteenth century redefined the imaginary of the modern/colonial 
world system in a manner consistent with the new imperial powers of Britain, France, and 
Holland.343 Conceived of as a new beginning, it erased for future generations the crucial 
importance of the Renaissance and the Reformation. The entire theological, ethical, and legal 
debates on colonialism and the rights of colonized people vanished. Postcolonial thinking 
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promoted an imaginary that begins in the eighteenth century. This is due in no small part to the 
work of Edward Said.  
 Many scholars cite Edward Said’s publication of Orientalism344 as the starting point of 
postcolonial studies. In Orientalism, Said, a Palestinian American and literary critique, focuses 
not on colonial history or the psychological effects of the colonial aftermath (as Franz Fanon and 
Albert Memmi had already done and Ashis Nandy did independently) but in European textual 
and discursive representations of the Orient, by which he meant primarily the Arab Middle East. 
Said’s main argument in that the Orient is a discursive invention of the West used to engender 
and maintain control. Orientalist discourse portrays the Orient as sensual, erotic, emotional, and 
fundamentalist, while “Occidental” is rational, cool, logical, and secular. Said limited his analysis 
primarily to British and French colonial representations of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century and thus emerged the idea that the field begins there. The entire Americas, including 
the Caribbean, North Africa, and most of Sub-Saharan Africa were left out of the picture. 
“Postcolonial” criticism and theory, as Walter Mignolo argues, increasingly became employed by 
critics and intellectuals writing in English to refer to the domain of the British empires and their 
ex-colonies (Australia, India, and New Zealand).345  
 The intention here is not to critique Said on that basis of what the book does or does 
not do (as Aijaz Ahmad has done).346 The intention instead is to point to the enormous silence 
                                                          
344
 Said, Orientalism. 
 
345
 Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, 92. 
 
346
 See Ahmad Aijaz, In Theory: Nations, Classes, Literatures, Radical Thinkers (London; New York: 
Verso, 2008 [1992]). Said’s work, while innovative, is deeply flawed not only in its glaring omission of 
earlier periods, but is also limited in at least three other ways: 1) It focuses on just one side of the 
discursive binary, failing to attend to discourses of resistance; 2) represents the Orient as a unified whole; 
and 3) it creates a reverse stereotype—that of the essentialized and racist Westerner. Said’s more recent 
work Culture and Imperialism attempts, with some measure of success, to address these limitations—see 
Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993). In it, Said focuses on the novel as a 
126 
that Said’s work enforces: orientalism is only the second hegemonic cultural imaginary of the 
modern world system. This second world system marks the transitions when the image of 
“modern/secular Europe” (England, France, Germany) replaced “Christian Europe” of the 
fifteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries (Italy, Portugal, Spain).347 It was the theft of nearly 
incalculable amounts of wealth, in the form of gold and silver, that reached Spain and the rest of 
Europe that made the second modernity possible. These enormous riches made possible the 
rapid growth of world trade. The great beneficiaries of such intense trade were the European 
middle-men, the merchants, the bankers, and other industries. It was also this influx of hard 
currency that enabled subsequent economic development.348 
 Said is right when he argues that the Orient become Europe’s Other during the 
eighteenth century. However the extreme West, the Occident, was never Europe’s other but its 
child, the “daughter” of Europe. That is why, in the words of Mignolo, “without Occidentalism 
there is no Orientalism.”349 Occidentalism envisioned the Americas as an expansion of Europe. 
Here is Mignolo’s basic definition: 
Occidentalism, in other words, is the overarching geopolitical imaginary of the 
modern/colonial world system, to which Orientalism was appended in its first 
radical transformation, when the center of the system moved from the Iberian 
Peninsula to the North Sea, between Holland and Britain.350 
                                                                                                                                                                             
chief cultural artifact. He examines the sometimes conscious ways in which the novels of Jane Austin, 
Joseph Conrad, Mary Shelly and others support and legitimize European imperial adventures. He also 
examines resistance literature—the novels of Salmon Rushdie, Chenua Achebe, and others. To his credit, 
towards the end of Culture and Imperialism, Said calls on postcolonial intellectuals to move beyond the 
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 The modern/colonial world system that emerged in the sixteenth century proved far 
more discriminatory and destructive to nature than the system it replaced.351 At the moment, 
societies around the world are facing a new horizon of historical change. Among the possible 
scenarios is the creation of a new historical system worse than the current one in which 
capitalist elites follow the familiar strategies of feudal aristocracy, shaping the world to ensure 
they maintain their own power. Another possible scenario is the subaltern groups around the 
world, the ones that Fanon called the wretched of the earth, mobilize to create a more 
diversified system. These groups consciously resist or simply resist homogenization, cultural 
assimilation, and co-optation by U.S. nation and empire. Transformation of the metropolitan 
centers is crucial for the future to take this second path. One of the factors in bringing about the 
transformations is the growth of Latina/o population the United States, one of the most 
powerful core countries in the world system.352  
 Latina/os arrive in metropolitan spaces with the conceptual distinctions elaborated 
above. They are polluted by a colonial history, colonial knowledges, and a history linked to 
empire.353 In Huntington’s Who Are We?, a follow up to The Clash of Civilizations, seeks a 
strategy for justifying and maintaining white supremacy in the U.S. domestic area in light of the 
fast growing Hispanic population.354 Huntington provides a racist, xenophobic response to justify 
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the exclusive leadership of WASP elites when they are no longer the demographic majority. 
Huntington insists on the assimilation of Latina/os which for him are non-English speaking 
foreigners. The challenge and the opportunity for Latina/os is to change the terms of the 
debate, to bring their consciousness of colonial history into the mainstream. Thus, Latina/o 
thinking can form part of the larger project of decolonizing knowledge in the U.S. and other 
parts of the globe by decolonizing moral visions of the political economy. 
 
Latina/o Thinking and Border Thinking 
A related concept to Latina/o thinking is border thinking. Both concepts exhibit 
epistemic and ethical potential; both are analytical and critical tools for dislodging 
modern/colonial imaginary. Border thinking attempts to restore what has been eliminated 
through colonial difference.355 Colonial difference names what distinguishes—within the 
colonial imaginary—the European from the other in the configuration of the world into a 
modern/colonial system. 356 In the sixteenth century, colonial difference revolved around the 
lack of alphabetic writing. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, it was history. In the 
twentieth century, it was development. Thus, border thinking is linked to but not synonymous 
with subjugated or subaltern or knowledges. It exploits the “cracks” in the imaginary of the 
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world/colonial system to allow the percolation of repressed forms of knowledges.357 The 
recognition of colonial difference demands an exploration of border thinking.358 
Border thinking emerges both within and without the geopolitical borders of the 
modern world system: within the “local histories” of metropolitan centers of Europe and the 
U.S., but also in the local histories of its margins: Latin American under Spanish control, India 
under British rule, Algeria and Tunisia under French colonialism.359 For Mignolo, “border thinking 
and double critique are the necessary conditions for ‘an other thinking,’ a thinking that is no 
longer conceivable in Hegel’s dialectics, but located at the border of coloniality of power in the 
modern world system.”360 This other thinking constitutes a way of thinking “that is not inspired 
in its own limitations and is not intended to dominate and to humiliate; a way of thinking that is 
universally marginal, fragmentary, and unachieved; and, as such, a way of thinking that, because 
universally marginal and fragmentary, is not ethnocidal.”361 
While border thinking’s recovery of subjugated knowledges is worthy of admiration, it 
also displays two troubling tendencies. First border thinking itself, with its refusal to take any 
particularized stance, can become a type of universal gaze with no accountability except itself. 
For Mignolo the “key configuration of border thinking” lies in “thinking from dichotomous 
subjects rather than ordering the world in dichotomies”; it is a “dichotomous locus of 
enunciation.”362 It seems that this may amount to a positing of a new universal subject position. 
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Second, Mignolo is more concerned with how border thinking applies to the disciplines (the 
academies) than the underlying material realities. In this sense border thinking becomes a 
constant cultural critique of and between schools of thought. 
Despite these short-comings, border thinking helps to illuminate an aspect of Latina/o 
thinking that moves between subaltern and hegemonic knowledges. Both offer a double 
critique, that is critical both of monovision western epistemology and Christianity, that can think 
from both traditions and at the same time neither of them, that has potential to decolonize 
Christian moral vision of the political economy.  
 
Latina/o Thinking and Transmodernity 
Another concept that can be related to Latina/o thinking is transmodernity. 
Transmodernity arises out of the observation that for some theorists talk about postmodernism 
indicates that, at least in some essential aspects, modernity has ended.363 But this begs the 
question: which parts of modernity have concluded? If the center of modernity has been the 
conception of history as a progressive realization of authentic humanity, a process of 
emancipation, then certainly the center is in crisis. The twilight of modernity, that is 
postmodernity, was initiated by Nietzsche and Heideggar. However, according to Dussel, 
postmodern critique largely remains provisionalized. All the accomplishments of modernity are 
the fruits of a dialectic between center and periphery; that is, the periphery helped create 
modernity.364 The periphery of modernity is its side: like two sides of the same coin.365 The 
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strategy of forgetting, concealing, and covering over has justified violence against the periphery 
as rational in the name of civilization, portraying its killers and perpetrators (conquistadores, 
traders, imperial colonizers) as innocent and its victims as guilty.366 The refusal (of Vatimo, 
Nietzsche, or Heideggar) to include the annihilation of non-European cultures of the planet 
reduces postmodernity to the same colonizing, dominating, and excluding conception. 
Transmodernity is the name Dussel gives to an ethics of liberation that moves beyond 
Eurocentricism and singularity of modernity and postmodernity. Transmodernity refers to a new 
project of liberation of the victims of modernity and the development of its potential 
alternatives.367 It is an attempt to strengthen the twentieth-century project of decolonization. In 
the current system, only liberal notions of democracy are accepted and legitimated. There is no 
recognition for indigenous, African, Islamic, or other non-European forms of democracy.368 A 
transmodern world, a world beyond modernity, is open to diverse views of democracy, liberty, 
and human rights of the dominated and colonized world.369 Transmodernity names a current 
crisis in capitalism/modernity that covers over the periphery that has lead to our current global 
configuration. 
While Dussel’s concept of Transmodernity is enormously valuable two critical comments 
are in order. First, it is worth noting that Dussel did not invent the “transmodern” phenomenon. 
What he did was to expand old ways of framing the interaction between the pre-modern, 
modern, and postmodern and to propose and application of the coloniality of power. Dussel’s 
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work flies high but people on the ground have been working on the disruption of modernity for 
decades (as other parts of this chapter make clear). Dussel’s account slights the efforts of 
Feminist, Latina/o, and Black rereadings of history and philosophy. He takes insights from them, 
but does not engage them. Second, some claim that Dussel is a Latin American liberation 
theologian, but he says nothing about Christianity, the church, or religion. That blinds him to the 
ordinary discourses of most of the people most of the time. This is somewhat surprising, given 
his attention to liberation. Along with transmodernity, Latina/o thinking affirms the need to 
recognize the dignity of the negated alterity. Both transmodernity and Latina/o thinking point to 
other epistemologies and an openness to otherness that can help to decolonize moral visions 
that move beyond modern/colonial/capitalist world system.  
 
Conclusion 
Social location shapes the analysis of the social situation, the reading of the tradition, 
and the resulting elaboration of Christian moral visions. Insofar as Christian social ethics is 
meant to address the problems of life concretely, the influence of social location cannot be 
treated as a matter of indifference, nor should the tension between social location and moral 
imagination be minimized.370 Christian ethics that continues to be elaborated from no place, 
from a zero point perspective, ironically speaks to no one and certainly not to the marginalized 
and oppressed communities it purports to champion.  
Envisioning and enacting a moral vision of the political economy requires moving 
beyond the formula of more of the same with some modifications. Latina/o thinking challenges 
mainstream Christian ethicists by asking what their moral visions would like from the underside 
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of modernity. It insists that any vision of the political economy that refuses to acknowledge the 
majority of the world and continues to impose provincial or regional European thinking as global 
is critically inadequate. The agenda of Latino/a thinking is to allow for the simultaneity of a 
multiple perspectives; it seeks to acknowledge, respect, and value other vantage points. 
Latina/o thinking, as expressed by U.S. Latina/o and Latin American intellectuals, emphasizes 
that there is a twofold condition of the subject: the Christian tradition and concrete social 
realities. Both must be taken into account in constructing moral visions.  
The lived experience of Latino/a peoples demonstrate that the present political 
economic order can be traced to Indian-annihilating and African-enslaving policies of the 
Spanish monarchy and of Anglo-American “democracy.”371 Hostile government policies continue 
to target Hispanics who are descended from populations that have been routinely and 
systematically conquered, renamed, and killed by Euro-American colonists. Conquest, 
colonization, and capitalist expansion are tied together in the Latina/o experience. From the 
perspective of Latino/a thinking, the horrific events of the past haunt the present with 
memories of conquest, killing, and deculturalizing. 
Latino/a thinking further reveals that the past not only haunts the present, but 
continues to shape the present through the continuing imposition of the Euro-American 
epistemological tradition, the “cultural archive” of the West, built in the service of imperialist 
expansion and colonial rule.372 The discursive covering of the majority of the world constitutes a 
                                                          
371
 See Arturo J. Aldama, Disrupting Savagism: Chicana/o, Mexican Immigrant, and Native 
American Struggles for Self-Representation, Latin America Otherwise (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2001); and R. Horseman, "Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxism," in 
Critical White Studies: Looking Behind the Mirror, ed. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1997). 
 
372
 As Foucault refers to it in Michel Foucault, Les Mots Et Les Choses: Une Archéologie Des 
Sciences Humaines, Bibliothèque Des Sciences Humaines ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1966). 
 
134 
strategy of modernity that continues to justify violent acts of the privileged few as rational in the 
name of progress and development. The contemporary political economy of the U.S. is not only 
rooted in the mutually reinforcing systems of colonial and capitalist domination but perpetuates 
past imperial policies of genocide and cultural holocaust, now affecting an ever greater number 
of people through the globalization of the market.373 
A political economy that benefits a privileged few at the expense of the many can hardly 
be worth sustaining. Latino/a thinking can support the struggle to envision a moral, inclusive, 
and egalitarian political economy. What then are the implications of Latina/o thinking for 
Christian ethics of the political economy? They are rearticulated briefly here: 
1. Identity and social location are tied to knowledge production. Latina/o thinking makes 
clear that the present order is result of theft, violence, and oppression and a 
rationalizing of those actions. As such, Latina/o thinking holds potential for restructuring 
moral visions of the political economy by reconfiguring the self according to border 
imaginary, which makes clear that misery, poverty, discrimination are the norm, not the 
exception. Through a reconceptualization of difference, Latina/o thinking allows 
movement beyond identity politics and creates the possibility of elaborating anti-
capitalist moral visions of the political economy, visions that are not designed around 
one group’s efforts to control and exploit others.  
 
2. Latina/o thinking, through a revitalized praxis (that transcends the limitations of the 
Aristotelian /Hegelian /Marxian conceptualization), moves ethics beyond the subject-
object distortion and dichotomization of the modern/colonial project and into the world 
of formally colonized people. It calls on Christian ethicists to abandon the theory to 
practice approach to knowledge that prioritizes developing a tidy abstract thought 
world without reference to (except as abstract categories) the misery and suffering of 
the majority of the world’s people. Latina/o thinking’s decolonizing praxis challenges 
Christian ethicists to develop a critical consciousness about society’s neocolonial 
arrangement.  
 
3. Latina/o thinking draws on lived experience as a counter-hegemonic source of ethical 
reflection. As part of Latina/o thinking, lived experience focuses attention on the violent 
and oppressive realities of the marginalized people around the world. Thus Latino/a 
thinking, by acknowledging the reality of marginalized groups, has the potential to 
transform mainstream Christian ethics into a counter-hegemonic process.  
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4. Lastly, Latina/o thinking brings Latina/os consciousness of colonial history into the 
mainstream and offers a point of departure other than this modern/colonial complex of 
conquest and inequality. Latina/o thinking theorizes from both subaltern and 
hegemonic knowledges, enabling it to be critical of the tradition while drawing from it. It 
moves beyond the Eurocentrism of both modernity and postmodernity by 
acknowledging diverse notions of democracy, liberty, and human rights covered by the 
current capitalist/modern configuration of the world. It recovers subjugated knowleges 
lost through colonial difference and affirms the dignity of the neglected alterity. 
 
Thus, Latina/o thinking provides an alternative ethical space from which to decolonize and 
construct new moral visions of the political economy. Christian ethicists heeding the insights of 
Latino/a thinking are far better equipped to begin to rupture the status quo of inequality and 
oppression and make way for a socially just reimagining of the political economy. Yet, 
accounting for the failure of the Christian moral imagination and decolonizing moral visions of 
the political economy requires more than just addressing the epistemic limits of theorizing from 
a universalizing point of view. It also requires addressing the underlying economic framework 
upon which mainstream Christian ethics build its moral visions of the political economy. The 
next chapter examines these structural weaknesses using the insights of heterodox economics.  
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CHAPTER 4: REFRAMING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
Introduction 
The last chapter analyzed the way in which social location limits mainstream Christian 
moral visions of the political economy. It was argued that Latina/o thinking offers a way of 
addressing the limitations of social location. This chapter continues to delineate the limits of the 
Christian moral imagination by examining mainstream Christian ethics’ economic thinking. The 
argument in this chapter is that insistence of mainstream Christian ethics on “orthodox” 
neoclassical economics as the singular viable basis for the political economy limits the spectrum 
of possible moral visions to reformed capitalism (which remains essentially capitalist) and that 
heterodox economics offers a way to destabilize the entrenched position of neoclassical theory 
and expands the limits of the moral imagination.374 Heterodox economics imagines and realizes 
non-essentialist economic approaches, which accepts some concepts associated with 
neoclassical theory, such as market mechanisms, but are not reducible to these. Furthermore, 
heterodox economics shows that non-capitalist forms of economic activity are already present 
and prevalent. Incorporating heterodox economic principles expands the limited Christian moral 
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imagination to transcend the old left-right dichotomy and moves towards the creation of 
decolonized moral visions. 
 
Reliance on Neoclassical Economics 
The premise of mainstream Christian ethical thought is that a reformed capitalism and 
neoclassical economics constitute the only viable framework on which to build a moral vision of 
the political economy. It presumes that reformed capitalism, capitalism curbed of the excesses 
of laissez-faire ideology, can bring the political economy into closer alignment with the Christian 
faith. The attempt is to integrate Christian values with “realistic” economic patterns and to 
envision strategies to transform free-market relationships to deliver on the promise of economic 
prosperity for many. 
A brief survey of the Christian ethicists introduced in chapter two reveals their reliance 
on the neoclassical economic model. Conceptually, mainstream Christian ethics adopts its 
definition of economics, its relationship to other disciplines, and largely accept the neoclassical 
account of the human person in relationship to market realities. Their reliance on these 
neoclassical conceptual models is also manifested in the limited scope of their economic 
analysis and their tendency to emphasize its promises and minimize its problems.  
 
Defining Economics and Its Relationship to Ethics 
 Finn uses the terms “economics” and “economist” as synonyms for neoclassical 
economics. He concedes that there are other “significant” schools of economic thought 
(“Institutionalism, social economics, Marxism, feminist economics, Austrian economics, and so 
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forth”) that offer substantive and “badly needed” critique of economic orthodoxy.375 It is for the 
sake of simplicity, he explains, and not to disparage heterodox economics that he makes this 
theoretical move.376 In terms of its relationship with ethics, Finn affirms that economics—as a 
social science—plays an important part by correcting ideological perceptions about how the 
world “works.” Moral conviction, Finn argues, should not be allowed to trump or substitute for 
scientific social analysis.377 
If Stackhouse does not explicitly label his understanding of economics neoclassical, it is 
partly because for him it goes without saying: neoclassical theory is the only viable form of 
economics. Stackhouse does acknowledge that there are schools of economic thought outside 
of neoclassic economics.378 They are not however, for Stackhouse, economics proper. For 
Stackhouse, the discipline of economics is useful as a technical tool that has the ability to 
accurately describe and explain how political economic systems work. Economics analyzes how 
societies respond in the aggregate to economic pressures and trends of one kind or another. 
Stackhouse emphasizes that the advances in economics are so monumentally significant that 
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they are analogous to the discoveries of Galileo, Newton, and Einstein in physics.379 Here 
Stackhouse echoes the claims of some neoclassical economists themselves: that economics is a 
progressive process of refinement in modeling economic reality; that like the physical sciences it 
is a detached, objective, and value-free enterprise; that they are simply describing economic 
phenomenon through the process of hypothesis formulation and empirical testing.380  
 In Stackhouse’s view, economics offers a set of theoretical tools that are the necessary 
but not sufficient basis for creating a moral political economy, just as physics is the necessary 
but not sufficient basis for launching a probe into space (for example). Public theology is the 
hand that wields the tools of economics to determine economics organizations and practices 
that correspond to the laws, purposes, and mercies of God appropriate under a globally 
competitive and pluralistic life.381 Stackhouse insists that whatever these economic 
organizations and practices look like, they must be grounded in modern economics, law, and 
culture: “whatever ethical vision we propose must be socially viable” and that is revealed 
through neoclassical economics.382 Stackhouse takes economics (of the neoclassical variety) as 
given. Economics provides basic models, such as the law of supply and demand, that describe 
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economic realities and allow for the construction of moral visions of the political economy that 
cohere with economics, law, and culture. 
 Wogaman also defines economics according to a neoclassical understanding. For 
Wogaman, economics is “the process of making or developing or distributing goods and services 
and the system of allocating those goods and services.”383 It is “concerned with the systems of 
production and distribution of scarce values.”384 Despite defining economics in this limited 
fashion, he recognizes that there have been many economic “ideologies,” including 
traditionalist, feudalism, mercantilism, and various forms of socialism. But these systems are 
mostly of historical interest. In the late 20th century, there is only one reasonable form of 
economics and it lies between the extremes of laissez-faire capitalism and socialism.385 For 
Wogaman, the proper role of the economist is to clarify technical questions in such a way that 
the non-economist can participate in the discussion since “economics is too important to the 
human enterprise to leave in the hands of economists alone.”386  
Moreover, because these Christian ethicists utilize such a narrow definition of 
economics, large portions of human economic activity are ignored. For example, Stackhouse 
recognizes that household (or family, clan, villages, or estates) based economic activity exists, 
but their significance is minimal in comparison to the influence and allocative efficiencies of the 
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corporation.387 For Wogaman, scarcity is a necessary characteristic of economics. Unless a value 
is scarce, it should not be considered in economic models. Goods that are normally abundant 
can become scarce—such as clean air in the context of pollution—and thus are rendered 
“economic.” But unless they are construed as scarce, goods are not perceptible to economic 
analysis.  
 
Individualism, Self-Interest, and Economic Activity 
Neoclassical economics is built upon the idea of homo economicus, a portrayal of the 
human person characterized by radical individualism and unlimited self-interestedness. While 
mainstream Christian ethics repudiates the first, it accepts the second as part of economic 
reality. Finn and Pemberton argue that free-market advocates that uphold individual freedom as 
the most important element in human life have misunderstood the lessons of modern 
psychology and sociology about what human life is and the Judeo-Christian tradition in terms of 
what human life ought to be.388 Along with neoclassical economics, Finn and Pemberton affirm 
that self-interest (which they equate with “sin”) is part of human nature. For example, choosing 
to obtain a luxury good when those resources might have been used to secure basic needs of 
others is a selfish/sinful choice. Social evils are a result of sinful choices, rather than the model 
of capitalism. They applaud free-market economics for accounting for this aspect of the human 
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person. Since sinfulness is not created by capitalism, they discredit the notion that doing away 
with capitalism will end social evils.389  
Stackhouse critiques the radical individualism characteristic of unfettered markets. 
Protestant Christian ethics must oppose this framing of economic life.390 But in Stackhouse’s 
opinion, this is not the kind of human agency operative within the current political economy. 
The radically individualistic capitalism proposed by Friedman has been displaced by the present 
political economy, a new type of capitalism, sometimes called a mixed economy or free-market 
society. The charge that this revitalized capitalism is individualistic is for Stackhouse untrue. He 
admits that it does break up old communal relationships, but it immediately creates new 
associations.391 Revitalized capitalist society furnishes the connections of association and 
networks people require to sustain them. In this system, people are related to each other in 
literally hundreds of ways: through information in mass media, classes, political parties, religious 
groups, and last, but not least, through work in corporations. Stackhouse does not imagine that 
self-interest and individualism continue to operate within these new associations.  
Stackhouse describes economists as defining homo economicus as a view of humanity 
“basically driven by material interests, rationally calculated,”392 but expresses doubts that this 
homo economicus is in fact as rational as economists claim. While Finn and Pemberton argue 
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that markets account for sin, Stackhouse argues instead that “sin . . . deflects the *sic] rational 
capacities.”393 “Only God can bring about the transformation of the will” so that people can 
make truly rational decisions.394 Nevertheless, Stackhouse believes that this model of the human 
person can be made useful by extending the concept of rationality to include cultural and 
religious interests. He argues that people ought to be driven as much by rational calculations 
based on cultural norms and religious values as by calculations of material gains and losses. 
Stackhouse does not so much challenge the neoclassical account of the human person as he 
creates a more robust version of homo economicus. 
Like Finn, Wogaman critiques the radical individualism of laissez-faire capitalist ideology 
on anthropological grounds.395 He also critiques the “naked pursuit of self-interest” on moral 
grounds. Acquisitiveness or “principled selfishness,” Wogaman affirms, is both idolatrous and 
socially divisive, and thus unsuitable as an economic model for Christians.396 The market 
provides incentives for irresponsible behavior when such behavior serves self-interest.397 Self-
interest, however, is a reality of economic life. The solution is setting priorities from outside the 
market mechanism. Whereas various forms of capitalism that rely on “the indirect visitation of 
the ‘invisible hand,” social market capitalism and democratic socialism embody “prophetic 
judgment upon” laissez-faire capitalism’s encouragement of selfishness.398 Wogaman concludes 
that principled selfishness is sufficiently reined in by these centrist forms of political economy. 
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Even though these Christian ethicists reject radical individualism as the basis for 
Christian ethics, they accept self-interestedness as reality of economic life that must be 
managed. Self-interestedness is an organizing principle for the market. They may have some 
reservations about self-interested behavior, but they affirm that the notion of self-interest 
accurately describes the basis for economic decision-making. Thus, the essence of neoclassical 
theory, of homo economicus, remains intact.  
 
Emphasizes Promises, Minimizes Problems 
 Mainstream Christian social ethics emphasizes the promises of the neoclassical 
framework while minimizing or dismissing its problems altogether. Finn is aware of the 
problems wrought by capitalism. In various places he makes reference to the threat multi-
national corporations pose to democracy, the power differentials that lead to extraction of 
unfavorable terms for workers and the poor, and the increasing levels of unemployment 
matched by downward pressure on wages. But then he makes a theoretical move analogous to 
neoliberal economists: he treats these as “background commitments” that are asides from the 
“main” economic issues.399 
Stackhouse argues that capitalist-style globalization not only can deliver on its promises, 
it already has delivered on some major fronts. Stackhouse sees the story of capitalism as the 
story of the great expansion of the middle class.400 Increased population and industrialization 
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initially lead to increases in inequality, but eventually they result in a less stratified and more 
egalitarian society.401 The best evidence, Stackhouse claims, reveals that capitalism has: 
 Raised millions of poor people into a new middle class402 
 Exploited less than economies that are centrally planned 
 Shaken confidence in state managed economies 
 Provided a place of refuge for immigrants in democratic, capitalist areas 
 Allowed people to adopt its patters in a selective and locally sensitive manner 
 Improved nutrition levels, health, life span, leisure time, and openness to religious 
values403 
 
Given such overwhelming evidence of reformed capitalism’s positive effect on economic 
development and social progress, reformed capitalism must be the more just and humane 
political economic system Christians have been looking for: “Is it possible that, in the face of the 
new evidence, everyone who holds to a ‘preferential option for the poor’ must now embrace 
capitalism, since socialism itself impoverishes? In some measure, the answer is Yes. But it must 
be a reformed capitalism.”404  
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For Wogaman, the chief priority of economic life is productivity and capitalism is 
responsible for the vast expansion of productivity and growth in recent centuries.405 But unlike 
Stackhouse, Wogaman acknowledges the tendency of even welfare capitalism to concentrate 
economic power and thus permit great inequality.406 Examining the data on poverty, Wogaman 
concludes that the tendency both within and among nations is for the relative gap between the 
rich and the poor to increase, even when the poor are improving their situation in absolute 
terms. In the U.S., despite enormous expansion in productive capacity, the proportion of poor 
people has remained fairly constant over the last 30 years. Among rich and poor nations the 
contrast between wealth and poverty is even more dramatic. Wogaman argues that it is an 
undeniable economic reality that the poor people of the world, who lack basic necessities, are 
the vast majority while the rich constitute a much smaller number. He remains agnostic, 
however, as to the cause of such enormous disparities.407 
 
A Heterodox Economic Assessment 
A Narrow Approach to Economics  
Heterodox economic analysis addresses each of the flaws in neoclassical theory that 
Christian ethicists either discount as an inescapable part of economic life or consider solvable 
through superficial changes. The first flaw is a narrow approach to economics, marked by 
defining economics as the study of efficient allocation of scarce resources and accompanied by 
economic orthodoxy’s fundamental accoutrement: the pivotal assumption of economic 
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rationality, which includes the features of self-interest, exogenous preference formation, and 
strict optimizing behavior.408 The assumption of economic rationality is a necessary condition for 
neoclassical economics: without it, neoclassical theory is left adrift. Neoclassical thought 
presumes that what economics is, what it does, and how to go about “improving” economic 
outcomes are settled issues. Yet the narrow approach that neoclassical economics have chosen 
for themselves ignores the historically contingent character of the economy. Economic 
processes evolve over time along with social order. The neoclassical definition of economics is 
but one way of theorizing the political economy. Heterodox schools of economic thought 
(Keynseian, Austrian, feminist, neo-Marxian, institutionalist, etc) do not adhere to its narrow 
economic definition. Instead of the neoclassical preoccupation with abstract theorizing, 
methodological individualism, and equilibrium, heterodox economics is concerned with the 
effects of economic and social institutions on human beings and the environment, the social and 
cultural embeddedness of economic agents and their activities, and the myriad of ways in which 
capitalism generates oppression.409 
The narrow neoclassical approach yields unintended economic, social, and historical 
consequences which are not accounted for in its economic models. In many heterodox 
perspectives, capitalism is seen to be directly and indirectly connected with racism, ethnical 
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prejudice, and imperialism.410 The capitalist appetite for cheap labor led to the enslavement of 
millions of Africans to meet the demand for cotton, sugar, and tobacco.411 After the end of the 
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Civil War, the same appetite led to a system of tenant farming that kept freed blacks in a new 
form of bondage: that of perpetual debt. Capitalist logic also led to the acquisition of land and 
raw materials through imperialism. To acquire the materials needed to fuel industry and wealth, 
Europe and the U.S. relied on a combination of military conquest, political domination, and 
economic exploitation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.412 The U.S. harvested the rich natural 
resources in North America through a combination of conquest, genocide, and a complex series 
of treaties that were routinely ignored.413 
Capitalism is also indirectly connected with the creation of a system of oppression based 
on racial/ethnic identity after the Civil War. Following emancipation, lower-class whites could no 
long point to their freedom as a mark of superiority. The response to this loss was violence 
against blacks, including the Ku Klux Klan, with no serious opposition from government or 
churches.414 In the west, Chinese immigrants were used to build railways in harsh and 
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demeaning conditions. Even further west, Japanese immigrants had similar experiences on 
pineapple and sugar plantations in Hawaii.415 The same dynamics operate today. Claims of 
reverse racism, concerns about the influx of immigrant workers from Mexico and Asia, and the 
outsourcing of jobs to other countries reveals an underlying belief that the greatest challenge 
facing U.S. workers is competition from people of color at home and abroad. This belief ignores 
the fact that the capitalist system itself increases wealth by exploiting workers and keeping 
wages as low as possible. None of these direct or indirect effects of capitalism—slavery, 
genocide, racism/ethnic prejudice, theft, imperialism, exploitation—register on neoclassical 
models. A narrow conception of economics generates oppressive economic practice. 
A narrow approach to economics is also connected to the creation and perpetuation of 
the modern/colonial complex. Neoclassical economics has played a central role in constructing 
the discourses of poverty and wealth and has framed public policy that has discursively 
marginalized millions of communities in the Majority World as underdeveloped or less 
developed.416 Economic orthodoxy in the form of capitalism has upheld the narrative of 
development which presumes that North Atlantic societies are a desirable model for economic 
development.417 Capitalist development, while merely a historical experience of capitalist 
industrialization in a few regions, has become universal trajectory and a prescription for 
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economic and social intervention in all of the world’s nations.418 It continues to authorize and 
support institutional forms of power that center the processes of modernization and progress 
encompassed by the modern/colonial developmentalist perspective. 
Several heterodox approaches to economics seek a “non-modernist” approach that 
reconceptualizes economics from a subaltern perspective, including the hegemonic role that 
economics has played in the modernity and the relationship between culture and economics.419 
Like postcolonial theory, this strand of heterodox economic theory constitutes a critical 
approach, a strategy that maintains an attitude of openness to continuous revision, rather than 
a single economic theory. As such, it does not reject any economic paradigm in total. The hybrid 
nature of economic heterodoxy proceeds by selecting, contesting, and reappropriating 
categories in a syncretistic fashion.420 
Postcolonial economics envisions a new political economy by bringing to the fore the 
connection between the western telling of history, the production of political economic 
knowledge, and the exercise of western power.421 History has served as a synonym for the 
development of Euro-American consciousness. Non-Euro-Americans only formed part of that 
telling of history to the extent that they are involved in the constitution of the European 
historical being. The historical experiences of the West become the templates from which to 
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know and measure the world. This vision of history has grounded political economic analysis 
from Smith to contemporary scholarship.422 The heterodox task is to “acquire epistemic and 
material authority to effect change.” 423 This requires formerly colonized people to interpret 
their own histories and to reject the notion of the inevitable movement towards the Euro-
American prototype of political-economic development. Otherwise, the non-Euro-America 
people will continue to be permanently categorized as “pre capitalist, pre modern, or under 
developed.”424 
Mainstream Christian ethical approaches to political economic ethics begin with 
entrenched disciplinary divisions, each maintaining its own methodological tools and 
traditions.425 Economics is taken as given, while infusing it with insights from ethics in order to 
examine which political economic system is most Christian or how to make market moral. 
Christian ethics becomes another constraint on a generally accepted economic rationality. 
Therefore, mainstream Christian ethics has compounded neoclassical modeling with even moral 
variables while leaving the premise of neoclassical economic rationality intact. Heterodox 
economics destabilizes the disciplines’ epistemic authority, unmasking its “metaphysical priors” 
in order to understand individual academic disciplines as part of a broader cultural system of 
Euro-American modernity.426 
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From various heterodox perspective, the narrow, neoclassical approach to economics, 
wedded to the development of modernity and colonialism, has little to do with the actual lives 
of poor, marginalized, and “less developed” people of the world. It is connected with the 
creation and sustaining of a complex matrix of oppression. As a development project, it has 
more to do with validating the metaphysical movement of history that culminates in a Euro-
American type industrial society. Christian social ethics must not accept a culturally hegemonic 
definition of economics that operates within modernity. A moral vision of the political economy 
must resist the “techniques of specialist knowledge as they work with strategies of power.”427 
Instead, with heterodox economics, it must utilize a critical, counter-disciplinary approach in the 
hope of transforming the understanding economics and the political economy itself. 
 
A Simplistic Account of the Human Person 
Under economic orthodoxy, human beings make economic decisions by rationally 
maximizing their utility (or preference satisfaction) through the application of their exogenously 
determined preference ordering. Society is a collection of self-interested, preference satisfying, 
rational individuals interacting in an open marketplace. The neoclassical assumption about 
human rationality, however, represents a profoundly incomplete account of human decision 
making. This conception of human decision making excludes people with certain developmental 
disabilities, children, and the infirm.428 It also renders invisible a wide variety of economically 
significant relationships that do not fit into the rubric of rational utility maximization, such as 
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community service or caring labor, undertaken out of a sense of social responsibility or affection 
for others. This simplistic view of the human person also covers over differences of gender, 
sexuality, class, race, and ethnicity since these have no bearing on economic decision making, 
except to the degree that the bear on preferences. 
Heterodox economics advocate for a complex view of the human person which 
acknowledges that human beings make decision in the midst of complexity and uncertainty. 
Human decision making involves (mis-)perceptions, emotions, intuitions, anticipation of 
uncertain futures, and involves a “pervasive ignorance” which “renders impossible the full 
accounts of costs and benefits that would be necessary to decide whether (or how much) a 
particular activity contributes to happiness” or utility.429 In contrast, neoclassical models 
adopted a bounded rationality as a mechanism for economic decision making. Individuals 
engage in utility-maximizing calculations based on fixed preference order. A desire for simple 
and elegant mathematical models, which has become the basis for arguing for neoclassical 
formulation, has led neoclassical economics’ reluctance to deal with complexity that is not easily 
represented in such models. 
The heterodox view of the human person also includes the emotive and social aspects of 
human behavior. It recognizes that human beings are epistemically limited individuals making 
decisions based on preferences that are developed only on the spot, after coming to market, in 
the midst of changing circumstances. Individuals are understood to have subjective perceptions 
of both their own goals and the constraints they face.430 Their own subjective perceptions are 
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further influenced by others’ subjective preferences and perceptions.431 The result is a non-
reductionist view of economic decision making that better accounts for complexity of human 
perceptions and imagination. Given this collection of epistemically limited and subjective 
individuals, market mechanisms are best described as a sea of “unpredictable change,” not a 
rationally predictable process.432  
 
Ignoring the Majority of Economic Activity 
A third flaw in the neoclassical economic framework is that it ignores the majority of 
economic activity. The neoclassical approach privileges commodity production and wage labor. 
Yet, wage-labor for capitalist firms and commodities exchange in a market is only the tip of the 
iceberg in terms of diverse activities of the economy.433 Just underneath the surface are a 
multitude of non-market transactions which are also economic activities—the hosts of elders 
and deacons that serve their location congregations, the grandparents and other relatives who 
provide child care for children so their parents can join the workforce, volunteers who donate 
several hours a week to shelters, food pantries, and soup kitchens (among other organizations), 
the police who turn a blind eye to illicit drug trades in exchange for kick backs, reciprocal forms 
of farm labor exchange in which families exchange an equal number of day’s work or attend 
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work parties hosted by a neighbor (accompanied by feasting and drinking).434 All of these 
economic actors participate in a diverse economy outside of formal market transactions. But 
none of their activities are considered as economic within an orthodox economic framework.435  
The current global political economy is economically diverse. What is usually considered 
the economy—formal markets, wage labor, capitalist firms—is merely a subset of a complex 
field of economic relations that sustain livelihoods around the world.436 Acknowledging diverse 
economic activities as economic has important consequences for envisioning a moral political 
economy. It allows envisioning a political economy that values the vast majority of human 
activity and generates and sustains communities that delivers wellbeing “directly rather than 
through the circuitous route of capitalist industrialization.”437 It emphasizes a diversity and 
richness of human relationships rather than reducing human relationships to those mediated 
through capitalist logics. It resists the idea that the endless consumption of commodities and 
competition for jobs that enrich capitalist corporations constitutes human progress. Recognizing 
the diversity of practices that sustain livelihoods, including paid and unpaid labor, market and 
non-market activities, non-capitalist and alternative capitalist business (cooperatives, socially 
responsible firms, etc.), opens the possibility of imagining a political economic ethics beyond 
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capitalism.438 Given that economic difference accounts for perhaps more than 50 percent of 
economic activity, Christian social ethics built exclusively on neoclassical theory discursively 
covers over a myriad of noncapitalist economic activity and is thus irresponsible and somewhat 
irrelevant. Beginning to see capitalism as a “fantasy of wholeness” rather than a “reality” is of 
course, difficult.439 Yet it is an important part of decolonizing the economic terrain of the moral 
imagination. 
 
Persistent Instability, Growing Inequality, and Exploitative Labor Process 
A fourth flaw in the neoclassical framework is the pattern of instabilities, growing 
inequalities, and exploitative labor processes. Capitalism is enormously unstable. Over the last 
75 years, global capitalism has experienced two major crises—the Great Depression that began 
with the 1929 stock market crash and the global economic meltdown that began in 2007—and 
smaller contractions every 3 to7 years.440 From the Marxian perspective, these instabilities are 
permanent features of capitalism. Attempts to reform capitalism, to perfect it through the 
removal of periodic downturns, have failed. Neither Mill nor Hayek, the masters of liberal and 
free-market theory, nor Keynes and his followers could do it.441 The instability or crises of 
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capitalism takes on diverse forms in different situations. But no amount of tinkering to date has 
been able to mend capitalism’s structural instabilities.442 
Capitalism is also characterized by massive and growing inequalities. Claims of 
capitalism’s track record of poverty reduction mask these inequalities. Despite steady increasing 
in U.S. productivity since the 1970s, real wages for lower and working class workers has 
stagnated. While it is generally assumed that inequalities are greatest in poor countries, steep 
inequalities exist within the U.S. and the U.K. The inequality of both countries is far greater than 
that of India, for example.443 The Gini coefficient for the U.K. is now higher than it has been 
during the last 30 years at .36, compared with .25 in 1979 when Margaret Thatcher came to 
power.444 This trend of growing inequality since the 1980s is being observed in other European 
countries as well, including staunchly egalitarian societies such as Scandinavia and the 
                                                          
442
 U.S. economic history is one of periods of turmoil (in the forms of wars, depressions, or 
recessions) followed by periods of prosperity. Never was this boom more successful than during the 
“Golden Age” of capitalism (the period roughly from 1946 to 1976). It is called a Golden Age because of its 
sustained growth and high employment, which was commonly held to have brought prosperity to every 
segment of U.S. society (Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet Schor, The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting 
the Postwar Experience, Studies in Development Economics (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford 
University Press, 1990)). This common perception is basically wrong because only the white segments of 
society prospered. Racism, ethnic exclusion, and patriarchy were all associated with the evolution of 
capitalism, without exception for its so-called Golden Age. On this point see Leonard Beeghley, The 
Structure of Social Stratification in the United States, 5th ed. (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 2007 
[1989]); Deanna Jacobsen Koepke, "Race, Class, Poverty, and Capitalism," Race, Gender & Class, no. 3/4 
(2007); Theda Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical Perspective, 
Princeton Studies in American Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Dan Zuberi, 
Differences That Matter: Social Policy and the Working Poor in the United States and Canada (Ithaca, NY: 
ILR Press/Cornell University Press, 2006). 
 
443
 As measured by the Gini coefficient reported in United Nations Development Programme, 
Human Development Report 2011 (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmilla, 1992). 
 
444
 Barry Mason, “Britain: Income inequality at record high,” World Socialist Web Site, 4 June 
2009, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jun2009/inco-j04.shtml (accessed August 30, 2011). 
 
159 
Netherlands.445 The same pattern is being repeated elsewhere around the world. The income 
gap between North-South and East-West was higher in the late 1990s than it was in the 1980s. 
Since the early 1980s, income concentration has risen everywhere: “this trend toward an 
increase in inequality is perplexing and marks a clear departure from the move towards greater 
egalitarianism observed during the 1950s and 1960s.”446 The conventional neoclassical wisdom, 
that free trade and global economic integration will create a rising tide that will lift all boats, has 
lost its credibility. 
Of course, distributive inequalities are not a problem in the neoclassical model because 
equality is ignored in favor of individual freedom and absolute preference satisfaction. 
Neoclassical economists are concerned with achieving economic efficiency through Pareto 
optimal solutions, which say nothing about equality or fairness.447 Neoclassical economic models 
also ignore uneven distributions that favor whites over blacks (or another other privileged over 
oppressed group).448 While capitalism has produced an overall abundance of goods, it 
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distributes these goods so unevenly that it creates conditions of scarcity for most of the world’s 
population. 
In the Marxian view, capitalism is the exploitative labor process in which surplus value is 
extracted from the working class.449 While on the surface markets appears to be based on equal 
exchange—or liberty and freedom—a deep analysis of capitalism’s production process reveals 
how workers are exploited. In Marx’s terms, the processes of production and exchange are 
exploitative because capitalist control forces workers into a relationship in which their labor 
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power takes on the status of a commodity along with land and raw materials. Workers have no 
choice but to exchange their labor power for a wage that does not fully compensate for the 
labor performed. Commodities are produced through the exploitative practice of extracting 
surplus labor. Exploitation is the unavoidable grounds of capitalist production processes. 
Ownership of the means of production in the hands of a small group of elites renders impossible 
a non-exploitative economic system under which genuine equality and human capabilities can 
flourish.  
The neoclassical approach to economics is structurally flawed. Instability, unequal 
distribution of income and wealth, and exploitative production processes are all part of 
capitalism’s structural problems. Many have tried to repair capitalism’s faults, among them 
mainstream Christian social ethicists. Structurally, however, the capitalist setup is unjust. It 
promises fairness through the market and democratic representation, but in practice it depends 
necessarily on exploitative systems, results in oligopolies rather than competitive markets, and 
creates a privileged class that maintains inequality.450 Envisioning a moral political economy 
requires critically addressing these features of capitalism, rather than accepting them as a 
necessary part of economic reality.  
 
Lack of Alternatives 
While recognizing the shortcomings of capitalism and the neoclassical framework 
addressed in the previous section, mainstream Christian ethicists offer no alternatives. Chapter 
two referred to Finn and Pemberton’s critique of certain concepts within the neoclassic school 
of economics: scarcity, the market, efficiency, property, and the human person and self-interest. 
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Finn also finds “persuasive” Cobb and Daly’s critique of neoclassical/capitalist economics, 
including problems with Ricardo’s argument for comparative advantage, the reduction of 
environment damage to an externality, the disregard for democratic control, and the loss of 
community.451 Moreover, Finn cautions that neoclassical economists’ confidence in their 
theories as the science of social policy is at same time arrogant and out of sync with the recent 
philosophical consensus that science itself is a social project. Christian ethics must navigate the 
hazardous waters between having to rely heavily on economics for understanding economic 
reality and adjudicating between competing economic explanations on ethical and “scientific” 
grounds.452  
These critiques have deep resonances with heterodox economic theory. But it is there 
that the resonance ends. Finn does not treat these critiques as definitive nor does he move 
away from a neoclassical economic understanding because for him there is no alternative. The 
small, disciplined communities of Christian stewards Finn and Pemberton envision will work 
hard to strengthen social reforms, but they will do so within the context of the existing political 
economic order. For Finn, the Biblical challenge of radical redistribution—described by the Year 
of Jubilee (Lev 25:8-17) and in the practices of the first century Jerusalem church (Acts 2:44-
55)—is to be held out as an ideal. Finn defends his position here by appealing to sin. While sin 
creates a temptation for the wealthy to exploit the poor it also tempts individuals to shirk their 
responsibilities to work hard if they were guaranteed an equal share without regard to work.453 
Despite the Biblical challenge of radical redistribution, Finn argues that there must be a better 
                                                          
451
 Finn, Just Trading, 36-45. 
 
452
 Ibid., 75-77. 
 
453
 Ibid., 55-56. 
 
163 
solution to the problems of inequality than simple redistribution. He does not discuss, however, 
what that solution might be. By arguing that “an adequate analysis of markets, whether a 
defense or a critique, must include an articulation” of its moral ecology he upholds the division 
in neoclassical economics between moral arguments and morally neutral markets.454 Having 
acknowledged the difficulties with the neoclassical model’s strict distinction between fact and 
values, between empirical and moral analysis, Finn then reinscribes them. 
Stackhouse also acknowledges the faults with democratic capitalist systems: structural 
inequalities; the hypocrisy of advocating “free trade” while passing protectionist laws; and the 
inconsistency of advocating for democracy accompanied with a manipulation of elections.455 
Stackhouse is adamant that all of this can be corrected by a robust public theology guiding the 
development of the global political economy. Public theology will create social change not by 
challenging the domination of the world economy by technocratic corporations and militaristic 
nation-states, but by transforming their ethos. There is no need to raise up prophetic protest 
against the crucifying of the weaker people of the world and the destruction of ecological 
systems which make life possible.456 Instead, one should concentrate on forming a new moral 
and spiritual basis of global institutions to create a more ethical economic globalization.457 
Wogaman notes a number of problems with free-market capitalism. He acknowledges 
that it has lead directly to the “exploitation of child labor (and of the labor of men and women), 
hazardous working conditions, dehumanizingly long hours of work, low wage, periodic times of 
depression with high unemployment, shoddy and dangerous products, ruin of the natural 
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environment, racial, religious, and gender discrimination.”458 The most serious failing of the 
free-market mechanism is that it allows free market processes to establish and set priorities, 
neglecting the “social nature” of human beings.459 Conceptualizing human beings as individuals 
and society as the sum of individual transactions leads to social inefficiencies (such as the 
inability to provide community wide facilities, highways, and national defense) and incentivizes 
cost cutting in ways that are damaging to people and communities (it treats harmful practices as 
externalities). Free-market capitalism, left unchecked, is destructive to human society and the 
ecology. In Wogaman’s view, these issues can be and have been successfully addressed by a 
mixed political economy, a system in which the economic order is subject to a political order: 
either democratic capitalism or democratic socialism.460 For example, while social discrimination 
on the basis of gender, race, or ethnicity has a long history in the U.S., Wogaman argues that 
“sweeping social revolutions changed all this in the twentieth century.”461 Government 
intervention sparked by democratic, grass-roots movements, such as the woman’s movement, 
labor movements, and the civil rights movement, have largely succeeded in restraining the 
worst practices of free-market capitalism. 
In contemporary debates within mainstream social ethics the biggest obstacle to 
constructing non-capitalist alternatives is the representation of capitalism as hegemonic.462 
While mainstream Christian social ethics acknowledges problems with capitalism—even 
identifying capitalism as source of exploitation, inequality, and dehumanizing conditions—the 
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only alternative it offers is a reformed capitalism. Thus, mainstream Christian social ethics 
succumbs to an “inevitability” syndrome. The solution to capitalism’s problems is capitalism. 
 
Alternative Economic Frameworks 
The more just and sustainable world political economy that mainstream Christian 
ethicists so desire cannot be built on a neoclassical framework. Conceptually, neoclassical 
theory defines the science of economics narrowly and builds on an untenable and reductive 
account that overlooks the complexity of human behavior. In practice, it has yielded massive 
income disparity, growing global inequality, social instability, and ecological devastation; it also 
overlooks over a vast array of economic activity. 
Fortunately, there is more than one way to theorize the political economy. There are 
non-capitalist forms of economic activity, both in terms of present practices and envisioned 
futures. One cannot conclude that capitalism is co-terminus with the political economy.463 The 
research of certain heterodox economists is uncovering evidence of these non-capitalist 
theories and practices. In short, their work has the ability to rupture the limits and open 
potentials in the economic understanding of mainstream Christian social ethics and provides 
insight into alternative frameworks of the political economy.  
 
Conceptually 
Conceptually, heterodox economics offers some crucial concepts that can help Christian 
ethicists make adjustments to their operative political economic framework (and thereby 
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achieve something like a prophetic vision). This subsection develops some conceptual categories 
that are sometimes underdeveloped in the social theorizing of Christian ethicists. 
The first conceptual insight is the recognition that the world is already a combination of 
capitalist and non-capitalist economic activity. Heterodox economists insist on the need to 
disrupt the portrayal of economic life as dominated by capitalist logics. A sampling of the wide 
variety of non-market based economic activities is listed above. Feminist economics in particular 
has paid particular attention to the variety of non-market-oriented, non-capitalist economic 
production that takes place within the context of the home (such as cooking, cleaning, and 
caring for children and elders).464 Some studies estimate that unpaid household labor and 
production accounts for 30 to 50 percent of total economic activity465 while other studies 
estimate that non-capitalist economic activity accounts for more hours of work per week in both 
rich and poor countries than hours of work performed for capitalist firms.466  
Unpaid domestic work and production within the household are significant examples of 
“economic difference,” non-capitalist practices operative in the world. Gibson-Graham, Resnick, 
and Wolff warn of the danger of portraying economic difference as “less significant, less 
productive, less world-shaping, *and+ less real” than capitalist practices.467 Gibson-Graham has 
named this dynamic “capitalocentrism.” Capitalocentrism values capitalist economic activities 
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over all other processes of production and distribution by identifying them “in relation to 
capitalism as the same as, the opposite of, a complement to, or contained within.”468 
Capitalocentrism treats noncapitalist economic processes “as obsolete remnants of a 
precapitalist ‘traditional’ economy, or as seedbeds of truly capitalist endeavor, or as ultimately 
‘capitalist’ because they involve commodification or markets.” Christian social ethicists should 
be wary of falling into capitalocentrism because it limits the moral imagination. 
The process of identifying noncapitalist economic activities and practices begins with 
recognizing that economic differences have been confined, naturalized, or integrated into 
capitalocentric discourse of political economics. Heterodox economists call for engendering an 
identity crisis in capitalism, relativizing it as simply one mode of production among many. 
Mainstream social ethicists, on the other hand, are caught up in a dualistic political economic 
imagination are unable to call forth any non-capitalist alternatives. 
The second conceptual insight is tied to the first; since economic activities are far more 
varied than imagined by neoclassical theory, a different, anti-essentialist, non-reductive, 
overdetermined approach is needed to theorize the political economy. Non-reductionist/anti-
essentialist theory rejects the notion of timeless, contextless, and universal determinants of 
social interaction—such as rationality and scarcity—as neoclassical economists tend to do.469 
Human nature and social affairs are understood to be the result of the interaction of complex 
and often contradictory economic, social, political, and natural factors.470 Non-reductionist/anti-
essentialist theory also asserts that the world is too complex to naïvely pretend, as neoclassical 
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economists do, that economic rationality explains all human behavior at every time and place, 
or that all choices should be made using only one criteria (the strength of desire) without 
reference to the validity of the desires, or that some aspects of human existence are ethically 
weightier than people’s subjective states.471  
Christian social ethics attempts to discipline social structures and realities in accordance 
with theological convictions, motifs, and systems of thought. It presupposes a theoretical 
formulation that approximates the essence of reality and draws on modern epistemologies that 
provide an absolute grounding for all knowledge as a mirror representation to an external 
reality. Reality is seen as a singular phenomena whose nature makes it accessible to theory. 
Thus, for Dan Finn, markets can be considered moral within the proper legal framework and 
under the right conditions. Stackhouse holds that if only the appropriate theological convictions 
were to underlie social processes, then society will be transformed. Each of these theorists holds 
to a rationalist epistemological position by which true observation of the reality depends on a 
true theory of the correct essence of social reality.472 This common epistemological position of 
knowledge as an accurate representation of a single external reality, as Richard Rorty and others 
have pointed out, is largely misguided and self-deceptive.473 
On a macro level, heterodox economics abandons the starting assumption that perfectly 
competitive markets are the norm.474 While the assumption of perfectly competitive markets 
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makes for an elegant and simplified world that neoclassical economics finds useful for analysis, 
heterodox economics holds that it is “neither intellectually or morally justifiable.”475 From a non-
essentialist perspective, the economy is the result of the complex interplay of factors, including 
existing cultural, historical, social, natural, and political ones, without prioritizing any of these.476 
The overdetermined approach to economics rejects the idea of a unified linear history of 
economic evolution towards some economic ideal. Instead, the economy is seen as contextual 
and contingent on a multitude of diverse forces “which together produced the particular sets of 
institutions, norms, behaviors and rules that govern economic behavior and outcomes.”477 
The third conceptual insight is the need to disrupt the focus on nation-states as the 
basic unit of economic activity. To articulate a decolonized vision of the political economy, it is 
important to critically examine the way in which orthodox economic theory has imagined the 
nation-state. The nation-state is marked in many ways with continuity with Euro-
American/colonial control. State normalizing theories assume that nations are isolated 
economically from the outside world, treating the nation as a natural unit and treating 
international trade, migration, and finance as additive elements.478 
For postcolonial heterodox thinkers, the nation-state represents a continuation of 
colonial/modernist control. Instead of the rigid and compartmentalized world of nation-states, 
Colin Danby envisions a world that moves beyond “state-normalizing modernity.” He ruptures 
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the notion of nation-states by noting the transnational economic activity that is already 
prevalent: the Hakka Chinese living in Calcutta but with business interests in China, India, and 
Canada; the Mexican elites who move assets on both sides of the border with ease. Households 
also earn income across nations: “Zambian men working in South Africa coal mines, Filipina 
women working as maids in Singapore, [and] a country like El Salvador with at least a quarter of 
its labor force earning incomes in the United States.”479 Given the deep transnational 
connections already present, Danby argues that treating nation-states as the basic unit of the 
political-economy is largely misguided. He develops an alternative model, called “constitutive 
openness,” which is more attentive to transnational and international links that are 
fundamental to certain domestic centers, such as export industries and import-dependent firms 
and sectors. 
Ultimately, Danby’s postcolonial heterodox economics troubles and problematizes the 
neatness of state-normalizing modernity. Orthodox economics assumes modernist nation-states 
and conceptualizes the world as a collection of such states.480 Danby opens the door to the 
possibility of moving beyond a state-normalizing modernity and effectively develops a picture of 
an integration and connected “migrant, overlapping, contested world.”481 Heterodox economics 
offers transgressive ways to think about the state, as a porous subject of both endogenous and 
exogenous zones.  
The lesson from postcolonial heterodox economics for Christian social ethics is that the 
contemporary configuration of nation-states is part of a deeper ideology of 
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modernity/coloniality rather than any form of social ontology. The arbitrary bounding of nation-
states as economic units masks the often unequal distribution of benefits derived from a 
country’s resources. The centrality of the nation-state in mainstream economic analysis 
reinforces the leveling of difference and portrays large numbers of people under a single 
interest, a technique that began with colonialism. Continuing to theorizing the nation-state as a 
primary source of resistance to the negative effects of global capital limits the moral imagination 
in terms of constructing regional, local, and communal sources of resistance.482 Decolonized 
moral visions must move beyond nation-centric economic theorizing by opting for economic 
theories that decentralize the nation-state in economic models in order to better capture the 
devastation visited upon the non-elite majority through neoclassical development. 
The last conceptual insight is a disruption of the idea of detachment in economics, a 
destabilizing of the fictive positive/normative split. Heterodox economists contend that the 
sacrosanct idea of economic as “science” is a modernist theoretical construction. Economics is 
not an objective, value-free science. Instead, all economic analysis is value-laden “to the extent 
that it is guided—implicitly or explicitly—by an approach to economic and social problems that 
combines issues of ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be.’”483 
Neoclassical economic theory rests on a set of normative commitments that 
mainstream Christian ethicists would find objectionable. Indeed, the normative objections to 
neoclassical theory are perhaps more damning than all the empirical, analytical, and practical 
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objections raised so far. But because mainstream Christian ethicists accept economics as a tool 
which is neither moral or amoral in itself, they have largely ignored its normative underpinnings. 
The set of normative commitments shared by neoclassical economists is called 
“welfarism” or welfare consequentialism.484 Without it, neoclassical economists would have 
little basis for adopting their positions about free trade and market economies.485 Welfarism 
derived from utilitarianism that assesses outcomes based exclusively on the subjective states—
the internal mental workings—of those affected by the outcome.486 Neoclassical economics is 
concerned with achieving “efficient” outcomes. An “efficient” outcome, one in which no one is 
made better off without making at least one person worse off. Consider a scenario described by 
DeMartino: 
assume that I walk into my classroom with $100 and distribute this money 
equally among my students. Once this distribution is completed, the situation 
that obtains is efficient in the neoclassical sense. This is because any one 
student can be made better off at this point only if at least one other student is 
made worse off (e.g. if I take money away from the second to give to the first) . . 
. What if, instead of distributing the money equally, I were to give all $100 to 
one student, leaving nothing for the others. Would this situation be efficient? 
Indeed it is, because the only way that one of the unfortunates could be made 
better off after the initial distribution is made is for me to take away some 
money from the lucky recipient, making her worse off.487 
 
This example makes clear that efficiency is not concerned at all with equity or fairness.488 
Whenever there is an efficient outcome of this sort, it is called a “Pareto optimality,” or 
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maximum social welfare.489 The goal of neoclassic economics is to maximize social welfare or to 
achieve Pareto optimality, which in no way implies that society is equitable. In fact, as the above 
example illustrates, a state of maximum social welfare is consistent with highly unequal 
distributions of income. Welfarism (seemingly) offers neoclassical economists a way to 
adjudicate between policy alternatives with reference to the purportedly positive concept of 
efficiency rather than value judgments.  
Why should the discipline of economics be concerned with efficiency and achieving 
Pareto optimality instead of reducing poverty or ensuring equality? Should economics deal with 
maximizing output given limited resources, or should it be directed at minimizing harm to the 
natural world while ensuring a sufficient level of sustenance? These questions begin to make 
clear that “the notion of economics as value-free is a value-laden fiction.”490 Value judgments are 
already implicit in the choice of initial assumptions, theoretical bases, and the choice of what to 
make the object of study.491 When Christian social ethicists accept the neoclassical vision as 
indicative of “economic reality,” they are accepting a questionable set of policies derived from 
normative choices about what constitutes economic reality.  
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Heterodox economists agree that the normative commitments of the neoclassical vision 
are morally bankrupt.492 DeMartino carefully parses out five objections to purported value-
neutrality of neoclassical theory, which when taken together seriously undermine welfarism. 
The first objection deals with the exogeneity of preferences. Neoclassicals assume that 
individual preference ordering remains unaffected by economic activity, a vital assumption for 
assessing the social benefit of economic outcomes. Critics point out that social culture, religious 
institutions, level of wealth, and other institutions are not innocent “with respect to the content 
of people’s preferences.”493 One of the chief economic agents, corporations, consciously acts as 
if preference ordering is endogenous. Why else would these corporations spend vast amounts 
of resources on advertising to induce consumer desires if preferences were merely exogenous? 
Preferences, DeMartino insists, are endogenous: they change as a result of participation in 
economic processes. 
The second objection is over the neoclassical tendency to mistake values for 
preferences. Neoclassicals use people’s preferences, based on their willingness to pay, as the 
basis for determining all policy outcomes.494 Critics argue that this is a categorical error. The 
strength of desires (preferences) should be tempered by the reasons for the desires (values). 
The neoclassical vision fails to distinguish between private affairs, with little or no social effect 
(like preferences for a blue shirt) and decisions involving values with “broad social (and natural) 
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effects” (like paving over wetlands to make way for a new mall).495 The third, closely related 
objection concerns the rejection of utility or preferences as the sole criteria for assessing 
outcomes. The neoclassical strategy bans interpersonal utility comparisons, or the comparison 
of subjective states. Critics affirm that the “capacity to avoid starvation” or “avoid preventable 
morbidity” are comparable interpersonally.496 Thus critics of neoliberalism would have little 
difficulty, for e.g., in demanding redistribution of $100,000 of a billionaire’s wealth for 
immunizations of impoverished people without reference to the psychic damage that this 
transfer causes the billionaire. 
The fourth objection is the agnosticism that neoliberal visionaries bestow on economic 
agents. This agnosticism shields the economic agent from having to account for her actions 
(they are simply rational) and the economists from the sticky business of normative evaluation. 
Critics reject agnosticism of people’s preferences, insisting that the reasons behind an economic 
agent’s desire should be brought to bear on assessing its significance.497 The last objection 
concerns the legitimacy of unequal resource endowments that are “convertible to inequality in 
other domains.”498 Critics recognize inequalities in the domains of “education, housing, nutrition 
and so forth” perpetuate and deepen inequalities in resource endowments. Unequal resources 
distribution is granted by unequal opportunities rather than by free choice. 
The political economy is complex. Economic modeling that requires excessively 
simplified and essentialized assumptions about society and humanity misses important 
information that is relevant to constructing a moral imagination. The positive-normative 
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distinction upheld by neoclassical theory is a social construction. Its models are based on a set of 
normative commitments that are designed to maximize social welfare, defined narrowly as 
Pareto optimality. Their policies might increase efficiency (though even claims to capitalism’s 
efficiency are under attack by heterodox thinkers), but they have little regard for equality and 
ecological sustainability. This makes neoclassical economics morally suspect, an unworthy 
theory for those concerned with developing a political economy centered on community and 
the common good. In choosing theoretical economic models, Christian social ethicists should 
choose models concerned with social equality and ecological sustainability over models that 
than focus on “efficiency” in the neoclassical sense.  
 
In Present Practices 
The representation of the economy as essentially capitalist excludes many other types 
of non-capitalist economic transactions. Household production, child-rearing, cooperatives, 
voluntary labor, and gift giving are just some of the economic activities that do not register 
within a capitalist framework. There are many, many other examples of non-capitalist economic 
activity, actually existing non-capitalist practices. This subsection examines such practices as 
models and proposals for reimagining the political economy by examining three sites studied by 
the Community Economies Collective (the Republic of Kiribati, the Latrobe Valley Community 
Partnering Project, and Mondragon). Community Economies Collective is a group of activists and 
scholars who are committed to envisioning and enacting just and ecologically-sustainable 
economic communities. The project is particularly concerned with community economies in 
which “the material well-being of people and the sustainability of the community are priority 
177 
objectives.”499 The goal of the collaborative is to bring together theorizing about conceptual 
possibilities based on “already existing alternative economies.”500 While the three studies 
highlighted below do not encompass all possible models of economic difference, they serve as a 
sample for the possibilities of real world economic experimentation.  
 
Community-Centered Economy of the Republic of Kiribati 
The community-centered economy of the Micronesian island state, the Republic of 
Kiribati serves as an example of unconventional notions of economic development and 
noncapitalist economic forms.501 Kiribati is comprised of 34 islands, including the Gilbert Islands, 
the Phoenix Islands, and the Line Islands, with combined area of 811 km2. All but one of the 
islands are coral atolls. Its population is about 100,000, with over half of the populace living in 
the capitals South Tarawa. 
 Kiribati’s economy embodies some of the noncapitalist elements that are discussed 
above. The country’s experience serves as a counterpoint to modern/colonial developmentalist 
notions of development from a Euro-American experience of industrial growth and capitalist 
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series of visits by 19
th
 century whalers and traders. Except for a few Protestant and Catholic missionaries, 
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expansion.502 The nation has managed to develop a stable economy based on independent 
subsistence farming, the sale of offshore fishing licenses, seafarers’ remittances, and a trust 
fund which plays a major role in stabilizing the economy and supplementing income flows. The 
nation’s trust fund does not operate according to capitalist logics. Initially funded through 
windfall gain from non-renewal resources (phosphate from 1900-79), it is now used for the fiscal 
support for the community. The fund administrators (a committee chaired by the Minister of 
Finance) are charged to act in the best interests of the people, rather than shareholders. The 
goal of the fund is not to maximize return or even to accumulate ever-expanding levels of 
wealth, but to serve the collective interest of the nation. All income generated by the fund is 
reinvested unless the government authorizes a drawdown in order to augment government 
revenue. 
Indicators of poverty and hardship that depend on income generating activity is less 
than meaningful in a largely subsistence or semi-subsistence environment.503 What does 
poverty, measured by income, mean when basic means of livelihood are provided for without 
money?504 More relevant indicators of well-being are life expectancy, access to health, and 
mortality (or death) rate. While data that is useable for comparison is not available for all these 
indicators, the crude death rate, the number of deaths during a year per 1,000 population at 
midyear, is 7.4 in July 2011 for Kiribati, but 8.4 for the U.S. While the death rate is only a rough 
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estimate of mortality, it is widely accepted as an accurate indicator of mortality impact on 
population growth. 505  
Kiribati provides an example of an economy centered on community interests (rather 
than individual interest), the very thing for which mainstream Christian ethicists advocate, but 
have been unable to imagine.  
 
The Latrobe Valley Community Partnering Project 
Like towns across the U.S., including Detroit, MI, the Latrobe area in Australia, a region 
two hours east of Melbourne, was once a bustling industrial town.506 It has served the electricity 
needs of the State of Victoria since the 1920s and developed ancillary manufacturing and 
services industries until the 1970s. But in the 1980s, the decision to privatize the State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria (SEC) led to a cascading effect of downsizing, deindustrialization, 
population loss, unemployment, and despair. Having witnessed the effects of the neoliberal 
agenda, Jenny Cameron and Katherine Gibson understood that orthodox approaches to 
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community and economic development, which focuses on attracting firms that promise 
employment, could not work. Instead, they developed an “action research intervention,” the 
Latrobe Valley Community Partnering Project.507 
Over a two year period, they developed four different community initiatives: the 
Latrobe Valley Community Environmental Gardens, Santa’s Workshop, the Latrobe Valley 
Community Partnering Project, and the Latrobe Valley Community Partnering Project.508 These 
initiatives were developed with members of the Latrobe Valley community in discussions about 
four challenges to common representations of community development. These “key ideas” are: 
1. Identify and build on assets already in place 
2. Diverse economic practices, guided by non-capitalist values and dynamics, support 
and sustain the economic world 
3. Community brings into being new and yet unknown identities, generated by 
difference and diverse of life experiences, not common identities, interests or 
locales 
4. “People with different knowledges and forms of expertise can jointly research and 
develop strategies for producing change in the world”509 
 
Each initiative fared differently, but each represented non-capitalist economic activity that could 
become full-fledged enterprises. Moreover, the project overall “revealed the richness and depth 
of skills and capacities . . . of those who had been marginalized by the SEC’s restructuring.”510 
Development that focuses on business growth and job creation through offering 
concessions and tax breaks has often hurt the long-term well being of communities. The asset-
based community development and action research experiment in the Latrobe Valley 
Community Partnering Project destabilizes that unitary paradigm and demonstrates the 
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potential of economic development on different terms. By foregrounding communities of 
differences, and through collaboration between professionals and those that have been 
marginalized, it produced rich tangible outcomes that surpass the scope of formal economic 
development. And it provides Christian social ethics with noncapitalist model for 
community/economic development.  
 
Rethinking the Mondragon Story 
Such economic innovations are not limited to the Pacific.511 The Mondragon cooperative 
of the Basque region of Spain contradicts Stackhouse’s insistence that the ability of capitalist-
style corporations in handling the complexities of production and distribution on a massive scale 
is inimitable.512 At the end of 2010, Mondragon had over 85,000 employees (88 percent of 
which are partners in the cooperative), 13.8 million Euros in total sales, and 33 million Euros in 
assets.513 The cooperative continues to expand its presence in international markets, with 13.3 
percent increase in 2010 over the previous year in international sales and 77 overseas 
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production plants, in countries such as Brazil, China, Russia, and India. No other Spanish 
industrial company has managed to achieve Mondragon’s size, financial diversification, or 
international scope.514  
Rather than the self-interested pursuit of profits that mainstream ethicists scorn, 
Mondragon’s activities are guided by the principles of democratic organization. All owner-
workers are equal members of the cooperative. The sovereignty of the workers, the 
subordination of capital to people, pay solidarity, and social transformation (the goal of creating 
a more just and free Basque society).515 When the cooperatives were first set-up, they sought to 
produce domestic appliances not already found in the region out of a commitment to an ethic of 
regional business solidarity.516 Since then, Mondragon has expanded its manufacturing in ways 
that have strengthened the regional economy. More recently it has moved into retail and 
service industries out of a desire to increase employment. In terms of pay, wages are 
determined through a democratic process, according to the principles of “equilibrio and 
solidarity.”517 Wages are pegged to that comparable to workers in neighboring industries to 
guard against the creation of a new wealthy social class. Differences in wages within any 
cooperative are set at a fixed ratio, most recently 1:6, between the lowest and highest paid 
worker. Profits are distributed into owner-worker saving accounts, “apportioned according to 
number of hours worked and salary grade.”518 Individuals have a right to draw on the interest 
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accumulated or to use their accounts as collateral for personal loans, “but the principle cannot 
normally be touched until they resign or retire.”519 Management of operations represents one of 
the clearest advantages over capitalist corporations. The cooperatives are “not burdened by 
layers of supervisors and managers who act as enforcers” and must be paid out of surplus.520 
Instead, each cooperative elects general members to four year terms on a council that oversees 
the day to day operations. The governing council meets before the beginning of the working day 
and then resumes their specific jobs at the conclusion of the meeting.521 
The choices of production, the process of setting wages, the handling of profits, and the 
terms and conditions of management all reveal a strong commit to an ethics of equilibrio and 
solidarity and a respect for the individual and collective rights of owner-workers.522 It is not 
surprising that Mondragon has been the focus of so much study from groups around the world 
who are interested in efficient business practices that emphasize cooperative and community 
values. Mondragon cooperative serves as a model for how to organize economic activity 
ethically that centers on community-interests and is free from exploitative labor processes.  
All of these examples represent diverse economies that are not dependent on the 
engine of global capitalism. They are community economies that are currently in place, 
operating according to values and policies that do not correspond to capitalist logic. 
Commentators have often framed these alternative spaces as ultimately beholden to or 
dominated by capitalist forces. Positioned as “alternatives” to capitalism, they cannot help but 
                                                          
519
 Matthews “the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation: A Case Study,” a paper presented at the 
International Communications for Management Conference on Executive Remuneration, Sydney, April, 
1997, cited in Ibid.: 143.  
 
520
 Morrison, We Build the Road, 214, cited in “Enabling,” 148. 
 
521
 Race Mathews, Jobs of Our Own: Building a Stake-Holder Society : Alternatives to the Market 
and the State (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1999), 199. 
 
522
 Gibson-Graham, "Enabling Ethical Economies," 154. 
184 
disappoint.523 The solution, as noted above, is to reform the story outside of a capitalocentric 
framing.524 Read instead as “local practices of economic experimentation” they open up the 
space for reimagining the political economy. It cannot be said, in the face of these community 
economies, that capitalism is the only alternative, and thus the ethical one. 
The goal of non-reductive political economics is not to force all economies to fit one 
model, but to insist that there are many local non-capitalist models through which to bring 
about human flourishing. In building sustainable, equitable political economies there are no 
fixed paths to follow, there are no off-the-shelf solutions.525 The process of combining Christian 
ethics with communal values will begin to create pathways to just and sustainable economic 
communities. Through this process, the decolonizing of the moral imagination is made into 
concrete, actually existing practices and institutions.  
 
Conclusion 
Mainstream Christian social ethics builds upon the framework of neoclassical economic 
consensus. Because of this framing, alternatives to “enlightened” capitalism are dismissed as 
utopian nonsense: capitalism is the only possible (and conveniently most moral) configuration of 
the political economy. Rather than examine the reasons for this commitment to such a narrow 
conception of economics, mainstream Christian social ethicists take it for granted that it 
represents the best of economic thinking, perhaps because it is the most prevalent 
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perspective.526 Finn cites Roger Hutchinson on this topic, who warns against insisting on a 
“‘framework for discussion’ which itself ‘predetermines the outcome of the debate,’” but 
ironically succumbs to this very error by failing to critically examine the neoclassical framework 
in his own work.527 
Christian ethicists might be forgiven for advocating reformed capitalism given that their 
research question is about the big picture. What’s the political economic system most in line 
with Christian values in every situation, for the whole world? One of the insights of this project 
is the recognition that this is the wrong sort of question. There is no one-size-fits-all form of 
political economy, or rather there does not have to be. What constitutes a moral political 
economy may have to be determined on a local and regional level, in conversation with 
community interests and values.  
Economic monism is evidence of the colonization of hegemonic conceptions in the 
economic terrain.528 The challenge to Christian ethicists is to read the economic landscape of 
economic difference, “populated by various capitalist and non-capitalist institutions and 
practice.”529 The goal is a counter-hegemonic theorizing that eschews the view of the political 
economy as essentially, unavoidably, capitalist.530 
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This restructuring of the Christian political economic imagination is a difficult task, for it 
means contending not only with colonized imaginations, but naturalized conceptions of the 
economy and long held beliefs about politics.531 What is needed is a non-reductive principle of 
social change, which recognizes that the unfeasibility of immediately implementing certain 
policy regimes does not constitute a sufficient warrant to dismiss these policy initiatives.532 
Certainly the kinds of policy changes necessary to create a more just and sustainable world 
require a deeper level of international cooperation and solidarity than is currently available. But 
it does not follow that the world then should sit on its hands. The politics of today must build 
cooperation and solidarity to ensure the possibility of implementing these policies tomorrow. 
The non-reductive principle of social change counteracts the passivity and immobility resulting 
from the portrayal of class oppression and capitalism as an all-encompassing phenomenon that 
cannot be challenged except by a unified global political movement, a movement that is unlikely 
to ever materialize.533  
Thus, the non-reductive principle of social change accomplishes several feats: 1) it 
provides a way out of the dilemma proposed by Gibson-Graham and the reform-revolution 
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dichotomy by producing a form of politics better suited to the overdetermined character of 
human beings and social structures; 2) responds to liberationists and radical social ethicists that 
reject out of hand “cosmetic” reforms, citing their inadequacy in bringing about revolutionary 
changes to our current institutions and global structures; 3) frees the Christian moral 
imagination to undertake the task of elaborating a moral vision that encourages piecemeal 
policy initiatives while still holding out for more comprehensive social transformation, without 
being constrained by the artificial intellectual constrains that are implicit within neoclassical 
thought.534 
Heterodox approaches sensitive to postmodern and postcolonial theoretical 
developments are more than just new configurations of the neoclassical model. In a sense, they 
represent a fundamental challenge to orthodox economic thinking.535 Heterodox economics is 
not generally interested in making the argument that it better represents the economy “out 
there.” Rather, it relinquishes the “‘mirror of nature’ view of knowledge” and emphasize the 
“constitutive, as against the representational, view of economic thinking.”536 That is, each theory 
of economics creates what economics is and does through producing a specific discourse. One 
particular approach to economics no more mirrors the “real economy” than any of the other 
existing theories with the discipline. 
The implications for social ethics are enormous. It opens up an ethical space for social 
ethicists to create new points of encounter across the disciplinary landscape of economics. One 





 “Postmodern” economics, Ruccio and Amariglio insist, is not a separate economic theory. 
Instead modern and postmodern approaches cut across each school of thought. Figure 8.1 “Modernism 
and Postmodernism in Economics” illustrates this nicely (Ruccio and Amariglio, Postmodern Moments in 






discourses of the economic world cannot be demonstrated as more objective than another.537 
Since there is no objective standpoint from which to evaluate, the social ethicist is free to chose 
the school of economics that best helps him or her to articulate a vision of economics and 
economic relationships that best corresponds to Christian moral theory rather the constraints 
and requirements of capitalism.  
The next and final chapter identifies some themes and concerns about which the 
conversation among social ethicists can usefully center.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND PROSPECTS 
 
The Argument Revisited 
The Problem: Modern/Colonial Limits of the Christian Moral Imagination  
The moral visions of mainstream Christian social ethicists fall within a narrow spectrum 
of political economic possibilities. Conditioned by their subject position within 
modernity/colonialism and committed to a neoclassical understanding of the political economy, 
they have largely failed to account for the multiple forms of oppression that form part and 
parcel of the capitalist political economy. While they write against neoliberalism—understood 
as an extreme ideological position which advocates for unrestricted free markets, the 
maximization of individual freedom, and unapologetic pursuit of self-interest—they argue that 
reformed capitalism can serve as the basis for a moral political economy, ignoring its 
exploitative, neocolonial arrangements. The form of Christian social ethics which reifies 
capitalism as the only viable form of the political economy is a Christian social ethics that deals 
death to millions of people. A political economy ethics in the trajectory of Jesus’ consistent life 
ethic would focus on life.538 But, as many social ethicists have recognized, instead of promoting 
life, capitalism focuses on industrialization, development (narrowly conceived), and growth.  
Mainstream Christian social ethics takes the orthodox, neoclassical approach as the only 
relevant way to conceive of the political economy, enervating the ability to imagine an economic 
                                                          
538
 In the gospels, Jesus never confronts people for wrong doctrine; but he often confronts them 
for the actions that marginalize and exclude people from communal life and thus bring social and literal 
death to people. 
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order that is intended to reduce the exploitation of one group over the other. Even when 
heterodox approaches are acknowledged (Finn), they are dismissed as secondary or tangential, 
unworthy of consideration. Instead of undertaking an analysis of the exploitative and oppressive 
practices that may flourish under capitalism, these social ethicists write about the “moral 
ecology” of markets (Finn), the spirituality of corporations (Stackhouse), or power of democratic 
processes to curb economic injustices (Wogaman). They claim that attacks against MNCs, 
market mechanisms, and the state are unwarranted, since all three have produced enormous 
benefits to humanity. Analysis of mainstream Christian social ethics of the political economy 
reveals colonized moral visions and a short-circuiting of moral imagination, whereby the 
conditions that frame the discussion impede the possibility for the construction of solutions to 
political economic problems outside of a moderated version of the existing state of affairs. 
 
The Solution: Embracing Latina/o Thinking and Economic Heterodoxy 
Part of the solution is to embrace Latina/o thinking. Latina/o thinking is not a nativist 
project, which rejects modernity, attempts to expel the colonizing other, and castoffs all things 
Euro-American because of their geographical origin. Latina/o’s existential reality suggests the 
method of Latina/o thinking: a people who embody the oppressor and the oppressed, the 
colonizer and the colonized. Thus, Latina/o thinking points to something much more difficult 
than a nativist project: a retrieval of the best of all traditions. The goal of this retrieval is not to 
create some sort of conglomerated ethnicity/culture/race, an artificial social location from 
which to theorize. Rather, it is a cross-border, trans-cultural, cross-social location that 
recognizes the horrors and atrocities of the past and insists on keeping exploitation before the 
mind’s eye both as a warning of what may happen if the least of these are forgotten and as a 
191 
guide for constructive theorizing. Latina/o thinking is a subversive epistemology that rejects 
entanglements with modern/colonial logics, such as patriarchy, anthropocentrism, and 
heterosexuality. It constitutes a border-crossing, transmodern, queering gnosis that explodes 
categories, invalidates binaries, and disrupts stability of the Christian moral imagination. It offers 
tools to question, rethink, and reconceptualize established ethical paradigms and point towards 
the development of a decolonized Christian political economic ethic.  
This leads directly to the embrace of the rich variety of heterodox economic views. 
Heterodox economics offers a multi-dimensional challenge to neoclassic economics’ claim to 
value-neutrality, theorizes economics itself through non-reductive and non-essencialist 
paradigms that better accounts for the complexity of the human person, and offers guidance for 
how to envision an egalitarian, just political economy. Envisioning a pragmatic and workable 
solution that is substantively different than the status quo is an important part of moving ethical 
analysis to a new level since, ironically, social ethicists, who have in a sense no problem in 
articulating dreamy eyed visions of an eschatological future, tend to reject as “impractical” or 
“unworkable” any solution that does not involved markets and corporations as the primary 
mechanisms of distribution and production. They have in a sense given up on the possibility of 
an egalitarian and just future for the politics of the possible. But the worst of it is that the 
“possible” constitutes an enormously narrow range: one that takes as self-evident the 
supremacy of capitalist structures and institutions. In order to construct decolonized moral 
visions, Christian social ethics must embrace, along with Latina/o thinking, heterodox economic 
thought. Latina/o thinking combined with theoretical suggestions and practical examples of 
economic heterodoxy, disrupt and destabilize the modern/colonial imaginary. Together they 
offer a more supple and flexible framework for constructing a Christian political economic 
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ethics, one that is responsive to plight of those most vulnerable in the face of the systems of 
domination and oppression of modern/colonial complex.  
 
Contributions of the Project 
To Christian Social Ethicists  
The project’s overall contribution to Christian social ethics is to call for decolonization of 
the way that ethics is done in terms of the political economy. The proposals in this dissertation 
suggest new possibilities that expand the options to engage political economic ethics, proposals 
that respond to and differ from the mainstream perspective. These proposals should free and 
empower other theorists to pursue their own projects, in political economy or otherwise, in an 
enhanced way. Within this broad contribution, this dissertation offers three specific 
contributions. First, the dissertation emphasizes the need for an examination of the underlying 
normative principles in neoclassical thought as part of Christian ethical analysis.539 As observed 
in chapter four, neoclassical economics is grounded in normative principles that Christian 
ethicists would find objectionable if these underlying normative principles were made explicit.540 
Christian political economic ethics that continues to take for granted the viability of neoclassical 
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 Finn is aware of the underlying normative commitment driving neoclassical economic 
thought. He makes the case that the efforts of some well-known economics already employ some form of 
moral commitment to sustain their arguments about the inevitability of markets. However, he mentions 
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economics as a basis for moral visions of the political economy builds on a framework 
incongruent with Christian concerns. The neoclassical approach is based on simplistic 
assumptions about human beings as self-interested, utility maximizing, self-actualized, rational 
individuals. Ethically significant categories of difference, such as race/ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality, and (dis)ability, are irrelevant in neoclassical theorizing and thus it is inadequate as the 
basis for Christian social ethics. A decolonized moral vision of the political economy recognizes 
these ethically significant categories and identifies human beings as epistemologically limited 
individuals-in-community, who base their decision making both on their own subjective 
perceptions of their goals; the social, psychological, and physical constraints they face; and their 
commitments and internal turmoil. 
A second contribution to social ethics lies in the deployment of postcolonial 
hermeneutics and tools as a method for articulating Christian social ethics. Religious scholars, 
such as Richard King and David Chidester, and biblical scholars such as Musa Dube, Fernando 
Segovia, and R. S. Sugirtharajah, have successfully deployed the insights of postcolonial theory 
and criticism to the fundamental questions within their field of study.541 In contrast, Christian 
social ethicists, with a few exceptions, have paid scant attention to postcolonial studies. As 
Kwok Pui Lan remarks, “this oversight is unwarranted, given the lengthy history of [Christian] 
theology’s relation with empire building, especially in the modern period.”542 Within the context 
of the ascendancy of U.S. imperialism, failing to attend to the collusion with colonialism in 
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ethical frameworks amounts to complicity with empire. Christian social ethicists should be 
concerned that if they continue along the lines of homogenizing colonial tendency, they increase 
the danger of becoming irrelevant to shaping a multicultural, multiracial, and polyphonic 
society. To the extent that social ethicists desire their discourses be more than academic 
production, that they play a part in shaping society and influencing social change, then they 
must do better than continue to perpetuate monocultural monstrosities on multicultural 
societies.543  
The third and related particularized contribution is a more careful analysis of political 
economy than is generally found within the liberationist strand of Christian social ethics.544 
Many liberationists have utilized the term political economy, and its cognate terms such as late 
capitalism, global capital, or globalization, without any precision whatsoever.545 They engage in 
prophetic denunciation of capitalism without a serious analysis of the normative basis of 
capitalist political economy or attention to non-capitalist forms of economic activity. This 
dissertation addresses head on the issue that haunts U.S. liberationist projects, which attempt 
to address oppression in various manifestations, but seldom address the configuration of the 
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totalizing complex which forms the context of these oppression.546 Thus, it offers a modest 
theoretical advancement to the on-going liberationist project by correcting the vagueness about 
the term “political economy” that plagues U.S. liberation theologies. 
 
To Latina/o Religious Cultural Studies 
The dissertation’s overall contribution to Latina/o religious cultural studies is the 
application of Latina/o thinking, which points to the work of U.S. Latina/os, Chicanas, and Latin 
America’s religious scholars and theologians, in decolonizing moral visions. It is the first major 
research project that attempts to articulate a Latina/o liberation ethics of the political economy. 
This general contribution can be particularized in two ways. First, the project moves beyond 
identity politics by applying the insights of Latina/o thinking to political economic ethics.547 
Latina/o thinking does more than just rethink categories of identity and politics; it shifts the 
locus of theorizing political economic ethics. Generations of Latina/o scholars have now 
attempted to articulate a critical religious theory and theology which reflected their social 
location and the experiences of racial/ ethnic prejudice and cultural imperialism. However, as 
has been noted by Miguel De La Torre, Gastón Espinosa, and Benjamin Valentín, among others, 
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these theories and theologies have for far too long been stuck in identity politics.548 This project 
moves beyond questions of identity, self-determination, and minority rights by addressing the 
questions of the political economy.549 Latina/o thinking creates the possibility of a general social 
theory and critique, not just a theory of a social minority. It moves beyond deconstruction of 
identities and dominant epistemologies to a critique of the political economic conditions which 
make imperialist and dominating epistemologies possible.550 Latina/o thinking ties the critical 
theory of Latina/o religious scholars to articulate an ethical standpoint that can guide Christian 
social ethics.551  
 A second contribution lies in pointing to non-capitalist theoretical tools for use in 
Latina/o religious cultural scholarship. U.S. Latina/o religious scholars and theologians have 
generally shied away from analyzing the inner-workings of the economy partly because wariness 
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of Marx. This eschewing of Marxism has little or nothing to do with the merits of Marxist 
analysis; rather, it is rooted in a complex set of socio-political factors.552 In that sense, Latina/o 
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fearing retribution and chastisement from the Church, have focused their writings on liberation from 
racism, cultural marginalization, and devaluation of identity rather than addressing the issues of poverty 
and economic injustice.  
 A second important factor that accounts for the persistence of a narrowly conceived liberation is 
the association of Marxism with the often-brutal governments in their homelands. As you know, many 
Latino/as came to the U.S. fleeing violent Marxist-inspired regimes in countries such as Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela, and Cuba. Catholic and Protestant Cuban theologians in particular 
strongly associate any form of Marxism with Castro-style so-called socialism. The Cuban perspective is 
significant because a disproportionate number of U.S. Hispanic theologians hail from Cuba. Justo L. 
González, Ada María Isasi-Díaz, Fernando Segovia, Orlando Espín, Roberto S. Goizueta, and Sixto García, 
some of the most prominent Latina/o theologians, are all Cuban. As De La Torre notes, in the religious 
milieu of the exilic Cuban community, anything short of an unequivocal distaste of Castro’s government—
equated with Marxism—constitutes treason. De La Torre explores the confluence of religious fever and 
political conviction in Miami’s exilic Cuban community, which he calls la lucha, in his book De La Torre, La 
Lucha for Cuba: Religion and Politics on the Streets of Miami. 
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religious scholars fall prey to the same capitalism or socialism dichotomy exhibited by the 
mainstream Christian ethicists. While these scholars intuit that there is something wrong with 
the capitalist system, they also are suspicious of socialism, and are thus unable to theorize 
alternatives economies. The process of seeing the political economy as something other than 
capitalist already breaks apart the binary and counters the argument that neoliberalism is here 
to stay.553 Heterodox economic theorizing makes clear that there are many other ways of 
conceiving of the political economy and allows theorists to engage in non-capitalist economic 
theorizing. The introduction of economic heterodoxy as an alternative way to think about the 
political economy empowers scholars by providing them with new analytical tools to combat the 
hegemonic conceptualization of capitalism as co-terminus with the political economy. 
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 Gibson-Graham’s observation that capitalism is discursively imagined as an undefeatable 
monster is very much alive in Latina/o religious thought. It may even be more prevalent among their 
theorizing than in mainstream Christian ethical thought because they see capitalism as the enemy. 
Whereas mainstream Christian ethicists think they can tame the beast, liberationists think there is no way 
to defeat the beast. 
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Prospects: Looking Forward 
The reading of mainstream Christian ethics presented in this dissertation suggests some 
lines of research and theorizing that will further enhance the decolonization of moral visions. 
Chapter four noted some crucial heterodox concepts that can help Christian social ethicists 
make the necessary structural adjustments to the economic framework operative in their work. 
Heterodox theory and the examples of present non-capitalist economic practices can potentially 
reinvigorate the moral imagination by opening ethical space to theorize the political economy 
outside the limits of the neoclassic vision. These heterodox ideas formulate at least a starting 
point for future conversation. The concern of social ethics is now to consider how to incorporate 
heterodox insights into their own work. 
At this point, a social ethicist might object, exclaiming “I am no economist, heterodox or 
otherwise.” But by tackling the political economy in their work, social ethicists have already 
engaged in the task of political economics. The question now facing social ethics is whether it 
will do its economics well or whether it will just take prevalent economic conceptions as given. 
In one way, social ethics is about drawing on the expertise of various fields around ethical 
questions. Social ethicists are jacks of all trades: they dabble, explore, and experiment with all of 
the social sciences and humanities. The call here is for social ethicists to do better in by drawing 
on the best of economics, the type of economic analysis that begins with the awareness of the 
exploitative nature of capitalism, its complicity with the modern/colonial complex, the physical, 
mental, and moral degradation that results from it, and its failure to deliver on its promises of 
efficiency, equality, and quality of life.554 The model of economics should also acknowledge that 
economic ideas are always value-laden and that economic realities are more complex than what 
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can be captured by reductionist and elegant mathematical models. It is a slam-dunk case: from 
this point on Christian political economic ethics that does not concern itself with economic 
heterodoxy is irrelevant. Beyond irrelevancy, this sort of ethics condones the current death-
dealing configuration of the political economy.  
A second line of research and theory around which Christian political economic ethics 
should proceed involves analyzing how to avoid the hegemonic suppression of subjugated 
knowledges. Latina/o thinking suggests one answer: to theorize from multiple places at once. 
Latina/o thinking always takes place from a subaltern perspective and well as (unavoidably) a 
perspective from within modernity/coloniality, unlike Mignolo’s “border thinking” which can 
never be a “form a territorial (e.g., from inside modernity)” perspective.555 However, Latina/o 
thinking is, like border thinking, a method for decolonization. As a critical practice, Latina/o 
thinking takes the deconstruction of the false contemporary consciousness as starting point. The 
goal is to move towards at least a dual perspective, one of which is a non-hegemonic local or 
regional history. A catalogue, of sorts, of one’s one local and/or regional history functions as a 
transforming initiative that just starts the process of decolonization and a historical anchoring of 
one’s production of knowledge.556 Engaging in this process of Latina/o thinking may be as 
straight forward as asking the question: what is the effect of this work on the subaltern, on the 
oppressed and marginalized of society? If the answer is “this work is concerned with broader 
issues,” or on the other extreme “much in every way: these changes will trickle-down to those 
on the margins.” the work has failed to consider the subaltern. 
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A third line of research and theorizing around which the conversation among social 
ethicists can usefully center is the enduring entanglement of history, culture, and political 
economy. Modernity and the capitalist political economy were born together with the 16th 
century. Both together led to the genocide of Amerindians, the enslavement of Africans, and 
annihilation of the culture, difference, and heterogeneity. The birth place of modernity, along 
with Eurocentric culture, was 1492, though, as Dussel notes, it gestated in the cities of medieval 
Europe.557 The lessons European nobility and clergy had learned in geopolitical control of 
conquered bodies, from lower aristocracy to free serfs and unfree peasants, yield enormous 
benefits in the control and domination on a global scale. The European cultural conception of 
history as a progressive realization of authentic humanity has collaborated with and contributed 
to violence of modernity/colonialism. Social ethics must contest and repudiate modernity/ 
coloniality’s long-standing history of strategically forgetting violence against non-Europeans or 
justifying it in the name of civilization and of portraying the perpetrators of violence as innocent 
and even heroic.558  
There may be a good reason that social ethics is ignorant of historical and cultural 
matters: this inattention to history and culture is paralleled by neoclassic economics. The static 
universality and rational-choice individualism of neoclassical economics excluded culture from 
economic theory.559 While history and cultural ideas and the analysis of culture have greatly 
influenced the humanities and other social sciences, neoclassical economics remains 
impoverished in terms of cultural analysis. It seems that social ethics has unwittingly adopted 
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this economic/historical-cultural divide present in neoclassical economics, impoverishing its own 
research. In any case, continuing to ask questions about the influence of history and culture and 
political-economics on one another constitutes a useful area of research.  
The final point concerns multi-dimensional analysis and the non-reductive, non- 
essentialist approach to social ethics. The decolonization of moral visions, as noted in chapter 
three, cannot be reduced to one dimension of life; it involves thinking broadly about social 
transformation, including epistemic and hermeneutical hierarchies. As discussed in chapter four, 
the non-reductive/non-essentialist approach refuses to reduce social interactions to a set of 
predetermined universal determinants: the social world is a complex interplay of cultural (as 
noted above), historical, natural, and political-economic factors. This “overdetermined” view of 
social world rejects linear historical narratives of the social evolution towards some ideal. It is a 
view consistent with postcolonial hermeneutics and Latina/o thinking. Decolonizing moral 
visions requires that Christian social ethics must reflect on how to capture this complexity in 
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